Gaskins v. Duval

• Citation: 640 F.3d 443
• Decision Date: 13 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–2322.,09–2322.
• Parties: Tony B. GASKINS, Petitioner, Appellant,v.Ronald T. DUVAL, Respondent, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

640 F.3d 443

Tony B. GASKINS, Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
Ronald T. DUVAL, Respondent, Appellee.

No. 09–2322.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard May 7, 2010.Decided April 13, 2011.

[640 F.3d 444]

John J. Barter, for appellant.Eva M. Badway, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, with whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Tony Gaskins appeals the district court's denial of his request for habeas corpus relief from his 1992 Massachusetts state court conviction for first degree murder. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He claims that his conviction was based on coerced and perjured testimony and faulty jury instructions. Massachusetts contends that the district court erred in failing to dismiss the petition as untimely, but correctly decided its substance. The statute of limitations issue presents a close question that merits some discussion, but it is one that we ultimately need not resolve. After

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careful review of the petition and the lengthy trail of prior proceedings, we affirm the denial on the merits.

I. Factual Background & Procedural Trail A. Trial

We take the facts of conviction as recounted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) when it affirmed Gaskins's conviction on direct appeal, supplementing those with other record facts consistent with the SJC's findings. Yeboah–Sefah v. Ficco, 556 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 639, 175 L.Ed.2d 491 (2009); Healy v. Spencer, 453 F.3d 21, 22 (1st Cir.2006). According to the SJC:

The jury could have found the following from the evidence. [Raymond] Coffill and [Leo] Womack had had a general plan in February, 1991, to rob a “drug house.” On February 15, 1991, Coffill purchased cocaine from a drug house in Lynn and shared it with Womack. Later that day they went to the drug house to purchase more cocaine, but because they were short of funds, they were unable to make a purchase. As they were leaving, they met [Gaskins] and Robert Reid. The four pooled their resources, purchased cocaine, and went to Coffill's house where they discovered that the cocaine was of poor quality. There followed a loosely developed plan to rob the drug house. They returned to the drug house. Coffill and [Gaskins] knocked on the door, had an argument with the people inside about the poor quality of the cocaine, but failed to obtain any satisfaction. The four then consulted and decided that they would try to disrupt the business of the drug house. Two people were allowed to make purchases without incident. The victim then arrived alone. He apparently made a drug purchase, and, as he was leaving, Womack grabbed him and struck him on the head. [Gaskins] held a knife to the victim's body and told the victim, “Kick it in.” The victim begged that they not stab him for a “twenty.” The victim struggled and fled, pursued by [Gaskins], Womack, and Reid on foot and Coffill in an automobile. Ultimately, the four joined up in the automobile. [Gaskins] said “I stuck that nigger. He didn't make the fence. I got him.” [Gaskins] still had the knife. The victim died one week later as a result of a stab wound to his abdomen.

Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 419 Mass. 809, 647 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1995) ( “ Gaskins I ”).

Both Coffill and Womack testified at Gaskins's trial in exchange for reduced charges and sentences. Each had murder charges reduced to manslaughter. Id. Gaskins was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.

B. Direct Appeal

Gaskins appealed to the SJC. He argued that: 1) the trial judge erred in failing to order a not guilty finding; 2) the jury was improperly instructed concerning the possibility of a second degree murder verdict; and 3) counsel was constitutionally ineffective both in failing to challenge the composition of the jury pool and failing to offer certain evidence. Id. at 430. The SJC denied Gaskins's appeal in 1995.

C. First New Trial Motion

In 1997, Gaskins filed his first motion for new trial in state superior court. In addition to the points raised in his direct appeal, he argued that the prosecution used perjured testimony to convict him and inappropriately vouched for the credibility of Womack and Coffill. He also alleged that the trial judge provided an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction

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and that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, No. 91–018642, Order at 2 (Mass.Sup.Ct. May 8, 1997). The motion was denied, with the judge ruling that “[a]ll of the issues now raised ... in this motion ... have either been previously raised and ruled upon in the prior appeal, or have been waived.” Id. The issues raised in the new trial motion that were held to be waived were deemed so because Gaskins had not identified them in his direct appeal. Id. (citing Mass. R.Crim. P. 30(c)(2)). Gaskins sought leave to appeal that decision with respect to his trial counsel's failure to challenge the composition of the jury pool. An SJC “gatekeeper” justice denied leave to appeal in January 1999.¹

