Garrett v. Works

• Citation: 56 N.E. 667,154 Ind. 319
• Parties: GARRETT v. BISSELL CHILLED PLOW WORKS.
• Decision Date: 09 March 1900
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

154 Ind. 319

56 N.E. 667

GARRETT

v.BISSELL CHILLED PLOW WORKS.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 9, 1900.

Appeal from circuit court, St. Joseph county; Lucius Hubbard, Judge.

Action by Orlando Garrett against the Bissell Chilled Plow Works. From an order sustaining defendant's demurrer to complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

George G. Feldman, for appellant. Anderson & Dushane and Will G. Crabill, for appellee.

MONKS, J.

This appeal is from a judgment in favor of appellee on demurrer to appellant's complaint for libel. The complaint was in two paragraphs, which were substantially the same, and predicated upon the following letter: “Office of Bissell Chilled Plow Works, South Bend, Ind., May 15, 1897. Mr. M. J. Bufanger, Granger, Ind.-Dear Sir: The plow that Mr. Garrett used is ours, and, if you will deliver it to E. F. Rhoades, he will try and sell it for us; or, if you can sell it for $30.00, we will give you $5.00 for selling it. If you will send us a draft for $25.00, you may have the plow. Truly yours, Bissell Chilled Plow Works. E. C. Westervelt, Pres. & Treas.” It is admitted by appellant in his brief that the letter is not libelous per se. The part upon which he predicated his right to recover reads as follows: “The plow that Mr. Garrett used is ours.” Unless the extraneous matter set forth by way of inducement makes the letter libelous, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. It is alleged in the first paragraph of complaint, by way of inducement, that appellant is, and has been for many years, a resident of St. Joseph county, Ind., and has had, and still has, control of a farm in said county, which was farmed by himself and his tenants; that for some time prior to the delivery of said letter to said Bufanger he had owned a riding plow, which he had used on his farm, and which he had sold for $45 to said Bufanger, to whom he had rented said farm. From these allegations, considered in connection with the statement in said letter, “the plow that Mr. Garrett used is ours,” the inference drawn by appellant, and alleged in said first paragraph of complaint, was that appellee thereby charged that appellant was guilty of the crime of embezzlement, had feloniously appropriated and converted property of appellee to his own use, was guilty of obtaining money and property under false pretenses and by false representations, and of feloniously, wrongfully, and unlawfully disposing of defendant's property. It is the office of the innuendo to explain, not to extend or enlarge, the meaning of the words. An innuendo cannot aver a fact or change the ordinary meaning of language. If words not libelous per se are charged, the absence of inducement showing by extrinsic matter that said words are actionable is not supplied by an innuendo attributing to those words a meaning which renders them actionable. Hays v. Mitchell, 7 Blackf. 117;Stucker v. Davis, 8 Blackf. 414;Harper v. Delp, 3 Ind. 225, 231, 232, and cases cited; Wood v. Colyhan, 30 Ind. 395;Hart v. Coy, 40 Ind. 553Rock v. McClarnon, 95 Ind. 415;Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430; Townsh. Sland. & L. §§ 335, 336; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 465, 466; 13 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 51-54. Words are to be understood in their plain and natural import, according to the idea they are calculated to convey to those to whom they...