Garrison v. Ryno

• Decision Date: 09 November 1959
• Docket Number: No. 1,1
• Citation: 328 S.W.2d 557
• Parties: Jerry Lee GARRISON, by his duly appointed guardian and curator, Joseph Garrison, Respondent, v. R. D. RYNO, d/b/a R. D. Ryno Motor Sales, and C. H. Kent, Appellants. No 47272
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 557

328 S.W.2d 557

Jerry Lee GARRISON, by his duly appointed guardian and curator, Joseph Garrison, Respondent, v. R. D. RYNO, d/b/a R. D. Ryno Motor Sales, and C. H. Kent, Appellants.

No 47272.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

Nov. 9, 1959.

Allen, Woolsey & Fisher, Russell G. Clark, Springfield, for appellants.

Neale, Newman, Bradshaw, Freeman & Neale, Jean Paul Bradshaw, Paul L. Bradshaw, Springfield, for respondent.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

Jerry Lee Garrison, a minor, acting through his guardian and curator, filed suit against Powell Brothers Truck Line, Carl Spencer, R. D. Ryno, doing business as R. D. Ryno Motor Sales, and C. H. Kent for personal injuries sustained in a vehicular collision which occurred at the junction of U. S. Highway No. 66 and County Road W. in Webster County. Plaintiff eventually dismissed as to Powell Brothers Truck Line and Spencer and proceeded to trial against Ryno and Kent. Trial before judge and jury in the Circuit Court of Greene County resulted in a verdict and judgment for $50,000 for plaintiff and against defendants Ryno and Kent, who have appealed.

Highway 66 at the scene of the collision runs east and west. Road W runs north and south. From the intersection visibility to the east is good for 2,000 feet. Visibility to the west is good for 3/4 mile, to the top of a hill. It is upgrade approaching the intersection on Road W from the north. Highway 66 is a two-lane 24-foot wide concrete highway. Road W is a gravel road, blacktopped for some 400 feet north of the intersection. Road W broadens to a width of 70 or 80 feet where it intersects Highway 66. There was a stop sign on the west side of Road W, north of the intersection, for southbound traffic on Road W.

The collision occurred at 7 p. m. on January 18, 1955. It was dark. The roads were 'very slick' with ice and snow. Plaintiff, a passenger in a 1949 Plymouth driven by James Newman, was seated in the front seat between Newman and Jimmy Boswell. The three were traveling west on Highway 66, bound for Springfield. Defendant Kent was driving a twocar unit consisting of two new automobiles connected by a tow-bar. He was transporting the tow-bar unit from Toledo, Ohio to Fort Worth, Texas. After stopping for food at a cafe 400 feet north of the intersection Kent drove the tow-bar unit south on Road W, 400 feet to the intersection and then turned right or west on Highway 66, toward Springfield. Carl Spencer, an employee of Powell Brothers Truck Line, was driving one of its tractor-trailer units east on Highway 66. The westbound Newman Plymouth collided with the eastbound Powell tractor-trailer unit at the west edge of the intersection. There was no contact between the Newman Plymouth and the tow-bar unit driven by Kent.