D. First Habeas Petition

Meanwhile, in July 1997, during the pendency of his state court new trial motion, Gaskins filed a habeas petition in federal court. The petition contained an expanded version of his claim that his conviction was caused, in part, by Womack's perjury, and included an affidavit from Womack asserting that he was coerced by the prosecutor to lie on the witness stand. See Gaskins v. Duval, 89 F.Supp.2d 139, 141 (D.Mass.2000) (“ Gaskins III ”).² The district court dismissed the petition as untimely, but we reversed, holding that the applicable limitations period was tolled while Gaskins's state court motion was pending. Gaskins v. Duval, 183 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.1999) ( “ Gaskins II ”).

On remand, the district court dismissed the petition without prejudice because it contained both exhausted claims and the unexhausted expanded perjury claim. Gaskins III, 89 F.Supp.2d at 142.

E. Further State Proceedings

Gaskins returned to state court after the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his habeas petition and filed another motion for new trial in April 2000. He asserted two grounds relevant here: 1) prosecutorial misconduct in light of the Womack affidavit; and 2) erroneous jury instructions which permitted an inference of malice on less than a strong likelihood of death. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, No. 91–018642, Order at 4 (Mass.Sup.Ct. July 12, 2002). The Superior Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the prosecutorial misconduct issue and further argument on the jury instruction claim. Id. at 6–7.

The evidentiary hearing took place in December 2002. In an order dated February 13, 2003, the Superior Court denied the motion with respect to the jury instruction issue. The Court reasoned both that Gaskins had waived the jury instruction issue because it was not addressed in his direct appeal or any post-trial motions, and alternatively, that the argument failed substantively.

Womack did not testify at the December 2002 evidentiary hearing, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Somewhat ironically, he claimed before the hearing that he was coerced into signing the very affidavit in which he announced that he was coerced to lie at Gaskins's trial, and thus argued that

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he did not waive his Fifth Amendment rights by providing that affidavit.

As a result of Womack's refusal to testify, the superior court, although it accepted evidence from many of the individuals involved in preparing Womack for trial, did not reach the substance of Gaskins's claim that Womack had essentially recanted his trial testimony. However, based on Womack's testimony at an in camera hearing ³ limited to his Fifth Amendment claim, the court rejected Womack's claim that he was coerced into signing the recantation affidavit and thus held that Womack had waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. The court concluded that “[o]n the circumstances surrounding the preparation and signing of the affidavit ... Womack's testimony [was] not credible or believable.” In addition, the court stated that “on the claim of coercion in the signing of the affidavit, Womack did not appear, and I find he was not, truthful. In light of all the circumstances and evidence, Womack's explanations were not plausible and I do not accept them.” Commonwealth v. Gaskins, No. 91–018642, slip op. at 4 (Mass.Sup.Ct. Feb. 13, 2003). The superior court stayed the proceedings in order to allow Womack to pursue an appeal of the court's Fifth Amendment ruling. The SJC ruled against Womack, holding that he could refuse to testify at a reconvened hearing and then appeal from any ensuing contempt order. In re Womack, 444 Mass. 1015, 831 N.E.2d 881 (2005).

The matter returned to the same superior court judge in 2006, in order to reach the remaining merits of Gaskins's new trial motion, which by then had been pending for more than five years. Womack again refused to testify. Finally, in February 2008, the judge issued a twelve-page decision denying Gaskins's new trial motion on two grounds. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, No. 91–18642, Order at 11–12 (Mass.Sup.Ct. Feb. 25, 2008). First, while referring to its 2003 order,⁴ the court stated that it had previously found that “ ‘Womack's explanations [regarding the prosecution's alleged actions] were not plausible’ and that the court ‘[did] not accept them.’ ” (brackets in original). This was erroneous because, as previously noted, the 2003 order addressed Womack's credibility only with respect to whether he was coerced into signing the recantation affidavit, and not the affidavit relating to the issue of whether Womack was coerced to testify falsely at Gaskins's trial. The second basis for denying the new trial motion was the additional evidence submitted by the Commonwealth in connection with the motion that undermined the perjury claim, which the...