Garrett v. Pennymac Loan Servs.
| Decision Date | 29 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-cv-00718 |
| Parties | JUNE GARRETT, Plaintiff, v. PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(CAPUTO, J.)
(SAPORITO, M.J.)
This civil action was commenced by the plaintiff, June Garrett, by the filing of a fee-paid pro se complaint on April 3, 2018. (Doc. 1). Garrett has asserted various federal and state law claims against a long list of defendants, all related to state court foreclosure and ejectment proceedings, a sheriff's sale, and her ultimate, forcible eviction from her home, located in Monroe County, Pennsylvania.
The matter now comes before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by seven separately represented sets of defendants: (a) Todd Martin, the Sheriff of Monroe County ("Sheriff Martin"); (b) the Chase Defendants;1(c) the PennyMac Defendants;2 (d) the Duane Morris Defendants;3 (e) the Delaware Defendants;4 (f) the Grenen & Birsic Defendants;5 and (g) the Federal Agency Defendants.6 (Doc. 20 (Sheriff Martin); Doc. 49 (Chase Defendants); Doc. 51 (PennyMac Defendants); Doc. 52 (Duane Morris Defendants); Doc. 58 (Delaware Defendants); Doc. 65 (Grenen & Birsic Defendants); Doc. 70 (Federal Agency Defendants).) In addition to dismissal, the PennyMac Defendants have moved for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
According to the plaintiff's pro se complaint, the plaintiff and her husband, Lundes Garrett, executed a mortgage agreement with Wachovia Corp. in August 2003. In August 2010, Chase initiated a foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property, naming only the plaintiff's husband. The plaintiff alleges that Chase did so based upon a fraudulent mortgage assignment.
In January 2013, the plaintiff alleges that Chase expressly released its mortgage lien on the Garrett's home as a result of a settlement agreement with various unspecified federal and state agencies. In July 2013, however, the plaintiff alleges that Chase resumed foreclosure proceedings on the Garrett's property, based on the same fraudulent documentation. The plaintiff further alleges that Chase subsequently assigned its mortgage interest in the property to PennyMac.
The plaintiff alleges that she filed administrative complaints with the Federal Agency Defendants, to no avail. The allegations of the complaint also indicate that she and her husband each filed for bankruptcy protection at some point during this process, and the defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct in some manner violatedprotections to which they were entitled under the Bankruptcy Code.
According to the complaint, the Garrett's property was sold at a sheriff's sale on July 29, 2016, and they were forcibly evicted from their home on March 28, 2018. In addition to being dispossessed of their home and real property, they were deprived of unspecified personal property left behind in the home.
The plaintiff seeks an award of actual, statutory, and punitive damages, plus costs and attorney fees, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. In particular, the plaintiff seeks an order to direct the defendants to return the plaintiff's real and personal property to them, to invalidate the deed of trust and mortgage lien on the property, and to quiet title in the real property in favor of the plaintiff and her husband.
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). A defendant may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in one of two fashions: it may attack the complaint on its face or it may attack theexistence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, relying on evidence beyond the pleadings. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Where a defendant attacks a complaint as deficient on its face, "the court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true." Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court may only consider the allegations contained in the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint; matters of public record such as court records, letter decisions of government agencies and published reports of administrative bodies; and 'undisputably authentic' documents which the plaintiff has identified as a basis of his claims and which the defendant has attached as exhibits to his motion to dismiss." Medici v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-2344, 2010 WL 1006917, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010). However, when a motion to dismiss attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations," and "the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. This case falls into the latter category.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Nor is it required to credit factual allegations contradicted by indisputably authenticdocuments on which the complaint relies or matters of public record of which we may take judicial notice. In re Washington Mut. Inc., 741 Fed. App'x 88, 91 n.3 (3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2018); Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
In her complaint, the plaintiff seeks to hold three dozen defendants liable for conspiring together to fraudulently and wrongfully foreclose upon and evict her and her husband from their home. She claims that this alleged conduct by the defendants violated her federal civil rights under the United States Constitution, various federal statutes, and the 2012 National Mortgage Settlement,7 and she further claims that it constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. She also asserts various state tort claims based on the same conduct. The Federal Agency Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Duane Morris Defendants have movedto dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The rest of the defendants have moved to dismiss both for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addition, the PennyMac Defendants have moved for Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff alleges that she filed a complaint with the Federal Agency Defendants regarding the allegedly fraudulent conduct of the other defendants. Based on the apparent inaction of the Federal Agency Defendants in response to her complaint, she alleges that the Federal Agency Defendants were participants in a conspiracy with the other defendants to defraud the plaintiff and her husband, and that the National Mortgage Settlement was "nothing but a diversion tactic designed to camouflage the real [theft] of property." (Doc. 1 ¶ 75.)
The Federal Agency Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that, as federal agencies, they are entitled to sovereign immunity from suit.
As the Third Circuit has summarized:
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States "is immune from suit save as it consents to besued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." "A waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and will not be implied."
Cooper v. Comm'r, 718 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2013) () (citations omitted). "Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); see also Clark v. Wells Fargo Bank, 585 Fed. App'x 817, 819-20 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (); Albrecht v. Comm. on Emp. Benefits of Fed. Reserve Emp. Benefits Sys., 357 F.3d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (); Rodriguez v. Bank of America, N.A., Civil No. 16-8197 (RBK/AMD), 2017 WL 3086369, at *5 (D.N.J. July 20, 2017) (same).
As noted above, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at...
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