When the Newman Plymouth, traveling about 25 m. p. h., was 400-500 feet east of the intersection Newman saw 'several sets' of taillights 40 or 50 feet off to the north side of Highway 66, coming south on Road W, 'sort of southwest,' 'veering in a southwesterly direction,' approaching the intersection, moving 'very slow.' 'They proceeded southwest.' Newman did not then see the vehicle to which the taillights were attached, nor did he see any headlights. He saw only taillights, but saw them clearly--not 'the complete round,' just taillights. He was in such position in his car and the vehicles were in such position that he clearly and distinctly saw the round taillights--more than one set of them--one set ten feet behind the other: 'bright red taillights.' At about the same instant he saw headlights on the oncoming eastbound Powell Brothers tractor-trailer unit, which was then about the same distance from the intersection as the Newman Plymouth (450 feet). At 25 m. p. h. Newman could have stopped the Plymouth within 300 feet under the icy conditions then prevailing, but he did not change the operation of the Plymouth in any way at that point, seeing no need at that time to do anything. Newman had travelled that highway many times and he knew about the stop sign for southbound traffic on Road W. He thought the vehicle approaching from the north was going to stop at the stop sign, but the taillights continued moving in a southwesterly direction. It first became apparent to Newman that the taillights approaching from the north were not going to stop when the Newman Plymouth was about 200 feet away. Without stopping for the stop sign the taillights continued on out onto Highway 66, then moved in a straight westerly direction. After getting out onto Highway 66 the vehicles on which the taillights were mounted either came to a stop or proceeded so very slowly that the difference was imperceptible to Newman. The Newman Plymouth was about 200 feet east of the intersection when the taillights came out onto Highway 66. Newman could then distinguish the vehicles to which the taillights were attached as automobiles. After the vehicles with the taillights drove out onto Highway 66 Newman applied the brakes on the Plymouth three separate times. The first time the Plymouth started skidding. It did the same thing the second time. By the time he applied the brakes the third time he was 'so close' (to the taillights, which were completely blocking the westbound lane) that Newman was confronted with a situation where he either had to attempt to stop, or cross to the other lane, or go over an embankment on the right-hand side of the highway. The taillights were then 'a short distance' in front of the Plymouth; 'real close'; 'probably about four car lengths, or so.' By that time the headlights on the oncoming eastbound tractor-trailer unit 'were right there.' Newman applied the brakes the third time and the Plymouth skidded over into the eastbound lane and into the path of the eastbound tractor-trailer unit, which struck the left front of the Plymouth. The taillights of the tow-bar unit were four or five car lengths west of the intersection when the collision occurred. All of the occupants of the Plymouth were thrown out of the car. Jimmy Boswell was instantly killed. Severe personal injuries were inflicted upon plaintiff.

Appellants' first point is that there was no substantial evidence that Kent was negligent or that such negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the collision, in that respondent's only testimony that Kent pulled onto Highway 66 when the Plymouth was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard was so contrary to physical laws and facts of common knowledge that it could not be accepted as substantial evidence. Appellants refer to respondent's testimony that the direction in which the tow-bar unit was headed was south, directly toward Highway 66, claiming that there was no evidence that the unit did not approach the highway directly (i. e. at right angles); that it is a law of physics that a beam or reflection from a light will travel in a straight line; that Newman's testimony that he saw taillights and no headlights leads to only one conclusion, namely, that the taillights he saw were facing the direction from which Newman was traveling, i. e. east, and that the taillights he saw were on the rear of a vehicle traveling west on Highway 66, so that the tow-bar unit must already have been on the highway when Newman first saw it. Appellants say that Newman's testimony therefore has no probative value on the issue of when the tow-bar unit pulled onto the highway in relation to the approach of the Newman Plymouth. Where testimony, beyond any reasonable doubt, is contrary to established physical facts or laws and facts of common knowledge it cannot be accepted as substantial evidence, Lohmann v. Wabash R. Co., 364 Mo. 910, 269 S.W.2d 885, but courts are reluctant to say that declared facts are manifestly impossible or untrue, Doyle v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 326 Mo. 425, 31 S.W.2d 1010, and should not indulge in arbitrary deductions from physical laws and facts except when they appear to be so clear and irrefutable that no room is left for the entertainment, by reasonable minds, of any other conclusion. Lansford v. Southwest Lime Co., Mo.Sup., 266 S.W.2d 564 and cases cited. The basic premise of the argument (that the tow-bar unit was approaching the intersection at right angles) is not an established fact. The testimony most favorable to plaintiff is that as the tow-bar unit approached the intersection it was proceeding in a southwesterly direction, which would more effectively have displayed the lights to one approaching from the east. We cannot say that this testimony is manifestly impossible or untrue, or beyond any reasonable doubt contrary to physical facts or laws. Reasonable minds might conclude that on a dark night a beam or reflection from a red taillight or from two sets of red taillights approaching an intersection at an angle, 40 or 50 feet from the intersection, might be seen from a point on the intersecting highway 400 to 500 feet distant from the intersection; that the headlights of such a vehicle might not be noticed, where the vehicle was going upgrade as it approached the intersection--that the beam of the headlights would be cast up into the air rather than down upon the road.

Appellants further maintain that respondent's evidence showed as a matter of law that Newman's negligence 'in allowing his car to skid into the left hand lane of the pavement' was the sole proximate cause of the casualty; that 'there is nothing in the evidence * * * that would indicate that he could not have stopped his car before running into the rear of the tow-bar unit * * *.' This argument is based upon two assumptions that cannot be made: (1) that Kent's negligence had no causal connection with the occurrence of the collision (which cannot be declared as a matter of law, it being a jury question whether Kent's acts constituted negligence and whether that negligence was a contributing cause), and (2) that there is an absence of evidence that Newman could not have...