Garza v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-71931.,03-71931.
• Citation: 305 F.Supp.2d 777
• Parties: Trina GARZA, Individually and as Next Friend of Brittany Weir, a Minor, Plaintiff, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

305 F.Supp.2d 777

Trina GARZA, Individually and as Next Friend of Brittany Weir, a Minor, Plaintiff, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

No. 03-71931.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

February 23, 2004.

David R. Baxter, Esq., Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.

Robert Giroux, Jr., Esq., Southfield, MI, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Trina Garza commenced this suit in Wayne County Circuit Court, State of Michigan, on or around April 23, 2003, asserting claims on her own behalf and on behalf of her daughter, Brittany Weir, arising from the alleged molestation of Brittany by a fellow passenger aboard an August 4, 2001 flight operated by Defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc. Defendant removed the case to this Court on May 19, 2003, citing diversity of citizenship among the parties.

In lieu of answering the complaint, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on May 27, 2003, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable negligence claim under Michigan law. In support of this contention, Defendant cites Michigan court decisions holding that premises owners generally owe no duty to protect their business invitees against the criminal acts of a third party. Plaintiff responded to this motion on June 20, 2003, contending that various facts take this case outside the scope of the premises liability law cited by Defendant. Among other considerations, Plaintiff notes that her daughter paid an additional fee to participate in Defendant's "Unaccompanied Minor" program, under which Defendant allegedly promises to supervise child passengers who travel without a parent or guardian. On June 27, 2003, Defendant filed a reply brief in further support of its motion.

The Court conducted a hearing on Defendant's motion on January 22, 2004. Upon considering the arguments of counsel at this hearing, and upon reviewing the parties' written submissions and the record as a whole, the Court now is prepared to rule on Defendant's motion. This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's rulings.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Under the present procedural posture, the Court accepts as true the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint. In particular, the Court looks principally to the First Amended Complaint filed on or around April 29, 2003.¹

On August 4, 2001, Plaintiff Trina Garza's daughter and next friend, Brittany Weir, was a passenger on Defendant Northwest Airlines's Flight No. 1186 from Kansas City, Missouri to Detroit, Michigan. Brittany was 11 years old at the time, and was traveling unaccompanied by her parents or a guardian.

In anticipation that children occasionally will travel without their parents, Defendant has established an "Unaccompanied Minor" program. Under this program, unaccompanied children are charged an additional fee, above and beyond the fare paid by other passengers, in exchange for the promise that they will be "safe and supervised." (First Amended Complaint at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has established this program "for the purpose of encouraging children and families to participate so that Defendant could profit" from such travel. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant promised "safe and supervised" travel "knowing that people would rely on the[se] representations and pay money to participate in the program." (Id. at ¶ 10.)

For her August 4, 2001 flight to Detroit, Brittany Weir enrolled in Defendant's "Unaccompanied Minor" program and paid the requisite fee. Plaintiff alleges that Brittany participated in this program in "rel[iance] on all of Defendant's representations and promises" — namely, that Brittany "would have a safe, happy, [and] enjoyable flight under the care and supervision of Defendant's employees." (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 14.) Accordingly, when Brittany arrived at the airport that day, she was "placed into Defendant's care, supervision and control." (Id. at ¶ 13.)

Upon boarding the plane, Brittany was seated next to Ravichandra Thuluva, a man who was unknown to Brittany or her family. In making this seating assignment, Defendant allegedly failed to place Brittany in a designated section for unaccompanied minor travelers, nor did the airline otherwise seat her in an isolated area of the plane where she could be easily and regularly monitored. (See id. at ¶¶ 16, 32(c)-(d).) During the course of the flight from Kansas City to Detroit, Mr. Thuluva allegedly "touched, fondled, molested, assaulted and battered" Brittany. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Throughout this alleged assault, Brittany allegedly was left unsupervised and unmonitored by Defendant's flight attendants, and none of Defendant's employees made himself or herself available to Brittany or came to her aid.

