Garrish v. United Auto., Aerospace & Ag. Implement

• Decision Date: 07 March 2001
• Docket Number: Civil No. 00-40291.
• Citation: 133 F.Supp.2d 959
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
• Parties: Dale GARRISH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, International Union ("UAW"), et al., Defendants.

133 F.Supp.2d 959

Dale GARRISH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, International Union ("UAW"), et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 00-40291.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 7, 2001.

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Harold Dunne, Livonia, MI, for plaintiffs.

Stuart M. Israel, Martens, Ice, Southfield, MI, Andrew M. Kramer, Jones, Day, Cleveland, OH, Samuel C. McKnight, Klimist, McKnight, Southfield, MI, Andrew A. Nickelhoff, Sachs, Waldman, Detroit, MI, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GADOLA, District Judge.

Before this Court are the following motions: Defendant General Motors' motion to dismiss [docket entry 12]; Defendants UAW and UAW Local 594's motion for summary judgment [docket entry 16]; and Defendants Todd Fante and Gordon Campbell's motion for summary judgment or dismissal [docket entry 20]. The Court held hearings in open court on these motion on February 2, 2001 and March 1, 2001. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants Fante and Campbell's motion to dismiss. The Court denies all other relief Defendants seek at this point.

I BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are employees of Defendant General Motors Corporation ("GM") who work at GM's Truck and Bus facility ("the facility") in Pontiac, Michigan. (C.¹ at ¶¶ 4, 8.) Plaintiffs are also members of Defendant United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, International Union ("UAW") and Defendant Local 594. Plaintiffs purport to represent the interests of 6,000 employees at the facility. Defendant GM builds vehicles. Defendant UAW is a union purporting to represent the interests of workers at GM. Defendant Local 594 is a local union and an element of Defendant UAW. Defendants Todd Fante and Gordon Campbell are members of UAW and employees of GM.

Defendants UAW and GM are parties to a National Collective Bargaining Agreement ("NCBA") The NCBA concerns Plaintiffs' employment rights, including wages, hours of employment, and working conditions. Defendant Local 594 and the facility are parties to a Local Collective Bargaining Agreement ("LCBA"), which allows them to negotiate matters not covered by the NCBA.

This dispute is rooted in a strike over local demands and grievances that Local 594 began, with the UAW's permission, at the facility on April 23, 1997 and that ended on July 21, 1997. Plaintiffs allege that, although all legitimate demands of Local 594 were settled within the strike's first month, Defendant unions fraudulently prolonged the strike for approximately two months for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs allege that the unions sought to obtain roughly $200,000 in "overtime" payments from GM to high-level officials of Local 594. Second, Plaintiffs allege that the unions sought to obtain employment at GM for the relatives of high-level UAW officials.

Plaintiffs further allege that GM ultimately paid $200,000 to Local 594 to be divided among its high-level union representatives. (C. at ¶ 88.) Plaintiffs allege that GM knew this payment was illegal, and that GM nonetheless provided the $200,000 as a means of paying the union leaders to end the strike. (C. at ¶¶ 89, 97.) According to Plaintiffs, at least one member of Local 594's executive board shared in the disbursement of the improperly-obtained $200,000.

Plaintiffs also aver that Local 594 ultimately obtained employment for Defendants Fante and Campbell. Plaintiffs aver that both Mr. Fante and Mr. Campbell were unqualified for the positions for which GM hired them and that hiring them was a violation of the NCBA. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Campbell is the son of Jay Campbell, chairman of Local 594's bargaining committee (C. at ¶ 50), and that Mr. Fante is the son of a friend of Donny Douglas, who was the UAW's representative during the 1997 strike negotiations at the facility. (C. at ¶ 51.)

Plaintiffs brought suit on August 7, 2000. In their first amended complaint, filed on October 4, 2000, Plaintiffs assert the following "counts" pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), Title III, § 301, 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 [hereinafter "§ 301"].

In "count I," Plaintiffs claim that all Defendants colluded in violation of LMRA to violate Plaintiffs' contractual rights under the NCBA by arranging for the hiring of Messrs. Fante and Campbell. (C. at ¶¶ 45-75.)

In "count II," Plaintiffs allege that Defendants UAW and Local 594 committed fraud and collusion in violation of LMRA to extort the $200,000 "overtime" payment from GM. (C. at ¶¶ 76-103.)

