Garrett v. Myers

• Decision Date: 27 January 1942
• Docket Number: 30194.
• Citation: 123 P.2d 965,190 Okla. 273,1942 OK 32
• Parties: GARRETT v. MYERS et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

123 P.2d 965

190 Okla. 273, 1942 OK 32

GARRETT v. MYERS et al.

No. 30194.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

January 27, 1942

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1942.

Second Petition for Rehearing Denied March 24, 1942.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The liability of an officer of a corporation for a fraud practiced by him which induces another to contract with such corporation to his detriment arises ex delicto rather than ex contractu, and may be enforced by the injured party in an action brought against said officer as an individual.

2. In an action to recover damages for consequences of a legal fraud the plaintiff may recover in addition to actual damages exemplary damages.

Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; George H. Giddings Judge.

Action by Nadine Myers and husband against Otis Garrett to recover damages for detriment alleged to have been sustained as the result of fraud. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed on condition of remittitur.

Leslie L. Conner, P. James Demopolos, and Frank C. Crouch, all of Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.

Clay M Roper and Herman Merson, both of Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM.

Nadine Myers and Herbert Myers, hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, instituted this action against Otis Garrett hereinafter referred to as defendant, to recover damages actual and exemplary, which they alleged they had sustained as the result of fraud practiced by the defendant who had induced them to enter into a contract with the corporation of which the defendant was president. The defendant denied all personal responsibility for the transaction; admitted he had induced the plaintiffs to enter into the contract involved but averred that in so doing he was merely acting as an agent of the corporation with whom the plaintiffs had contracted and that therefore his liability, if any, was merely that of an officer of the corporation and nothing more.

The essential facts as reflected by the record will be briefly stated. Defendant was president of the corporation which was drilling for oil and gas and other minerals in Oklahoma City. Said corporation had a drilling operation on lots which adjoined those of the plaintiffs. The defendant contacted the plaintiffs and informed them that his corporation desired to use the lots which the plaintiffs owned, and upon which they then had their home, for the purpose of erecting a slush pit and that if the plaintiffs would permit the use of their lots for such purpose that the defendant would move their house from the premises where it was then located and to any one of several other places which the plaintiffs might select and where the defendant owned the property and that he would give the plaintiffs a warranty deed to such new location; that plaintiffs appeared receptive to the offer so made and that thereupon the defendant took the plaintiffs to various locations which he represented belonged to him and that finally the plaintiffs decided to accept certain lots pointed out by the defendant and which were identified as lots 5 [123 P.2d 966] and 6 in Block 2 of Kenwood Second Addition to Oklahoma City and that thereupon the defendant conveyed the plaintiffs to the office of the corporation of which he was president and there drew up a contract in the name of the corporation and which he signed as president; said contract bound the corporation to move the house of the plaintiffs to lots 5 and 6 in block 2, Kenwood Addition, and to furnish the plaintiffs with free water and gas for use in said home and to give the plaintiffs a good warranty deed to the surface of said lots that the plaintiffs accepted such contract and thereafter the corporation proceeded to move the house of the plaintiffs to the new location and to furnish water and gas for a time but neglected to furnish the warranty deed to the surface and that as a matter of fact neither the defendant nor the corporation of which he was president had ever had any title to the surface of said lots which they or either of them could convey; that the corporation proceeded to utilize the lots which belonged to the plaintiffs for the construction of a slush pit and to destroy the premises for residence purposes and left the same in such condition that they could only be restored for use as a home site by the expenditure of a considerable sum of money; that the house of the plaintiffs instead of being removed to the place designated in the contract was moved to lots 5 and 6 in Block 2, Kenwood Second Addition, and of which property another than the defendant or the corporation which he represented was the owner; that if the owner of said lot would permit the plaintiffs to remove the house therefrom and back to the lots which the plaintiffs had formerly occupied that it would require the expenditure of several hundreds of dollars in the process; that in the moving...