Garris v. Weller Const. Co., 30558
| Decision Date | 26 October 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 30558,30558 |
| Citation | 132 So.2d 553 |
| Parties | Alfred GARRIS, Petitioner, v. WELLER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Great American Indemnity Company, and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Kaplan & Ser, Miami, and Donald Feldman, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Charles Desmond Crowley, Fort Lauderdale, for Weller Construction Co. and Great American Indemnity Co.
Paul E. Speh and Burnis T. Coleman, Tallahassee, for Florida Industrial Commission, respondents.
Certiorari is denied in the above cause but not necessarily for the reasons stated in the order of the respondent commission.
By petition for certiorari we have been requested to review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission which partially modified a compensation order of a deputy commissioner.
We originally denied certiorari, expressing the view that our denial was not necessarily based upon the reasons stated by the full commission for its order now under review.
By petition for rehearing it has been brought to our attention that possibilities of misunderstanding implicit in our order of denial could result in confusion and additional expense in the subsequent handling of this cause. Feeling that there was merit to this position we granted rehearing and upon further consideration we now have the view that writ should issue and the order of the full commission should be quashed for the reasons we hereafter explain.
The petitioner Garris suffered a compensable industrial injury. He was awarded workmen's compensation benefits on the basis of 25% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole. Certain remedial medical treatment was also provided. The last compensation payment was made on October 12, 1954. The last remedial medical treatment was provided on May 7, 1958. We emphasize the importance of these two dates.
On February 28, 1955, the employee filed a claim for benefits for disabilities arising out of the injury and requested a hearing. On March 16, 1955, the employer's insurance carrier addressed a letter to the deputy commissioner by which he advised that he and the claimant's attorney had entered into negotiations regarding the claim and stated that 'at the present time we feel that the hearing date should not be set until we notify you requesting same.' (Emphasis added.) About July 7, 1958, approximately two months after the last provision of medical benefits, a new claim was filed requesting further compensation, medical benefits and a hearing on both the old and the new claim. On January 29, 1959, an additional claim for temporary total benefits for various periods was also filed. On April 20, 1959, the employer and carrier moved to dismiss the claim of February 1955, alleging that there had been a failure on the part of the claimant to prosecute it. At this hearing, which was the initial hearing, the employer and carrier did not move to dismiss the 1958 and 1959 claims with any contention that they were barred by the statute of limitations.
At a subsequent hearing, the deputy commissioner refused to dismiss the 1955 claim. He denied additional compensation for temporary total disability. He awarded compensation for 25% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole with credit for payments made and he ordered further remedial medical treatment. Review by the full Industrial Commission was sought by both parties. We do not find in the record that the employer claimed error regarding the failure of the deputy to hold the 1958 and 1959 claims barred by the statute of limitations. However, upon reviewing the matter the respondent commission modified the order of the deputy by holding 'the 1958 and 1959 claims to be barred by the limitation period as provided by statute insofar as the claims for compensation are concerned and as modified, said order be and the same is hereby affirmed.'
We understand the import of the full commission's order to be that the 1955 claim should have been dismissed for failure to prosecute as prescribed by Commission's Rules of Procedure Nos. 3 and 11. If this claim is eliminated then the filing of the claims in 1958 and 1959 would have been barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. This ruling applied to the claims for the payment of compensation. The full commission did not disturb the order of the deputy awarding additional remedial care, attorneys' fees and cost and denying the claim for additional benefits.
The principal point which we must now consider, and which we think perhaps we overlooked in our original denial of certiorari, is the effect of the amendments to the applicable statutes of limitation in relation to the various claims filed by the employee Garris. Our ultimate conclusion must turn on the correctness of the ruling of the full commission dismissing the 1955 claim. If that claim was alive when the deputy heard the matter in 1959, then the cases applicable to statutes of limitation would preclude the dismissal of the 1958 and 1959 claims as having been barred by statute. Coherence requires that we summarize a chronology of events.
The injury occurred November 23, 1951. Compensation payments were made until October 12, 1954. During this period the statute of limitations on the filing of claims was Chapter 26484, Laws of 1951, Section 10(1), which, in effect, provided that the period of limitations for filing claims was two years from the time of injury or the date of the last payment of compensation benefits. Inasmuch as compensation benefits were paid until October 12, 1954, under the then existing statute, the last date for filing a claim would have been October 12, 1956.
In the meantime, on February 28, 1955, the employee filed a claim requesting benefits. The consideration of this claim was held in abeyance at the request of the carrier. However, so far as the statute of limitations was concerned, the claim was filed in time. It was, therefore, a validly filed claim pending when the limitations statute was amended by Chapter 29778, Laws of 1955, Section 4(1), which extended the time for filing claims to a period of three years from the date of injury or the date of last payment of compensation. The effect of this amendment simply was that since the last compensation was paid on October 12, 1954, the period for filing the claim was...
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...enlarging the limitation period. Davis v. Industrial Accident Commission, 198 Cal. 631, 246 P. 1046 (1926); Garris v. Weller Construction Co., 132 So.2d 553 (Fla.1960); Wilson v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 185 Kan. 725, 347 P.2d 235 (1959); Kiser v. Bartley Mining Co., 397 S.W.2d 56......
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...has since been restored.) The judge applied the amended statute under the principle announced in such cases as Garris v. Weller Construction Company, 132 So.2d 553 (Fla.1960), that where a statutory amendment lengthens the limitation period for filing a claim, the amendment applies to claim......
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