Garsed v. Sugarman
| Decision Date | 28 January 1930 |
| Citation | 126 So. 157,99 Fla. 191 |
| Parties | GARSED v. SUGARMAN et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; H. F. Atkinson, Judge.
Action by Ethelyn Garsed, a single woman, against William Sugarman and others. To review an adverse judgment, plaintiff brings error.
Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
In its inception, conspiracy, though limited in nature, was both a civil and criminal offense. In its inception, conspiracy while limited in nature, was both a civil and a criminal offense.
One injured as result of execution of conspiracy has right of action against conspirators (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 7541). If a conspiracy as contemplated under our statute is conceived and executed, and a private injury results, the one so injured would have a right of action against the conspirators.
James M. Carson and Winifred B. Judge, both of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
Robert J. Boone, of Miami, for defendants in error.
The declaration herein is embraced in three counts. The first count is predicated on malicious prosecution, the second count on an action of conspiracy, and the third count on a conspiracy to exact money by means of threats to accuse and prosecute for crime. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained, and final judgment was entered. Writ of error was prosecuted from that final judgment.
The sole question presented here for our consideration is whether or not the declaration states a cause of action.
The briefs of counsel and the record raise some very interesting questions on various legal aspects of conspiracy particularly as to whether or not, under the law of this state, it is both a civil and criminal offense. In its inception, though limited in nature, it was a civil wrong and a criminal offense. Our statute (section 5400, Revised General Statutes of 1920; section 7541, Compiled General Laws of 1927) defines conspiracy and materially enlarges its scope as a crime over the common-law conception of the act, but it does not attempt to modify or abrogate its civil aspect. It would seem, therefore, if a conspiracy as contemplated under our statute is conceived and executed, and a private injury results, the one so injured would have a right of action against the conspirators. Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A. C. 495, appears to be the leading case on the question. See, also, the 'Law of Conspiracy' by Harrison, a splendid monograph treating the subject of...
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Pokress v. Southern Hotel Corp.
...contentions enumerated and argued herein under (a) to (g), inclusive, supra. The sole question involved in the case of Garsed v. Sugarman, 99 Fla. 191, 126 So. 157, like the case at bar, was the sufficiency of the declaration to state a cause of action. The Garsed case embraced three separa......
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Patten v. Daoud
... ... the declaration in Stewart Land Company v. Perkins, ... 290 Mo. 194, 234 S.W. 653; Garsed v. Sugarman, 99 ... Fla. 191, 126 So. 157; and Harford v. Graves, 102 ... Fla. 835, 136 So. 620. It is fundamental that the allegations ... of a ... ...
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Faulk v. Allen
...this assertion. We do not feel that the question is open in this state however since it was held in the affirmative in Garsed v. Sugarman et al., 99 Fla. 191, 126 So. 157; Quigg v. Helm et al., 119 Fla. 693, 161 So. Hunter Lyon, Inc., v. W. H. Walker et al., Fla., 11 So.2d 176, opinion file......
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Catlett v. Chestnut
... ... It is ... sufficient to say, in affirming the judgment rendered in the ... present case, that the cited authority of Garsed v ... Sugarman, 99 Fla. 191, 126 So. 157, [2] affords no basis for ... a suit like this against a circuit judge and others connected ... with ... ...