Garza Land & Cattle Co. v. Redwine Independent S. Dist.

Decision Date03 March 1926
Docket Number(No. 2621.)
Citation282 S.W. 905
PartiesGARZA LAND & CATTLE CO. v. REDWINE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. et al.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from District Court, Lynn County; Gordon B. McGuire, Judge.

Suit by the Garza Land & Cattle Company against the Redwine Independent School District and others, who filed a cross-action. Judgment for defendants on cross-action, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Robert H. Bean and Bean & Klett, all of Lubbock, for appellant.

Lockhart & Garrard, of Lubbock, for appellees.

JACKSON, J.

Appellant, a Texas corporation, instituted this suit in the district court of Lynn county, Tex., against appellees, Redwine independent school district, a body corporate, its officers and trustees, to restrain it and them from the collection of a part of the taxes assessed against appellant's property for the year 1924, located in said school district.

Appellant alleged that the Redwine independent school district was created by an act of the Legislature of this state, and contained 39 sections of land, of which it owned 10¼ sections; that the district is 9 miles in length east and west, and is 4 miles wide north and south, except near the center, where for 3 miles of its length it is 5 miles in width; that the 10¼ sections of land owned by appellant are in the eastern end of the district, from 4 to 8 miles from the schoolhouse, and most of it is very rough, unimproved, and fit and used only for grazing purposes; that its 10¼ sections lie in a body, and are used as a ranch; and as a whole are not now and were not on January 1, 1924, of a cash market value to exceed $8.35 per acre; that the central and western parts of the district are mostly smooth agricultural land, with about 75 per cent. thereof in cultivation, with valuable improvements on almost every quarter section; that the board of trustees of said district levied and caused to be assessed sufficient taxes for the year 1924 for the maintenance of public schools in said district, and caused the same to be valued for the purposes of taxation, and in doing so the trustees and its assessor valued appellant's 10¼ sections at $8.35 per acre, which was about its cash market value taken as a whole; that appellees assessed and valued practically all the improved farm land in the central and western parts of the district at a flat valuation of $12 per acre, including the improvements, which value was only about one-fourth of the market value of the farm lands, and about one-third of the cash market value of said lands as a whole; that, after these values had been placed on the lands of appellant, it appeared before the board of trustees, acting as a board of equalization, and protested the high value placed on its lands as compared to the low value placed on the lands of the other residents of the district, and requested that its lands be valued for taxation in proportion to the tax values placed on the other property of the district, but the trustees and officers of the district adopted a system for valuing the property of the residents and other owners of property in the district at about one-third its actual cash market value, regardless of its actual or relative value, while appellant's property was valued at about its actual cash market value, which was illegal, arbitrary, and fraudulent, and done in pursuance of a definite system which was intended to and did have the effect of imposing unequal and unjust taxes on the property of appellant, and operated as an unfair discrimination against it, and deprived it of the equal and uniform assessment of its property in proportion to its value to which it is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the state and the United States; that the appellees fraudulently refused to reduce the value of its properties in proportion to the values placed on the other properties in the district for taxation; that the appellees fixed the total value of appellant's properties at $55,535, which is about its actual value, but that its value as compared with other properties in the district was and is about $18,512; that the taxes due by appellant on its real estate in the district are about $185.12, and the taxes on its personal property as assessed and levied are $42, and it is and at all times has been ready to pay said amount, and has tendered to the tax collector and officers of the school district said amount, but that the tax collector and officers refused to accept the money and issue a full receipt for appellant's taxes, and that it here tenders into court said sums of money, and is ready and anxious to pay such amount as the court finds is lawfully due based on the proportional value of its property compared with the value of other property in the district; that the tax collector of Lynn county is collecting the taxes for said district, and has possession of its tax rolls, and he and the trustees are asserting a lien against its property, and are threatening to and will demand and collect from appellant $370.25 in excess of the amount of taxes which appellant should pay unless restrained from so doing, and it has no adequate remedy at law.

It prays that a temporary order be issued restraining the appellees from collecting or attempting to collect as taxes any sum in excess of about $227.32, and that on final hearing the court ascertain the legal amount due by appellant, and appellees be perpetually enjoined from collecting or attempting to collect any sum of money as taxes for the year 1924 in excess of the amount the court finds appellant lawfully owes. It offers to do equity and prays for all relief to which it may be entitled in law or in equity.

The appellees answered by general demurrer, special exceptions, verified general denial, and specially pleaded that they were not guilty of discrimination against appellant; that the valuations were fixed after hearing testimony, and deliberating, and they arrived at the values at which the property was assessed without any corrupt or dishonest motive, and hence, their action is not subject to revision by the courts; that appellant's land was reasonably worth $15 to $20 per acre, and the value placed thereon by appellees was the same as that placed upon other property of a like character.

Appellees by cross-action sought to recover against appellant the sum of $555.35 for taxes for the year 1924 with the penalty of 10 per cent. on account of appellant's failure to pay the taxes before February 1, 1925, and for interest from said date at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, and asked for a foreclosure of its tax lien against the property of appellant, and for order of sale, etc.

In response to special issues submitted by the court, the jury found that the reasonable market value on January 1, 1924, of appellant's 10¼ sections of land was $14 per acre; that the reasonable market value of all other land in the Redwine independent school district on said date was $28 per acre, and that the trustees of the district exercised their best judgment and good faith in fixing the values of the property in the district for the year 1924.

On the answers of the jury to these issues and some other special issues which do not affect our disposition of the case, the court entered judgment that the Garza Land & Cattle Company take nothing by reason of its suit, and the temporary injunction theretofore granted be dissolved, and that the Redwine independent school district recover the sum of $555.35 on its cross-action, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, with a foreclosure of its tax lien, and the property be sold, etc.

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