Garrison v. People, 21039
| Decision Date | 01 November 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 21039,21039 |
| Citation | 408 P.2d 60,158 Colo. 348 |
| Parties | Sylvester Lee GARRISON, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Mellman, Mellman & Thorn, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.
Plaintiff in error, Sylvester Lee Garrison, will be referred to as the defendant, or by name.
Garrison was charged with first degree murder, convicted and sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the judgment and the death sentence. Garrison v. People, 147 Colo. 385, 364 P.2d 197. Thereafter, a petition was filed under the provisions of C.R.S. 1963, 39-8-4, alleging that the defendant had become insane subsequent to his conviction and was therefore entitled to have his execution stayed until his recovery. A jury trial resulted in a verdict that defendant was sane. This verdict was reversed on appeal and the matter remanded for a new trial. Garrison v. People, 151 Colo. 388, 378 P.2d 401. On retrial, the jury again returned a verdict finding the defendant sane. Judgment was entered upon the verdict, and from this judgment Garrison now brings writ of error. Since defendant's assignments of error concern specific points which arose at the trial and do not concern the evidence as a whole, a statement of the evidentiary facts is not necessary.
The defendant raises five arguments for our consideration: (1) It was error for the court to refuse to permit Dr. J. P. Hilton to testify that his opinion with respect to defendant's insanity was confirmed by the records of Denver General Hospital. (2) The court erred in failing to strike Dr. McDonald's opinion that the defendant was sane. (3) The court erred in refusing permission for Dr. Hannum to testify in regard to certain records of Denver General Hospital. (4) The court erred in rejecting as evidence the Denver General Hospital records which pertain to certain stays of the defendant at such hospital. (5) The court improperly ruled that Herman Garrison, defendant's brother, was not competent to testify.
Dr. Hilton testified in behalf of defendant. When asked for his opinion regarding defendant's mental condition, he replied:
'In my opinion, based on may examination, and based on confirmation of records which I examined at Denver General Hospital * * *' (Emphasis ours)
That portion of Dr. Hilton's testimony, stating that his opinion was confirmed by the hospital's records, was stricken. Dr. Hilton then proceeded to testify at great length that in his opinion the defendant was insane under the tests set forth in C.R.S. 1963, 39-8-4. The trial court very properly struck that portion of the testimony wherein Dr. Hilton attempted to show that the Denver General Hospital records confirmed his opinion. The situation here is almost identical to that in Carter v. People, 119 Colo. 342, 204 P.2d 147, wherein we held such testimony inadmissible. The authors of the hospital record were not called as witnesses, and testimony by Dr. Hilton which tended to show they concurred in his opinion was cleary hearsay. As is pointed out in 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 1364, hearsay is 'that rule which prohibits the use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony to the fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion and of his qualifications to make it.' Wigmore's assertion is peculiarly applicable here where the defendant attempted to bring in the conclusions and opinions of other doctors who were not present at the trial.
Moreover, these records in and of themselves were not admissible for the purpose of showing the mental state of the defendant. This point will be developed later on in our opinion. Dr. Hilton could not bolster his opinion by restating the conclusions which were contained in the hospital records which were themselves not admissible. To permit him to do so would thereby bring to the jury's attention the conclusions which they normally would not be permitted to consider in the reports themselves.
Dr. McDonald testified on behalf of the people that, in his opinion, the defendant was sane. Defendant argues that Dr. McDonald's opinion should have been excluded. This argument is based upon defendant's conclusion that Dr. McDonald's opinion was based upon a Dr. Hahn's psychological examination; a review of the county records, which included photostatic copies of the hospital records, and two brain wave examinations performed by another doctor. The record does not support defendant's argument. On cross-examination, Dr. McDonald consistently stated that he formed his opinion concerning the defendant's mental condition from his own personal examination and observation and was not influenced by information which was before him from any source other than his own investigation.
We have repeatedly held that a doctor is not disqualified to express his opinion concerning the sanity of a defendant merely because he had some information from a source outside his own examination if his opinion was not in any manner based on that information. Skeels v. People, 145 Colo. 281, 358 P.2d 605; Silliman v. People, 114 Colo. 130, 162 P.2d 793. The trial court properly admitted Dr. McDonald's opinion as to the sanity of Garrison.
The defendant also contends that the court erred in denying his request to further cross-examine Dr. McDonald. Defendant felt that such further examination would prove that Dr. McDonald's opinion had not been made independently of the information which he had before him. The granting or denial of a request to further cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court. Hammil v. People, 145 Colo. 577, 361 P.2d 117; Archina v. People, 135 Colo. 8, 307 P.2d 1083. We find no abuse of discretion here in light of the extensive cross-examination which counsel did conduct and the doctor's consistent insistence that his opinion was based solely on his examination of the defendant.
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly restricted the direct examination of Dr. Hannum. The questioning in issue here centered around an attempt by the defendant to lay...
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People v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist. In and For Clear Creek County, 82SA23
...person assessed, rather than on reports or records of examinations conducted by or observations made by others. See Garrison v. People, 158 Colo. 348, 408 P.2d 60 (1965); Skeels v. People, 145 Colo. 281, 358 P.2d 605 (1961); Silliman v. People, 114 Colo. 130, 162 P.2d 793 (1945). However, t......
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Garrison v. Patterson, 10163.
...v. Colorado, 147 Colo. 385, 364 P.2d 197 (1961). 2 Garrison v. Colorado, 151 Colo. 388, 378 P.2d 401 (1963) and Garrison v. Colorado, 158 Colo. 348, 408 P.2d 60 (1965). 3 Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 88 S.Ct. 1687, 20 L.Ed.2d 744 (1968). 4 Nutt v. United States, 335 F.2d 817 (10th C......
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