Garrant v. New York Telephone Co.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1992
• Citation: 179 A.D.2d 960,578 N.Y.S.2d 727
• Parties: Anthony D. GARRANT, Respondent, v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 727

578 N.Y.S.2d 727

179 A.D.2d 960

Anthony D. GARRANT, Respondent, v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Jan. 30, 1992.

Carter, Conboy, Bardwell, Case, Blackmore & Napierski (John F. Muller, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Maynard, O'Connor & Smith (Christine K. Krackeler, of counsel), Albany, for respondent.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and YESAWICH, CREW and HARVEY, JJ.

HARVEY, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Bradley, J.), entered December 21, 1990 in Ulster County, which, inter alia, denied defendant New York Telephone Company's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.

Plaintiff, an employee of Osmose Wood Preserving Inc., was injured on November 30, 1984 while installing utility line insulation to telephone lines belonging to defendant New York Telephone Company (hereinafter defendant) in the Town of Monroe, Orange County. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was standing on an extension ladder which was hooked onto the telephone line upon which he was working. Apparently, defendant also owned or at least co-owned the poles between which the line was suspended. The accident occurred at approximately 4:30 P.M. when the ladder became detached from the telephone line, causing plaintiff to fall 20 feet to the ground and sustain serious bodily injuries.

Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action alleging negligence and Labor Law violations. Following joinder of issue, plaintiff moved for summary judgment against defendant with respect to his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 claims. Supreme Court denied both motions and this appeal by defendant followed.

We affirm. Labor Law § 240(1) provides in relevant part that "[a]ll contractors and owners and their agents * * * in the * * * altering * * * of a building or structure shall furnish * * * for the performance of such labor [such safety equipment] as to give proper protection to a person so employed" (emphasis supplied). Defendant principally contends on appeal that his cross motion for summary judgment should have been granted because a telephone line allegedly cannot be considered to be a "structure" within the meaning of the statute. However, we find defendant's arguments to be far too limited in their scope as to the matters at hand. As this court recently noted, a telephone pole, because of its "attached hardware, cable and support systems", is a structure within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1) (Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 167 A.D.2d 732, 733, 563 N.Y.S.2d 303, affd. 78 N.Y.2d 942, 573 N.Y.S.2d 636, 578 N.E.2d 434). It is undisputed that the telephone line at issue was suspended between two telephone poles. Notably the word structure " 'in its broadest sense includes any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner' " (id., at 733, 563 N.Y.S.2d 303, quoting Caddy v. Interborough Rapid Tr. Co., 195 N.Y. 415, 420, 88 N.E. 747). Given the liberal interpretation to be afforded Labor Law § 240(1) (see, Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., supra, 167 A.D.2d at 733, 563 N.Y.S.2d 303) and the clear indication from the record that the telephone line involved here became a part of (or an offshoot of) the telephone pole "structures" to which they were attached (cf., Putnick v. H.M.C. Assocs., 137 A.D.2d 179, 185, 529 N.Y.S.2d 205), summary judgment in defendant's favor was properly denied.

Defendant's remaining arguments have been examined and found to be without merit. We disagree with its contention that Supreme Court should have found as a matter of law that weatherguarding is not an activity encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1). Defendant's own...