Garriepy v. Ballou & Nagle, Inc.

• fullCitation: Garriepy v. Ballou & Nagle, Inc., 114 Conn. 46, 157 A. 535 (Conn. 1931)
• Decision Date: 15 December 1931
• Citation: 114 Conn. 46,157 A. 535
• Parties: GARRIEPY v. BALLOU & NAGLE, Inc., et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

157 A. 535

114 Conn. 46

GARRIEPY v. BALLOU & NAGLE, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 15, 1931

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Walter M Pickett, Judge.

Action by Harold Garriepy against Ballou & Nagle, Inc., and another to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, tried to a jury. Judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant Weady and judgment in favor of the defendant Ballon & Nagle, Inc. motion to set aside the latter verdict denied, and the plaintiff appealed.

No error.

Joseph N. Manfreda, of Wallingford, and Jacob Belford, of New Haven, for appellant.

M. Joseph Blumenfeld and David R. Woodhouse, both of Hartford, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN BANKS, and AYERY, JJ.

HAINES, J.

From the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant Ballou & Nagle, Inc., was located in Southington and engaged in the trucking business; that one of the trucks operated by the company was a Mack Bulldog track and the defendant Weady, one of the company's drivers, had left New York City the morning of April 17, 1930, with this truck, stopped in New Haven to make some deliveries, telephoned to the home office for instructions, and was told to go to Wallingford and get a load of steel. Pursuant to these instructions, he proceeded up State street in New Haven, which is a direct route to Wallingford. About 11:30 a.m. as he approached the intersection of State and Lyman streets, he saw the plaintiff signaling for a ride; Weady and the plaintiff and the plaintiff's companion all lived in Wallingford and were acquainted; Weady, seeing the signal and recognizing these acquaintances, turned the truck toward the curb and applied the brakes for the sole purpose of bringing the truck to a stop in order to give the men a free ride to Wallingford. The truck was then moving about eighteen miles per hour and could not exceed that speed, being equipped with a governor set at that figure. At that time and place the traffic was light, but the street was wet and slippery. Nothing in the proper operation of the truck or in its speed or in the traffic conditions required the application of the brakes, and the sole purpose for which they were applied was to stop the truck and take on the plaintiff and his companion. The truck then weighed about fourteen thousand pounds, and had a load of about two hundred pounds in addition. The company had issued specific orders to all its truck drivers, including Weady, forbidding them to take passengers on any of the company's trucks, and the truck in question was labeled " No Riders," for the specific purpose of avoiding possible liability in the event of accident and injury to riders. All of the trucks were adequately manned so that it was unnecessary to resort to gratuitous passengers to assist in any way in the company's business. When Weady turned the truck to the right toward the easterly curb of State street and applied the brakes, it skidded and swung the read portion toward the right, striking the plaintiff and causing the injuries complained of. The plaintiff claims that both Weady and the company were responsible for the negligence of the former, and the jury returned a verdict against Weady, but did not hold the company responsible. The plaintiff appealed from this decision and from the refusal of the court to grant his motion to set aside the verdict.

The various assignments of error bear directly or indirectly upon the single controlling question, viz.: Did the negligence of Weady take place in the performance of an act which was within the scope of or incident to his employment as the servant and agent of the company. The court submitted this question to the jury as a question of fact. The plaintiff claims that this was error and that, upon the facts established, the court should have decided as a matter of law that the company was responsible; and many cases are cited in an endeavor to support this contention. Plaintiff also insists that upon the facts the jury could not reasonably and properly have found otherwise than that the company was responsible. The question in one form or another has been before this court in numerous appeals, and the principles upon which it has been decided are well settled but it is often a matter of extreme difficulty to apply them to the varying facts and circumstances which present themselves. Speaking generally, a principal must respond for the negligence of his agent where the latter acts upon the express or implied direction of the principal, or where the act is done in the execution of the master's business, though unauthorized or even contrary to the instructions. Loomis v. Hollister, 75 Conn. 718, 722, 55 A. 561. In one of our early cases, the rule is stated as follows: " For all acts done by a servant in obedience to the express orders or directions of the master, or in the execution of the master's business, within the scope of his employment, and for acts in any sense warranted by the express or implied authority conferred upon him, considering the nature of the services required, the instructions given, and the circumstances under which the act is done, the master is responsible; for acts which are not within these conditions the servant alone is responsible." Stone v. Hills, 45 Conn. 44, 47, 29 Am.Rep. 635. Whether the agent was acting within the scope of his...