Garrick v. Moody Bible Inst.

• Decision Date: 13 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18 C 573,18 C 573
• Citation: 494 F.Supp.3d 570
• Parties: Janay E. GARRICK, Plaintiff, v. MOODY BIBLE INSTITUTE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

494 F.Supp.3d 570

Janay E. GARRICK, Plaintiff,

v.MOODY BIBLE INSTITUTE, Defendant.

No. 18 C 573

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed October 13, 2020

Janay E. Garrick, Tallahassee, FL, pro se.

Christian Mark Poland, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN Z. LEE, United States District Judge

Moody Bible Institute ("Moody"), a religious educational institution, hired Janay Garrick to teach courses in secular subjects. During her tenure at Moody, Garrick encountered what she viewed as rampant gender discrimination and harassment. When Garrick complained, Moody fired her, claiming that she was a bad fit because she disagreed with certain aspects of its faith.

Believing that Moody invoked religious differences as a pretext for terminating her, Garrick brought this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. In particular, Garrick accuses Moody of nurturing a hostile work environment (Count I), engaging in gender discrimination (Counts II and III), and retaliating against her (Count IV). Moody has moved to dismiss, relying upon the applicable statute of limitations as well the rights to religious autonomy enshrined in the First Amendment. For the reasons below, the Court concludes that the statute of limitations does not bar Garrick's claims at this stage. As for the First Amendment, the Court holds that Garrick's claims—which turn, in large part, on whether the religious reasons that Moody gave for Garrick's termination were pretextual—do not impermissibly intrude upon Moody's religious rights. Even so, the Court also finds that Garrick fails to plead a hostile work environment. Accordingly, Moody's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background ¹

This factual and procedural summary assumes familiarity with the Court's prior orders, especially the September 25, 2019, Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing Garrick's first amended complaint. See ECF No. 91 (the "September 25 Order"). To review, Moody is a post-secondary religious educational institution that accepts federal aid. 2d Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶¶ 1, 3, ECF No. 98. Moody subscribes to a "complementarian" doctrine that forbids women from acting as religious leaders. Id. ¶¶ 80, 85.

Garrick holds a Master's degree in cross-cultural studies and a Bachelor's degree in creative writing and speech communications. Id. ¶ 18. She identifies as an "egalitarian Christian" and believes in gender equality in the ministry. Id. ¶ 20. Between 2014 and 2017, Garrick worked at Moody as an Instructor of Communications. Id. ¶ 19. Garrick advised Moody about her egalitarian beliefs before it hired her. Id. ¶ 20.

Throughout her time at Moody, Garrick experienced what she characterizes as pervasive gender discrimination. Garrick's thirty-page complaint catalogs dozens of allegedly discriminatory acts. For example, Moody adhered to its complementarian creed by barring Garrick from speaking during religious services. Id. ¶ 30. And, although Garrick has been ordained as a minister, Moody instructed her to remove that designation from her resume because "the office of pastor is reserved exclusively for male candidates." Id. ¶ 25.

Garrick also reports that Moody subjected women who taught secular courses to worse treatment than their male counterparts. For one thing, Moody staffed prestigious academic departments with men, leaving women to fill less valued roles. Id. ¶ 26. For another, Moody expected Garrick to teach more courses and undergo more searching performance reviews than similarly-situated men. Id. ¶¶ 31(b)–(c), 33.

The administrators were not the only ones who treated women differently at Moody. When Garrick entered the faculty workroom, male professors would avoid making eye contact with her and then leave the room. Id. ¶ 35(a). On one occasion, her male colleagues suggested that women are unable to understand basic employment documents. Id. ¶ 35(b). On another, a male professor criticized Garrick's clothes, saying that she looked like a student. Id. ¶ 35(c). Based on these and other incidents, Garrick repeatedly complained to her supervisor that she faced a hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 77.

Two years after she was hired, Moody informed Garrick that it was unlikely to renew her contract as a result of "performance and interpersonal issues." Id. ¶ 79(c). Moody fired Garrick a few weeks later. Id. ¶¶ 85, 86. In doing so, it claimed that she was "not aligned with [its] doctrinal statement as it related to gender roles in ministry." Id. ¶¶ 85, 96. Garrick believes that this explanation is "pretext," and that Moody actually fired her because she is a woman who raised concerns about gender discrimination. Id. ¶¶ 89, 96–97.

Soon after Garrick initiated this lawsuit, her counsel withdrew. See 10/3/18 Order, ECF No. 44. Proceeding pro se , Garrick filed an amended complaint asserting that Moody's conduct violated Title VII, Title IX, and the parties’ employment agreement. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 66. Upon motion by Moody, this Court dismissed the Title IX and breach of contract claims with prejudice, but permitted Garrick to replead the Title VII claims. See September 25 Order at 21. Now before the Court is Moody's motion to dismiss Garrick's second amended complaint asserting Title VII claims anew.

II. Legal Standards

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Additionally, when considering motions to dismiss, the Court accepts "all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park , 734 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013) ).

At the same time, "allegations in the form of legal conclusions are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. , 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). As such, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Courts also construe pro se complaints liberally. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007).

III. Analysis

Moody contends that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety on three grounds: (1) the statute of limitations, (2) Title VII's exemption for religious organizations, and (3) the First Amendment principles protecting religious autonomy. In the alternative, Moody submits that Garrick has failed to adequately plead her retaliation, hostile work environment, and class action claims.² The Court begins by analyzing Moody's objections to Garrick's Title VII claims as a whole, and then turns to its arguments challenging each of the specific Title VII claims.

A. The Statute of Limitations

Moody first argues that all of Garrick's Title VII claims are time-barred. To pursue a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") soon after the allegedly discriminatory conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). If the employee "initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency," a 300-day limitations period applies to that charge. Id. Otherwise, the claimant must contact the EEOC within 180 days. Id.

At this stage, the Court cannot determine from the record whether the 180-day or 300-day limit should govern this case. Because Garrick's complaint and response brief make no mention of proceedings before a state or local agency, Moody says that she has implicitly conceded that the shorter period applies. But the statute of limitations only justifies dismissal when a complaint "unambiguously establish[es] all elements of th[at] [affirmative] defense." Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd. , 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016). And, especially considering Garrick's pro se status, her silence cannot be construed as an unambiguous admission that the 180-day limit controls. Thus, at the pleading stage, the Court will allow Garrick to raise allegations of discriminatory conduct that occurred after March 11, 2017 (300 days before she filed a charge with the EEOC). SAC ¶ 6.

That constrains the scope of Garrick's claims, but does not foreclose them altogether. To be sure, many of the employment actions detailed in the complaint took place before March 11, 2017. But Garrick's firing took place thereafter, on April 17, and thus well within the 300-day period.³ SAC ¶ 86. Accordingly, to the extent that Garrick wishes to pursue gender discrimination and retaliation claims premised upon her termination, Defendant's motion to dismiss those claims based upon the statute of limitations is denied.⁴

Garrick's hostile work environment claim survives Moody's statute of limitations argument for different reasons. Unlike other types of Title VII claims, "[a] hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) ). So, if "an[y] act contributing to the [hostile work environment] claim occurs within the filing period," then "the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered." Id.

Here, rather than attributing the alleged harassment to a particular event on a particular date, Garrick depicts an ongoing course of conduct. See,...