Garrett v. State

• Decision Date: 25 April 1974
• Citation: 320 A.2d 745
• Parties: John E. GARRETT, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. The STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 745

320 A.2d 745

John E. GARRETT, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. The STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

April 25, 1974.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Jack B. Jacobs ^* of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, and James F. Kipp ^* of Becker & Kipp, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.

Richard R. Wier, Jr., State Prosecutor, and Joseph A. Hurley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.

Before HERRMANN, C.J., and CAREY and DUFFY, JJ.

HERRMANN, Chief Justice:

In this murder case, the defendant entered separate pleas of 'not guilty' and 'not guilty by reason of mental illness'. The defendant made pretrial application for bifurcated trial of the defense of mental illness. At trial, the defendant sought a jury instruction upon the consequences to the defendant of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness. ¹ Both applications were denied. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. This appeal brings up for review the propriety of the denial of those applications.

I.

The defendant claimed amnesia from the outset of defense counsel's efforts on his behalf; authorization for psychiatric examination was obtained. Early in the pretrial proceedings, defense counsel moved for bifurcated trial of the issue of not guilty by reason of mental illness. In support of the motion, the information presented to the Court was limited to the following: the defendant had been examined by an eminent psychiatrist under the Court's authorization; that, based upon his examination of the defendant, the psychiatrist would testify that, assuming that the defendant committed the offense, he was mentally ill at the time; that, by reason of amnesia and the unavailability of any concrete evidence to the contrary, the defendant intended to dispute the State's contention that he committed the offense and to rely upon his presumption of innocence; that the defendant's evidence bearing on the mental illness issue would be 'severely prejudicial to his contention of innocence' not only because of inherent inconsistency but also for the following reasons:

'Even more prejudicial than the aforementioned inconsistency will be the intermingling of evidence of insanity with evidence of guilt. Although defendant hesitates to divulge the specifics of his insanity defense (although he is willing to disclose this to the Court In camera), he represents that crucial to the sanity defense will be evidence that he pled guilty in 1966 to a charge of manslaughter in the death of his mother, after committing incestuous relations with her. Although such evidence is irrelevant to the issue of guilt of an alleged crime committed in 1972, it will be extremely, if not fatally, prejudicial to defendant if introduced by defendant in a 'unitary' proceeding, since it will tend to show that defendant, having committed homicide, is capable of committing the same act again.

'In addition, defendant believes that the State will attempt to introduce into evidence at the trial, photographs of the victim's severely mutilated body. The defense will oppose such attempted introduction of the photographs as evidence of his guilt, because such photographs are prejudicial in the highest degree. Yet, as proof of defendant's insanity, the defense itself might be required to introduce such photographs as a foundation for the testimony of its psychiatric expert. If introduced in the same hearing before the same jury, the photographs will greatly prejudice and jeopardize defendant's primary defense of innocence.'

As to the substantiality of any defense other than mental illness, the showing made in support of the pretrial motion for bifurcated trial was limited to the following:

'Although discovery has been taken pursuant to Criminal Rule 16, and although defense counsel have undertaken independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding the victim's death, nothing has developed thus far which links the defendant to Mrs. Mack's death or which tends to incriminate defendant of first degree murder. Defendant himself claims to have no memory of what occurred during a certain period on the night of the killing. For that reason, defendant intends to, and indeed must, dispute the State's contention that he murdered Mrs. Mack. At the present time, this defense is substantial, as is the alternative defense that defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity.'

The Trial Judge denied the pretrial motion for bifurcation.

At the commencement of the trial, the motion was renewed; upon being informed by defense counsel that they had nothing new or different to offer in support of the motion, the Trial Judge adhered to his prior ruling. In opening to the jury at the commencement of the trial, defense counsel's remarks were limited to the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof. By agreement, during the State's case-in-chief there was no reference to the defendant's personal history or to the defense of mental illness; the defense limited itself to the credibility of the State's witnesses. The defendant's case at the trial was limited to the defense of mental illness; the defendant did not take the stand to deny commission of the offense; no other defense, except the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof, was interposed. The defense summation to the jury at the close of the trial was limited to brief reference to the merits of the State's case ² and the remainder was addressed to the defense of mental illness.

II.

Upon this appeal, the defendant contends that denial of bifurcated trial of the defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness constituted abuse of judicial discretion.

Whether a bifurcated trial ³ of the issues of mental illness is to be allowed in a criminal case lies within the sound judicial discretion of the Trial Judge. Simpson v. State, Del.Supr., 275 A.2d 794 (1971). Looking to the line of cases cited in Simpson, we find that the exercise of such discretion is governed by the showing made to the Trial Judge, at the time of the application for bifurcation, ⁴ as to the substantiality not only of the mental illness defense ⁵ but also of any defense to be proffered on the merits. When such substantial defenses are demonstrated upon the application for bifurcation, and it is shown that either may be prejudiced by the other in a simultaneous trial, judicial discretion should dictate bifurcation. Contee v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 410 F.2d 249 (1968); ⁶ Parman v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 399 F.2d 559 (1968); Washington v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 419 F.2d 636 (1969); United States v. Bennett, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 364, 460 F.2d 872 (1972); United States v. Carlson, 9 Cir., 423 F.2d 431 (1970). But in the absence of a showing of some substantial defense on the merits, in addition to a timely showing of a substantial defense of mental illness, prejudice and abuse of discretion will not ordinarily appear in the denial of bifurcation. Harried v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 389 F.2d 281 (1967); United States v. Grimes, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 184, 421 F.2d 1119 (1969).

In the instant case, there was no showing of a substantial defense on the merits. The defendant did not deny commission of the offense at any stage. Except for the mental illness defense, the defendant relied wholly upon the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Mere reliance on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof, without more, is not a 'substantial' defense calling for the exercise of discretion under the bifurcation rule. See Harried v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 389 F.2d 281 (1967). ⁷

We cannot say, therefore, that there was an abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of a bifurcated trial of the issue of mental illness in this case.

III.

The defense requested that the jury be instructed, by reference to 11 Del.C. § 4702, that if the defendant were found not guilty by reason of mental illness, the result would not be release, but confinement in the State Hospital until he was declared no longer dangerous to the public. The Trial Judge denied the request, stating as the reason:

'The Court is not sure exactly what would ultimately happen to the defendant if he were found not guilty by reason of mental illness, and, therefore, it would be very difficult to instruct the jury in what would happen under such circumstances, remembering that the authority that would have charge of the defendant's custody is the authority from which persons have testified that they believed him to be sane at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.'

This appeal raises the question of whether the denial of the requested instruction constituted deprivation of due process. In support of this ground, we are referred to Lyles v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 254 F.2d 725 (1958).

The rationale of Lyles in this: jurors, like others, are aware of the meanings and consequences of verdicts of 'guilty' and 'not guilty'. It is common knowledge that a verdict of 'not guilty' means that a defendant goes free and that a verdict of 'guilty' means that he is subject to such punishment as the court shall impose. But a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of mental illness' has no such commonly understood meaning. It means neither freedom nor punishment. The jury is entitled to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts. Such understanding might avoid possible jury bias against a mentally ill defendant it mistakenly thinks would be released from custody upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness.

The Lyles rationale and rule have been adopted in several jurisdictions. See ...