Garrison v. Hill

• Decision Date: 20 June 1895
• Citation: 32 A. 191,81 Md. 551
• Parties: GARRISON v. HILL ET AL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

32 A. 191

81 Md. 551

GARRISON v. HILL ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 20, 1895

Appeal from orphans' court of Baltimore city.

Mary De C. Garrison, by her next friend, Thomas Garrison, filed a caveat to the will of Maria M. Johnson. The caveat was dismissed, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before BRYAN, McSHERRY, FOWLER, PAGE, ROBERTS, and BOYD, JJ.

John P Poe and Hyland P. Stewart, for appellant.

Wm. A Fisher, Bernard Carter, Marshall, Marbury & Boudoin, and Thomas I. Elliott, for appellees.

BOYD J.

The appellant filed on the 12th day of May, 1894, a caveat to the will of Maria M. Johnson, which had been admitted to probate on the 6th day of February, 1889. The orphans' court of Baltimore city dismissed it on the ground that chapter 405 of the Laws of 1894 was retroactive in its effect, and hence the caveat was filed too late. That act is entitled "An act to add an additional section to article 93 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland to come in after section 326 and to be known as section 326a." It provides that "no will, testament, codicil or other testamentary paper shall be subject to caveat or other objections to its validity after the expiration of three years from its probate," and by section 2 it is made to take effect from the date of its passage. It is contended by the appellant that the act is unconstitutional because (a) it is contrary to article 3 of section 29 of the constitution of Maryland; (b) there is no saving clause to those under disability to sue; and (c) it is contrary to the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. It was conceded in argument that if the title had read, "An act to add an additional section to article 93 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland title testamentary laws," it would have been sufficient, under the decisions in State v. Norris, 70 Md. 94, 16 A. 445; Lankford v. Commissioners, 73 Md. 118, 20 A. 1017, and 22 A. 412; and other cases that might be cited. But the case of Association v. Newman, 50 Md. 62, is directly in point, and is decisive of the first objection urged against this law. In that case the title was "An act to amend article 95 of the Code of Public General Laws by adding an additional section thereto," and it was held to be a compliance with the constitutional provision requiring the subject of an act of assembly to be described in its title. There is no substantial difference between the title to that act and the one now under consideration. This clause of the constitution has been before us so frequently that we do not deem it necessary to do more than refer to the above cases, without further comment on that question.

So far as the omission to insert a saving clause in favor of those under disability to sue is concerned, it might be said, the appellant is not in a position to complain. She is now in this court by her next friend, and could have so proceeded at any time since the will of Mrs. Johnson was probated. But the law cannot be said to be unconstitutional merely because it fails to extend the time in favor of those under disability, such as coverture, infancy, etc. It is discretionary with the legislature whether or not they shall be exempted from the operation of the statute of limitations, and, unless that statute does so exempt them, they are governed by the same law that others are. Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514, 2 S.Ct. 854; Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 718.

Having disposed of the technical objections urged against this law it remains for us to determine whether it is a bar to this proceeding. The statute is a very important one. Great injustice was possible to be done to devisees and legatees, as well as to testators themselves, by permitting caveats to be filed at any time, however long, after the probate of wills. Designing parties could wait until the death of those familiar with the circumstances under which a will was executed, before proceeding against it, and other dangers suggest themselves under the former practice in this state. The legislature has therefore wisely undertaken to limit the time within which wills can be attacked. The caveat filed by the appellant charges, amongst other things, that the alleged will of Maria M. Johnson was not in fact her will, but that she died intestate, and that it was not executed when she was of sound mind, capable of executing a valid deed or contract. It also alleges that appellant is the only heir at law and next of kin of Maria M. Johnson. If those allegations be true, then any real estate that Mrs. Johnson owned at her death became at once vested in the appellant, and she, as next of kin, was entitled to have the personalty, after payment of debts, etc., distributed to her. Section 309 of article 93 of the Code provides that no will shall be good and effectual, for any purpose whatever, unless the person making the same be at the time of its execution of sound and disposing mind, and capable of executing a valid deed or contract. Prior to the act of 1894 it was the established law of this state that no lapse of time would exclude the inquiry whether a certain paper constituted the will of a party or not. Emmert v. Stouffer, 64 Md. 559, 3 A. 293, and 6 A. 177; Clagett v. Hawkins, 11 Md. 387. The appellant therefore had a vested right in the property left by Mrs. Johnson, provided, of course, she can establish the facts alleged in her petition; and, as the law stood, she had the right to take steps to recover it. The legislature had no power to take from her this vested right. It cannot be done on the theory that the law in question only affects the remedy, for, as was said in Grinder v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299, an act which...