Garrett v. Nissen Corp.
Decision Date | 30 June 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 9380,9380 |
Citation | 84 N.M. 16,498 P.2d 1359,1972 NMSC 46 |
Parties | Billy GARRETT and John D. Garrett, his father, natural guardian, and next friend, and John D. Garrett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NISSEN CORPORATION, an Iowa Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
This cause was certified to this Court by the New Mexico Court of Appeals pursuant to § 16-7-14(C)(2), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, 1970). Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant. We affirm.
Plaintiffs sought from defendant, as the manufacturer of a trampoline, recovery of damages allegedly resulting from grave injuries sustained by plaintiff, Billy Garrett, on the trampoline. Billy was a senior in high school on April 12, 1965, the day he was injured. The trampoline belonged to and had been used by the school for almost four years in its physical education and athletic programs, and particularly in the development of its gymnastic teams.
Billy became interested in gymnastics while in the eighth grade and over the years had developed into a skilled tumbler. He was a member of the school gymnastics team, had participated in six or seven meets, and had won medals in the State Gymnastics Meet for his skills in tumbling, free exercise and performance on the side horse. He worked on all types of gymnastic equipment such as the rings, parallel bars, horizontal bar, still rings, side horse, long horse and the trampoline. He began using the trampoline while still in junior high school and used it primarily in physical education classes and as an aid in perfecting his tumbling maneuvers.
The basic maneuvers of rebound tumbling are similar to ground tumbling maneuvers, and Billy learned to perform the basic maneuvers on the trampoline with the purpose in mind of similating the maneuvers in his ground tumbling. He had been bouncing on the trampoline for four years. Although he had not engaged in competition as a performer on the trampoline, he had above average ability in its use and was advanced in the use thereof far beyond what was taught in the normal physical education classes. In addition to the basic drops, he performed such maneuvers as a front flip (somersault), a back flip, a double back flip, a back flip with a full twist, a front flip with a half twist, and a non-and-three-quarter front flip. He had performed a one-and-three-quarter front flip about 20 times and had always completed it successfully. He performed it two or three times successfully on the date of the accident, but on his third or fourth try he failed to complete the maneuver and landed on his head on the trampoline mat or bed. This failure on his part was not occasioned by any defect in the trampoline or its capacity to properly propel him to the height required to safely perform the maneuver, but was occasioned by his failure in one or more of the following particulars: (1) failure to achieve sufficient height before undertaking to perform the maneuver; (2) failure to remain in the tucked position long enough to complete the maneuver; or (3) failure to tumble or rotate with sufficient speed to complete the maneuver.
Plaintiffs relied upon 9 separately stated points for reversal in their brief in chief filed with the Court of Appeals. In their supplemental brief filed in this Court, they have consolidated some of their points, have sought reliance upon Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971), and have attacked the decision in Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 217, 490 P.2d 475 (Ct.App.1971).
This Court in Stang v. Hertz, No. 9324, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732, opinion issued May 26, 1972, reversed the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 217, 490 P.2d 475, supra, upon the issue of 'strict tort liability.' The rule enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), as extended in our opinion in Stang v. Hertz, No. 9324, supra, is now the law in New Mexico. Thus, plaintiffs' several points relating to this issue of 'strict tort liability' have been answered and are no longer of concern in this appeal.
In their supplemental brief filed in this court, plaintiffs stated
This statement is predicated upon our holding in Williamson v. Smith, supra, that, for the reasons stated in the opinion, 'assumption of risk will no longer be a defense in New Mexico.' We disagree with plaintiffs' contention that the summary judgment was granted on the basis of the assumption of the risk by Billy. The trial court entered two summary judgments. An appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals from the first was dismissed. Thereupon the second was entered, and the appeal now before us is from this second summary judgment. In this second summary judgment the only pertinent finding was '(t)hat there are no genuine issues as to any material fact . . . and the defendant, Nissen Corporation, is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.' This is all that was required of the trial court under Rule 56(c), Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the State of New Mexico (§ 21-1-1(56)(c), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, 1970)). Wilson v. Albuquerque Board of Realtors, 81 N.M. 657, 472 P.2d 371 (1970).
It is true in the original summary judgment the district court made 'Findings of Fact' and 'Conclusions of Law' as the basis for the summary judgment. The finding of fact and the conclusion of law suggestive of the position asserted by plaintiffs were:
We do not read this finding and conclusion as support for plaintiffs' position that the district court entered the summary judgment on the basis of Billy's assumption of the risk. However, even if we were to concede the quoted finding and conclusion supported the position of plaintiffs, we are not bound thereby. We do not know why the district court made findings and conclusions in the first but not in the second summary judgment. The court may have been endeavoring to comply with that portion of the decision in Wilson v. Albuquerque Board of Realtors, supra, wherein we stated:
'(I)n involved cases where the reason for the summary judgment is not otherwise clearly apparent from the record, the trial court should state its reasons for granting it in a separate opinion or in a recital in the judgment. * * *'
We no longer adhere to this position, and the decision of this court in Wilson v. Albuquerque Board of Realtors, supra, insofar as it required the trial court to state reasons for granting a summary judgment in greater detail than as provided in Rule 56(c), supra, is hereby overruled.
We do, however, agree with the trial court that Billy was fully aware of the risks involved in using the trampoline without supervision. He fully appreciated the danger involved if he should fail to complete the maneuver and land on his head. He testified as follows concerning his ability to perform the maneuver and his appreciation of the danger if he should fail to properly complete it:
'A. Bob Smith and Coach Bailey.
'
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