Gaskins v. Duval
| Decision Date | 09 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 04-12255-WGY. |
| Citation | 652 F.Supp.2d 116 |
| Parties | Tony GASKINS, Petitioner v. Ronald DUVAL, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
John J. Barter, Boston, MA, for Petitioner.
Eva M. Badway, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Respondent.
Tony Gaskins seeks a writ of habeas corpus from his conviction of murder in the first degree, contending that:
K. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to act when inadmissible hearsay statements were admitted into evidence.
See Petition for Habeas Corpus ("Petition") [Doc. No. 1] at ¶ 12.
The Supreme Judicial Court's recitation of the facts is succinct:
The jury could have found the following from the evidence. [Raymond] Coffill and [Leo] Womack had had a general plan in February, 1991, to rob a "drug house." On February 15, 1991, Coffill purchased cocaine from a drug house in Lynn and shared it with Womack. Later that day they went to the drug house to purchase more cocaine, but because they were short of funds, they were unable to make a purchase. As they were leaving, they met [Gaskins] and Robert Reid. The four pooled their resources, purchased cocaine, and went to Coffill's house where they discovered that the cocaine was of poor quality. There followed a loosely developed plan to rob the drug house. They returned to the drug house. Coffill and [Gaskins] knocked on the door, had an argument with the people inside about the poor quality of the cocaine, but failed to obtain any satisfaction. The four then consulted and decided that they would try to disrupt the business of the drug house. Two people were allowed to make purchases without incident. The victim then arrived alone. He apparently made a drug purchase, and, as he was leaving, Womack grabbed him and struck him on the head. [Gaskins] held a knife to the victim's body and told the victim, "Kick it in." The victim begged that they not stab him for a "twenty." The victim struggled and fled, pursued by [Gaskins], Womack, and Reid on foot and Coffill in an automobile. Ultimately, the four joined up in the automobile. [Gaskins] said [Gaskins] still had the knife. The victim died one week later as a result of a stab wound to his abdomen.
Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 419 Mass. 809, 810-11, 647 N.E.2d 429 (1995).
Coffill and Womack testified at the trial, each in exchange for an agreement that the charge against him for murdering the victim would be reduced to manslaughter and the prosecution would make a specific recommendation concerning the term of his incarceration: five to seven years for Coffill; fifteen to twenty for Womack. Id. at 810 & n. 1, 647 N.E.2d 429.
Gaskins was convicted in February 1992, and thereafter appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws c. 278, § 33E. He asserted in his direct appeal several of the claims now before this Court—D, H, J and K above—as well a challenge to the trial judge's denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty. Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 419 Mass. 809, 810, 647 N.E.2d 429 (1995). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Gaskins' conviction on March 31, 1995. Id. at 814, 647 N.E.2d 429.
Gaskins then, on March 5, 1997, filed in the Superior Court sitting in and for the County of Essex a motion for a new trial, asserting the same arguments made in his direct appeal as well as several new arguments. See Gaskin's March 1997 New Trial Motion in Respondent's Supplemental Answer ("Supp. Answer") [Doc. No. 26], Vol. II, Ex. O at C.1-C.48. The new arguments included those raised in the instant petition as claims B, G and I, above. See id.; Petition at ¶ 12. On May 8, 1997, the motion judge ruled that "all of the issues now raised by the defendant in this motion for a new trial have either been previously raised and ruled upon on direct appeal, or have been waived." See Memorandum Regarding Motion for New Trial in Supp. Answer, Vol. II, Ex. O at F.5.
On May 30, 1997, Gaskins sought leave to appeal from a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, attaching a copy of the denial of his motion.1 See May 1997 Motion for Leave to Appeal in Supp. Answer, Vol. II, Ex. O. at G.1-G.12. The single justice denied his request in a one-line order: "The defendant's application pursuant to G.L. c. 278, s. 33E, for leave to appeal from the denial of defendant's motion for new trial, is denied." Id. Ex. O at H.
Gaskins later filed two additional motions for a new trial, both raising the jury pool composition issue. Both were rejected. See Supp. Answer, Vol. II, Ex. O at I, J. On July 10, 1998, Gaskins sought leave to appeal the denial of his third motion for a new trial. See July 1998 motion for leave to appeal in Supp. Answer, Vol. II, Ex. M. He asserted only one claim in his application—that the composition of the jury pool should have been challenged by his counsel. Id. On January 22, 1999, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the request. Id. at Ex. Q.
