Garner v. Int'l Union
| Decision Date | 23 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-cv-01860-CMA-NYW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
| Parties | ERIC L. GARNER, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA UAW, Defendants. |
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the Motion of Defendant International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) to Dismiss the Complaint [Doc. 12][1] and the Memorandum of Law of Defendant International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [Doc. 13] (). The court considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order Referring Case dated September 3, 2021 [Doc. 10], and the Memorandum dated October 15, 2021. [Doc 14]. This court has reviewed the Motion, the associated briefing, and the applicable case law, and finds that oral argument would not materially assist in the resolution of this matter. For the reasons set forth herein, the court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The court draws the following facts from the Complaint [Doc. 1] and presumes they are true for purposes of the instant Motion. Plaintiff Eric L. Garner (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Garner”) was previously employed by non-party Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) U.S. (“Fiat”). [Doc. 1 at 3]. In July 2018, Mr. Garner filed grievances with Defendant International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (“UAW” or “Defendant”) regarding “labor disputes” with Fiat, “with the intention of seeking representation in collective bargaining with” Fiat. [Id. at 3, 4]. Plaintiff alleges that UAW failed to follow its established grievance procedures and failed to take appropriate action to respond to his “request [for UAW] to engage in representation with [Fiat] on [Plaintiff's] behalf.” [Id. at 3]. More specifically, UAW did not respond to Plaintiff's grievances until February 2020-two and a half years after the grievances were submitted-and responded only after Plaintiff filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). [Id.]. UAW's response stated that Plaintiff's grievances lacked merit and had been dismissed. [Id.]. Moreover, after the initial stages of the grievance process, Defendant did not maintain custody of the evidence that Plaintiff had submitted in support of his grievances. [Id.].
Additionally, Mr. Garner alleges generally that he filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that Fiat had discriminated and retaliated against him in the course of his employment. [Id.]. Mr. Garner asserts that he believes that “the only justification” for UAW failing to take any action on his grievances was his “interaction with the EEOC”-in other words, Mr. Garner alleges that UAW discriminated or retaliated against him for filing an EEOC charge against Fiat. [Id. at 4].
Plaintiff initiated this civil action pro se on July 8, 2021. See generally [id.]. Mr. Garner asserts two claims for relief: (1) a “[c]omission of [u]nfair [l]abor [p]ractices” claim under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (“Claim One”) and (2) a discrimination claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“Claim Two”). [Id. at 3]. Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on October 12, 2021, arguing that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 12; Doc 13]. In response, Mr. Garner filed two documents titled “Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Filed by Defendant[] ¶ 10/12/2021.” [Doc. 17; Doc. 18]. Because these documents were timely filed and do not exceed the page limits for a response set forth in the presiding judge's Practice Standards, see CMA Civ. Practice Standard 10.1(d)(1), the court considers these documents together as Plaintiff's Response. Defendant did not file a reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss, and the time to do so has lapsed. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d). The Motion is thus ripe for recommendation, and I consider the Parties' arguments below.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)). Nevertheless, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (). Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) ( that plausibility refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint, ” and that the allegations must be sufficient to nudge a plaintiff's claim(s) “across the line from conceivable to plausible”). The ultimate duty of the court is to “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
In applying the above principles, this court is mindful that Mr. Garner proceeds pro se and the court thus affords his papers and filings a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). But the court cannot and does not act as his advocate, Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to Plaintiff as to a represented party. See Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008); Dodson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 878 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012).
Defendant seeks to dismiss Mr. Garner's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 13 at 4-5]. First, UAW asserts that Plaintiff's Claim One should be dismissed because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. [Id. at 5]. Additionally, it maintains that Plaintiff's FLSA claim fails to plead facts sufficient to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). [Id. at 5-6]. The court addresses these arguments in turn.
The NLRA was enacted to “encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and [to] protect[] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 151. Section 7 of the NLRA establishes the rights of employees to engage in collective-bargaining activities, see 29 U.S.C. § 157, while section 8 defines the obligations of employers and labor organizations and defines which acts constitute “unfair labor practices” prohibited under the law. See 29 U.S.C. § 158. Mr. Garner asserts a claim under section 8, but does not set forth which subsection(s) of section 8 he believes Defendant has violated. See generally [Doc. 1 at 3].
UAW argues that Claim One should be dismissed because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. [Doc. 13 at 5]. Specifically, UAW asserts that unions “owe a federal, judicially-created duty - the DFR [“duty of fair representation”] - to the employees they represent, ” and “[a] claim for breach of the DFR is subject to a six-month statute of limitations.” [Id.]. UAW maintains that although the Complaint does not specify when the alleged violation(s) occurred, the last date referenced in the Complaint which involves UAW is February 2020, and because Mr. Garner's lawsuit was filed more than six months after February of 2020, his claim is time-barred. [Id.]. Mr. Garner responds that he filed an NLRB complaint in February 2020 “after being completely ignored by [the] union.” [Doc. 17 at 2]. He states that the NLRB “accepted the complaint even though it was past the statute of limitations” because UAW had never responded to or processed his grievances, which made the complaint “valid and relevant.” [Id.]. Plaintiff further asserts that, in April 2021, the NLRB “decided that [UAW was] liable for unfair labor practices and should be held accountable for such actions, ” closing [its] investigation in April or May of 2021. [Id.]. Mr. Garner states that he “has all documents, text messages, emails and witnesses to confirm such statements.” [Id.].
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant characterizes Claim One as a “DFR” claim, or a duty-of-fair-representation claim. See [Doc. 13 at 5]. Plaintiff's Complaint does not reference the duty of fair representation or allege a breach of any duty. See generally [Doc. 1 at 3-4]. Rather, Plaintiff expressly characterizes its claim as asserting a “[c]omission of [u]nfair [l]abor [p]ractices” under § 158(b). [Id. at 3]. But “as a general...
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