Based on this incident, Plaintiff has brought a claim of negligence against Defendant on behalf of her daughter Brittany.² Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendant breached its duty of due care to Brittany in a number of respects, including: (i) failure to supervise Brittany in accordance with the assurances provided under the "Unaccompanied Minor" program; (ii) failure to place her in a designated section or otherwise provide for regular monitoring of Brittany during her flight to Detroit; (iii) failure to detect and halt the abuse of Brittany during the flight; (iv) failure to ensure that Defendant's personnel aboard the plane were aware that Brittany was an unaccompanied child and that she required monitoring and supervision; and (v) failure to establish procedures or means for an unaccompanied minor to report problems or seek assistance during a flight. Through its present motion, Defendant argues that the complaint fails to allege a legally cognizable duty under Michigan law, in light of Michigan court decisions holding that a premises owner owes no duty to protect its business invitees against the criminal acts of third parties.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Standards Governing Defendant's Motion

Through its present motion, Defendant has moved for the dismissal of Plaintiff's state-law negligence claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss under this Rule for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court is required to accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations set forth in Plaintiffs' complaint. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir.1976). However, the Court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12. "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." 829 F.2d at 12 (footnote, internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court will apply these standards in resolving Defendant's motion.

B. Plaintiff's Negligence Claim Is Not Foreclosed by the Michigan Law of Premises Liability.

Defendant's request for dismissal rests upon the simple premise that it owed no duty to protect or warn Plaintiff's daughter Brittany concerning the criminal acts of third parties. Under Michigan law,³ a plaintiff must establish, among other elements, that the defendant owed her a legal duty, see Schultz v. Consumers Power Co., 443 Mich. 445, 506 N.W.2d 175, 177 (1993), and the existence of such a duty is a question of law for the court to decide, see Scott v. Harper Recreation, Inc., 444 Mich. 441, 506 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1993); Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495, 418 N.W.2d 381, 383 (1988). In Defendant's view, Michigan law forecloses the existence of any such duty under the facts and allegations of this case, where the criminal act of a third party was an inextricable link in the chain of events that led to the injuries alleged in the complaint.

In arguing for dismissal, Defendant seizes upon the allegation in Plaintiff's complaint that Brittany Weir was "a business visitor and/or invitee on Defendant's airplane," thereby giving rise to a duty to "act with due care and caution for the protection of" this child passenger. (First Amended Complaint at ¶ 31.) Given this apparent appeal to a theory of premises liability, Defendant relies on a recent line of Michigan Supreme Court decisions holding that a business owner generally owes no duty to anticipate and prevent a third party's criminal acts against its invitees.

In particular, the Michigan Supreme Court recently examined the scope of a premises owner's duty in MacDonald v. PKT, Inc., 464 Mich. 322, 628 N.W.2d 33 (2001). In each of the two consolidated cases before the Court, the plaintiff had been struck and injured by sod ripped from the lawn of the Pine Knob Music Theater and thrown by a fellow concertgoer. As to one of these cases, at least, there was ample evidence that sod-throwing was foreseeable — the event coordinator had a policy in place before the performance dictating the appropriate response to such conduct, evidence was introduced of two prior sod-throwing incidents at this same venue, and the plaintiff was struck during the second episode of sod-throwing in a single evening. Under these circumstances, the lower courts resolved the plaintiffs' premises liability claims under a foreseeability analysis, holding in one case that the sod-throwing incident was foreseeable and in the other that it was not.

The Michigan Supreme Court rejected this analysis, and instead adhered to, and perhaps even extended, its prior decisions sharply limiting a premises owner's duty as to criminal acts on its premises. Specifically, the Court reiterated its ruling in earlier cases that "a merchant has no obligation generally to anticipate and prevent criminal acts against its invitees." MacDonald, 628 N.W.2d at 38. The Court explained:

[W]e have never recognized as "foreseeable" a criminal act that did not ... arise from a...