In "count III," Plaintiffs aver that Defendants UAW and Local 594, in violation of LMRA, breached the duty fair of representation that they owed Plaintiffs by prolonging the strike in order to obtain employment for Messrs. Fante and Campbell.

At the outset of a case such as this, the Court must decide whether a plaintiff has alleged a § 301 suit and, if so, whether that action is a hybrid suit under § 301. See Jones v. Department Store Employees Union Local 1100, No. 90-15010, 944 F.2d 908, 1991 WL 181771, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept.18, 1991). The Court must also construe pleadings "so as to do substantial justice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f). The Court promotes substantial justice when it decides lawsuits on their merits, and not on whether a plaintiff has drawn artfully the averments in his pleadings. Polite v. Casella, 901 F.Supp. 90, 94 (N.D.N.Y.1995). Toward that end, the Court must strive to ascertain what a plaintiff is attempting to set forth in his pleading. Id. (citing Alexander v. Unification Church of Am., 634 F.2d 673, 678 (2d Cir.1980) for the proposition that a plaintiff's mislabeling of counts is immaterial). All that the Court demands of a plaintiff is that he provide "fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Iron Workers' Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Nyeholt Steel, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 514, 517 (E.D.Mich.1996) (Gadola, J.).

Construed so as to do substantial justice, the three "counts" that Plaintiffs assert constitute one hybrid cause of action under § 301. This is so because the Court confronts a hybrid cause of action where, as here, "the interrelationship between a union member, his union, and his employer is implicated." White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 561 (6th Cir.1990); see also Carrion v. Enterprise Ass'n Metal Trades Branch Local Union 638, 227 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir.2000); Duerr v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 101 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1065 (N.D.Ill.2000). It is common for courts to construe inartfully-drafted complaints as alleging a hybrid cause of action under § 301. See, e.g., Coleman v. General Mills, No. 94-3651, 43 F.3d 1471, 1994 WL 696116, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec.12, 1994); Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 21 F.3d 1381, 1386-87 (6th Cir.1994); Rudnianin v. Kroger Co., 770 F.2d 167, No. 82-1763, 1985 WL 13472, at *1 (6th Cir. Jul.12, 1985); Brown v. UAW, 682 F.Supp. 901, 904 (E.D.Mich.1987) (Suhrheinrich, J.).

A hybrid claim under § 301 has two elements: (1) that the employer violated the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Vencl v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18, 137 F.3d 420, 423 (6th Cir.1998); Sudderth v. Alreco Metals, Inc., 839 F.Supp. 1267, 1272 (W.D.Mich.1993) (citation omitted). These elements cannot stand individually: a plaintiff must prove both violations to succeed against either the union or the employer. Id. (citing Bagsby v. Lewis Bros. Inc., 820 F.2d 799, 801 (6th Cir.1987)).

During the hearing of March 1, 2001, Defendant GM and Defendant Local 594 argued that this case should not be construed as hybrid § 301 action because such a suit requires a nexus between a union's breach of the duty of fair representation and an employer's breach of contract. See generally McKelvin v. E.J. Branch Corp., No. 94 C 4104, 1996 WL 54195, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Feb.8, 1996). Here, these Defendants argued, there is no such nexus.

The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs claim that GM breached the NCBA by hiring Messrs. Fante and Campbell only because of the unions' breach of the duty of fair representation; i.e., Plaintiffs argue that GM wrongly hired Defendants Fante and Campbell because the union leaders wrongly would have prolonged a strike had GM not done so. There is thus an inextricable nexus between Plaintiffs' allegations against GM and the unions. Similarly, Plaintiffs tie GM's alleged payment of $200,000² to the union leaders to the unions' allegedly wrongful prolongation of a strike. The Court thus concludes that there is a connection between the allegations Plaintiffs make against the unions and GM.

Although this case is not a class action, Plaintiffs seek certification as such. Discovery is not yet closed.

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the district courts to dismiss any complaint that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Rule 12(b)(6) affords a defendant an opportunity to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true. In applying the standards under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must presume all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the non-moving party. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.1993). The court need not, however, accord the presumption of truthfulness to any legal conclusions, opinions or deductions, even if they are couched as factual allegations. Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir.1956). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is disfavored:

[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.

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