Garson v. Hendlin
Decision Date | 23 June 1987 |
Citation | 517 N.Y.S.2d 702,136 Misc.2d 114 |
Parties | Geoffrey GARSON, Plaintiff, v. Susan HENDLIN, Defendant. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
Bleakley & Schmidt, White Plains, for defendant.
Feiden, Dweck & Sladkus, New York City, for plaintiff.
When a relative of one of the parties to a divorce proceeding writes a letter to the probation department pending preparation of a report regarding visitation, is the writer accorded an absolute privilege, or may she be found liable in defamation? This is the major issue facing the court on this motion for summary judgment.
There is presently pending in this court an action for divorce between plaintiff Geoffrey Garson and Vicki Garson. The defendant in this action, Susan Hendlin, is Vicki Garson's aunt.
The divorce action was commenced in March of 1985 by Geoffrey. Among other items of relief, he sought custody of the parties' two children and possession of the marital premises. By stipulation, Geoffrey obtained temporary custody of the children and possession of the marital premises, with Vicki receiving temporary maintenance. In October of 1985, they further stipulated to refer the issue of visitation for investigation by the Westchester County Department of Probation, which agency assigned the investigation to probation officer Marjorie Roston. Roston's report was sent to the court on or about March 4, 1986.
On or about March 8, 1986, defendant, with whom Vicki was then living, wrote a letter to Roston, which letter is the subject of this action. The excerpted portion of the letter upon which the complaint is based reads as follows:
Defendant now moves for summary judgment. She avers that she wrote the letter at the behest of her niece, who was fearful that Roston would not share her belief that the children were in need of psychiatric care.
The first ground urged for this application is the claim that the context in which the letter was written renders it absolutely privileged. It is defendant's contention that the context was that of a judicial proceeding, that defendant's position was analogous to that of a witness at trial, and that the probation officer was an agent of the court.
(Park Knoll Assoc. v. Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 209, 464 N.Y.S.2d 424, 451 N.E.2d 182). Policy considerations however, limit the confer of absolute privilege to a limited number of situations (Stukuls v. State of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 272, 278, ...
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Garson v. Hendlin
...the letter was nevertheless qualifiedly privileged. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, 136 Misc.2d 114, 517 N.Y.S.2d 702. Initially, the court held that the letter did not fall within the narrow range of communications entitled to the protection of an abso......