Garratt v. City of Philadelphia

• Decision Date: 29 December 1956
• Citation: 127 A.2d 738,387 Pa. 442
• Parties: Elizabeth P. GARRATT, Appellant, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, and Frank L. McNamee, Fire Commissioner, and Thomas J. Gibbons, Police Commissioner, and Paul D'Ortona, Chairman of Committee of Public Safety of the City Council, and Vernon D. Northrop, Managing Director of City Council, and James H. J. Tate, President of the City Council, constituting the Hero Award Committee, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 738

127 A.2d 738

387 Pa. 442

Elizabeth P. GARRATT, Appellant, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, and Frank L. McNamee, Fire

Commissioner, and Thomas J. Gibbons, Police Commissioner,

and Paul D'Ortona, Chairman of Committee of Public Safety of

the City Council, and Vernon D. Northrop, Managing Director

of City Council, and James H. J. Tate, President of the City

Council, constituting the Hero Award Committee, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Dec. 29, 1956.

Robert Cook Grasberger, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Thomas A. Masterson, Asst. City Solicitor, David Berger, City Solicitor, Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before STERN, C. J., and JONES, BELL, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.

BELL, Justice.

The Award Committee denied an award to the plaintiff, who is the widow of a City fireman who (under the pleadings) was admittedly killed on March 19, 1955, while fighting a fire. The lower Court sustained preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed a complaint in mandamus to compel the Award Committee to make the award on the ground that under the City Ordinance dated December 29, 1954 ¹ (1) the death which occurred must have occurred while fighting a fire, and (2) must have resulted from an heroic deed which involved a special hazard or risk. We cannot agree with the lower Court's interpretation of the City Ordinance which reads in material part as follows:

'An Ordinance Providing for the establishment of an award committee and for the payment of an honor award of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars to the surviving widows or dependent children or dependent parents of firemen, policemen and park policemen who lose their lives in the course of performing certain ² duties.

'Whereas, Firemen, policemen and park policemen, without fear or hesitance and in accordance with the highest ideals and standards of service daily risk their lives in the performance of certain duties on behalf of the citizens of this City; and

'Whereas, the City desires to encourage the heroic acts of these men and to give recognition to and honor those who give their lives on behalf of the citizens of our City; therefore The Council of the City of Philadelphia hereby ordains:

'Section 1. The Council hereby provides that the sum of ten thousand (10,000) dollars shall be paid to the surviving widow or dependent children or dependent parents of every fireman, policeman, or park policeman who is killed in the course of responding to an alarm, fighting a fire, apprehending a criminal, or in the course of performing an heroic deed which involves a special hazard or risk;

'Section 2. There is hereby created an award committee consisting of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Safety of the Council, the Police Commissioner, the Fire Commissioner, the Managing Director, and the President of the Council, who shall be the Chairman of the award committee.

'Section 3. The award committee shall have the power and authority to determine in each case submitted to it whether the circumstances surrounding the death of any fireman, policeman, or park policeman merit the payment of an honor award.'

The Ordinance further provides that payments shall be made only after written certificate from the Award Committee and that the awards therein provided shall be in addition to any rights or benefits to which the deceased's heirs or next of kin may be otherwise entitled.

The core of the City's interpretation which was adopted by the Court below, is that death must have resulted in every case in the performance of an heroic deed. This is contrary to the clear and specific language of the Ordinance. Section 1, which is the pertinent section which deals specifically with the question at issue, clearly and explicitly provides that $10,000 shall be paid to a surviving widow of a fireman who is killed in the course of fighting a fire, or in the course of performing an heroic deed which involves a special hazard or risk. 'or'in its ordinary usage and meaning clearly and undoubtedly means 'or'. 'Or' can only be construed to mean 'and' when to give the word 'or' its ordinary meaning would be to produce a result that is absurd or impossible of execution or highly unreasonable or would manifestly change or nullify the intention of the legislative body. Cf. Section 52, Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 46 P.S. § 552. Section 1 of the Ordinance could not be clearer; 'or' means 'or'; and 'when the words of a law are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its [real or supposed] spirit'. Section 51, Statutory Construction Act. 46 P.S. § 551.

If we consider § 1 in connection with the entire Ordinance--Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899--we arrive at exactly the same result. There is no merit in the contention of the City Solicitor that to construe the word 'or' to mean 'or' 'would produce inconsistencies and absurdities' in the Ordinance. 'Or', by any reasonable interpretation, considering the language of every paragraph of the...