Garza v. Harlingen Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 13-21-00345-CV |
| Parties | CIRILO GARZA AND JEANETTE GARZA, Appellants, v. HARLINGEN CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 445th District Court of Cameron County Texas.
Before Justice Longoria, Hinojosa, and Silva
By two issues, Appellants Cirilo and Jeanette Garza (the Garzas) appeal a trial court's granting of appellee Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District's (HCISD) plea to the jurisdiction and alternatively granting HCISD's no-evidence motion for summary judgment. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
On February 22, 2018, the Garzas' minor son, A.G.[1], passed away. Settlement discussions ensued after the Garzas informed HCISD of their potential claims against it. On January 10, 2019, the parties entered into the "Compromise Settlement Agreement and Full and Final Mutual Release" (settlement agreement). In exchange for terms agreed upon by HCISD, the Garzas released HCISD from:
[A]ny and all claims, causes of actions, debts, demands, obligations, liabilities and suits whatsoever, whether arising by statute or by common law, including, but not limited to, claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, [§] 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 U[.]S[.]C[.] [§] 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Office of Civil Rights, Department of Justice, Texas and United States Constitution, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, [and] the Texas Labor Code.
The terms of the settlement agreement, in relevant part, included the following:
On January 9, 2020, the Garzas filed their original petition asserting a breach of contract action against HCISD for its failure to comply with certain terms under the settlement agreement. In their original petition, the Garzas pleaded that "[i]n exchange for certain obligations, [the Garzas] agreed to release [HCISD] from any and all claims arising out of or in any way related to the incident, including but not limited to, claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, [§] 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 [U.S.C. §], [and] common law claims, among others." The Garzas alleged:
Specifically, but not exclusively, [HCISD] failed to provide book donations on the prevention of bullying and suicide prevention to be housed at all HCISD Middle Schools in honor of [A.G.] within sixty (60) business days of the signing of the Agreement. [HCISD] further failed to allow [the Garzas] to present [A.G.]'s Journey as coordinated and approved by the Chief Academic Officer and the requirements provided in [HCISD] Policy . . . .
The Garzas sought economic damages, actual damages (both general and special), nominal damages, exemplary damages, costs, and attorney's fees. The Garzas also pleaded that "[a]ll conditions precedent to [the Garzas'] claim for relief have been performed; have occurred; or have been excused from occurring."
On July 9, 2021, HCISD filed its "Plea to the Jurisdiction, or in the Alternative, No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment" with attached exhibits. In its filing, HCISD argued that the Garzas' breach of contract claim did not invoke Chapter 271's limited statutory waiver of immunity, and therefore, HCISD retained its sovereign immunity. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§ 271.151-271.160. In addition, HCISD argued that the Garzas could not establish the breach element of their breach of contract claim because HCISD complied with every term of the settlement agreement. In addition, HCISD argued that the Garzas could not establish the damage element of their breach of contract claim.
On August 3, 2021, the Garzas filed their "Plaintiffs' Objections and Motion to Strike Evidence and Their Response to Defendant's Plea to the Jurisdiction and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment" with attached exhibits, which included deposition testimony from Jeanette . In their filing, the Garzas objected to the admission of several exhibits that HCISD had attached to its plea to the jurisdiction and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The Garzas also argued that Chapter 271 was inapplicable, that the settlement agreement released HCISD from several classes of claims for which it has waived immunity, including claims under the United States Constitution related to Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that HCISD may not regain immunity by virtue of a settlement agreement. The Garzas also argued that they were entitled to expectancy damages, mental anguish damages, and attorney's fees related to the breach of settlement agreement. Finally, the Garzas argued that there was more than a scintilla of evidence pertaining to HCISD's alleged breach of the settlement agreement.
On August 10, 2021 the trial court heard arguments from the parties on HCISD's plea to the jurisdiction. HCISD reiterated its argument that it retained immunity pursuant to Chapter 271 of the Local Government Code because the Garzas had failed to claim damages within that provision's limited waiver of immunity. HCISD also argued that the Garzas could not establish the four elements of its breach of contract claim, and claimed that those elements were jurisdictional. The Garzas reiterated their argument that Chapter 271 was not applicable to the case, and that HCISD's immunity was waived under Lawson and others. HCISD claimed that Lawson was a plurality opinion that was not analogous to the instant case and had no precedential value. After hearing arguments by the parties, the trial court took the matter under advisement. No evidence was introduced or admitted into the record at the hearing.
On September 20, 2021, the trial court signed its order granting HCISD's plea to the jurisdiction and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the order stated:
The Court, having considered the Plea to the Jurisdiction, finds that the Plea is well-taken and should be granted. Alternatively, the Court, having considered the Motion, the credible summary judgment evidence and the arguments of counsel, finds that the Motion is well-taken and should be granted. I[t] [is] [therefore] [ordered], [adjudged] and [decreed] that [HCISD]'s Plea to the Jurisdiction, or in the Alternative, No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment is in all things hereby GRANTED.
This interlocutory appeal ensued. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8).
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's authority to decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002). A plaintiff must plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Fleming v. Patterson, 310 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2010, pet. struck) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446).
Immunity from suit deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. 2011). To prevail on a claim of immunity, the governmental defendant "may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both." Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). "When a jurisdictional plea challenges the pleadings, we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. "If, however, the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must move beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues, even if the evidence implicates both subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim." Id. at 770-71. "[I]f the plaintiffs' factual allegations are challenged with supporting evidence necessary to consideration of the plea to the jurisdiction, to avoid dismissal plaintiffs must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 771.
In their first issue, the Garzas argue that the trial court erred in granting HCISD's plea to the jurisdiction because the waiver of immunity provision of Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code is inapplicable. In addition, relying on Texas A&M University-Kingsville v. Lawson and its progeny, the Garzas argue that because HCISD agreed to settle classes of claims from which it was not immune, it could not thereafter claim immunity from suit in an action that alleged a breach of the settlement agreement. See 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2002); see also Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 271.151- 271.160.
In Lawson, the plaintiff sued the university after he was terminated, alleging various causes of action, including violations of the Whistleblower Act. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 518-19...
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