While these proceedings were ongoing in the courts of the Commonwealth, Gaskins, on July 2, 1997, filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. See Docket Sheet in Supp. Answer, Vol. 1, Ex. E. The Court dismissed it in 2000 as unexhausted, ruling that one of the claims presented in the petition, the prosecutorial misconduct claim, was materially broader than when originally presented in the courts of the Commonwealth and was supported by new evidence—an affidavit by a key witness (Womack) stating that he was coerced by the prosecutor to give false testimony. See Gaskins v. Duval, 89 F.Supp.2d 139, 142 (D.Mass.2000).2
Gaskins later, on October 18, 2004, filed the instant petition along with a motion to stay. Petition [Doc. No. 3]; Motion to Stay [Doc. No. 1]. On November 2, 2004, the Court stayed the petition and administratively closed the case to allow Gaskins to return to the courts of the Commonwealth to exhaust his claims.
In April 2000, Gaskins filed another motion for a new trial in the Superior Court, submitting new evidence pertaining to the alleged perjured testimony and arguing that he was actually innocent and that the jury instructions on malice were incorrect. See Gaskins' 2008 Petition for Leave to Appeal in Supp. Answer, Vol. III, Ex. S, at 3. On July 12, 2002, a Justice in the Superior Court denied the motion in part, but allowed an evidentiary hearing on the prosecutorial misconduct issue and argument on the erroneous third prong malice issue. See Excerpt from Ruling in Supp. Answer, Vol. III, Ex. U at 0000235-0000239. After holding an evidentiary hearing and considering the testimony of Womack's trial attorney and an affidavit from the prosecutor, and noting Womack's refusal to testify at the evidentiary hearing, the motion judge, on February 26, 2008, found Womack's affidavit not credible and denied the motion for a new trial. See February 2008 Ruling in Supp. Answer, Vol. III, Ex. U at 0000263.
Gaskins again sought leave to appeal, see March 2008 Petition for Leave to Appeal in Supp. Answer, Vol. III, Ex. S, and again was denied. See August 2008 Single Justice Ruling in Supp. Answer, Vol. III, Ex. W. The Single Justice concluded that the issues pertaining to the instructions on malice, the destruction of exculpatory evidence, and the ineffectiveness of counsel were not new or substantial, and that the issue pertaining to prosecutorial misconduct was new but not substantial. Id.
On August 20, 2008, this Court granted Gaskins' motion to remove the stay on his petition for habeas corpus and restored the case to the docket. The Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on October 2, 2008 [Doc. No. 18], arguing that the limitations period had run and that Gaskin had failed to establish circumstances warranting the application of the equitable tolling doctrine. See Respondent's Mem. in Support Mtn. to Dismiss [Doc. NO. 19] at 1-2. The Court denied the motion on November 24, 2008.
On February 17, 2009, the Respondent submitted its answer [Doc. No. 25] and a motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. No. 28], supported by a memorandum of law. See Respondent's Mem. in Support Mtn. Judg. on Pleadings ( ) [Doc. No. 28]. It argued that the petition should be dismissed because Gaskin had not exhausted claims B, E, G, I, and J. See Answer [Doc. No. 25] at 10; Resp. Mem. at 5. Gaskins opposed the motion. See Gaskins Mem. in Opposition ("Gaskins Opp'n") [Doc. No. 31]. At a hearing on April 15, 2009, the Court denied the Respondent's motion, reserved the exhaustion issue, and ordered briefing on the merits.
Gaskins submitted his memorandum in support of his petition on June 9, 2009 ("Gaskins' Mem.") [Doc. No. 37], and a "Second Supplemental Memorandum" on June 15, 2009 [Doc. No. 40]. He subsequently moved for discovery [Doc. No. 38] and an evidentiary hearing [Doc. No....
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Gaskins v. Duval
...the petition and administratively closed the case while Gaskins exhausted his claims in state court. See Gaskins v. Duval, 652 F.Supp.2d 116, 122 (D.Mass.2009) ( “ Gaskins V ”). As noted above, Gaskins's state court efforts ended when the single SJC Justice denied further review on August 7......