Garrick v. Tidwell, 2045.

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Citation: 106 S.E. 551,151 Ga. 294
• Docket Number: 2045.
• Parties: GARRICK ET AL. v. TIDWELL.
• Decision Date: 16 February 1921

106 S.E. 551

151 Ga. 294

GARRICK ET AL. v. TIDWELL.

No. 2045.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 16, 1921

Judgment Adhered to March 5, 1921.

Error from Superior Court, Meriwether County; John D. Humphries Judge.

Action by Mrs. Claudia Tidwell against George W. Garrick and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

Beck P.J., and George, J., dissenting in part. The grounds of motion for new trial were in part as follows:

(4) Because upon the trial of said case the court erred in illegally withholding from the jury against the demand of the movants the following material evidence offered by them, to wit: The testimony of George W. Garrick as a witness, as follows: "While going from my house to Mr. Bowers' I told her [[[Mrs. Claudia Tidwell, plaintiff] about this contract between me and Mr. Tidwell. I told her about the contract me and Mr. Tidwell had; that I was to give six bales of cotton for the place as long as he lived, and she told me she understood it--says: 'Everything is all right.' That's exactly what she told me; that I need not fear narry moment of my life; that it was all right. I told her the whole contract." The court then and there permitted this witness to testify in this connection to the following disjointed, as movants contend, sentences and phrases covered in the above recital of this witness: "She told me she understood it. Everything is all right; that I need not fear narry moment of my life." All the remaining portion of said testimony was excluded and rejected by the court, which was illegal and error. The court permitted this witness to testify in this connection what Mrs. Tidwell said and stated in the conversation referred to, but refused and rejected that portion of the testimony which consisted of statements made by the witness Garrick to Mrs. Tidwell in the conversation, and in so ruling and holding the court committed error, and made it impossible for the disconnected statements made by Mrs. Tidwell in the conversation to show any intelligence or to convey any information to the court and jury, and in so rejecting the statements made by Garrick the witness, completely destroyed the sense, force, and effect of said testimony. This examination was by defendant's counsel.

(5) Because the court committed error in refusing to allow the witness George W. Garrick, introduced by the defendants, to testify as follows: "I have built barns and stables; I think about eight stables, cribs, smokehouse, and grain and seed houses; two-story building, where I could put it up stairs, at my own expense. I set out the orchard. I did all that was done about the terrace. I terraced on the place all that it needed. I put all the ditches there. I have cleared up all the land I have got, from a one-horse farm to close to a four-horse farm. I cleared it up at my own expense and labor." * * *

(6) Because the court committed error in refusing to allow the witness George W. Garrick, introduced by the defendants, to testify as follows: "When we first went there, where Tidwell placed me in possession, he told us if we would go on that place--it was all dilapidated; there wasn't any buildings hardly that we could live in--said if we would go there and take possession of the lands, and pay him six bales of cotton a year until his death, that the place should be ours. I was to improve it, and put any buildings there that I decided to put there, whatever the cost might be. About the clearing I was unlimited." * * *

(7) Because the court committed error in refusing to allow the witness George W. Garrick, one of the defendants, introduced by the defendants, to testify as follows: "As long as he [J. A. J. Tidwell] lived I paid him six bales of cotton per year according to the contract." Movants insist that the aforesaid testimony was material, and the court rejected and withheld the same from the jury against the demands of movants, and in so doing the court committed error, and said ruling was illegal.

(8) Because the court committed error in refusing to allow the witness George W. Garrick, one of the defendants, introduced by defendants, to testify as follows: "Nobody has made any improvements on that place since I went there, but myself. Since I have been there I have borne all of the expense." * * *

(10) Because, during the progress of the trial, movants moved the court to rule out the following material evidence, testified to by Mrs. Claudia Tidwell, and introduced by the plaintiff, to wit: "Mr. Garrick and his wife were living on that land as tenants. He had been my husband's tenant on that land somewhere between 25 and 30 years. He paid six bales of cotton a year for that land." And movants did then and there urge the following grounds of objection to said evidence: That it was irrelevant, immaterial, and a conclusion--which said objection the court then and there overruled, and allowed the evidence to remain before the jury, which rulings movants insist were error. * * *

(13) Because upon the trial of said case the court erred in the following point and particular, to wit: During the trial of the case, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, the jury was sent from the courtroom, and arguments were made to the court by counsel during the absence of the jury, and in connection with such argument the court, referring to the law governing the case then on trial, used the following language from the bench: "The law that applies in this case, that permits parties to enforce a parol contract of land, where the donor or grantor is dead, is in my opinion a bad law, and should be abolished and repealed by the Legislature. There was a bill introduced in the Legislature to do so, but it failed to pass. While I am personally opposed to the law, I think that I can give you a fair trial." While movants concede the honesty and integrity of the court, yet they insist that this language of the court clearly implies and warrants the conclusion that their case was unconsciously prejudiced in the mind of the court by reason of the fact that the court was unfriendly to the law that governed their case, and by reason of this fact the court, with honest intentions, but with erroneous judgment, construed this law too strictly against movant, and likewise weighed and judged the evidence in the case unfavorable...