Gastelum v. Cotton on U.S., Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 April 2023
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-01194-SAB
• Parties: FERNANDO GASTELUM, Plaintiff, v. COTTON ON USA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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FERNANDO GASTELUM, Plaintiff, v. COTTON ON USA, INC., Defendant.

No. 1:22-cv-01194-SAB

United States District Court, E.D. California

April 14, 2023

DEADLINE MAY 1, 2023

ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION, AND DISMISSING STATE LAW CLAIMS ORDER TO FILE JOINT SCHEDULING REPORT

(ECF NOS. 11, 13, 14)

On February 1, 2023, the Court issued an order requiring Fernando Gastelum (“Plaintiff”) to show cause as to why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his State law claims.^[1] (ECF No. 11.) Presently before the Court are the parties' responses to its order to show cause. Having considered the briefs submitted by the parties, as well as the Court's file the Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court declines to exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's State law claims and those claims shall be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se^[2] in this accessibility litigation against Defendant Cotton On USA, Inc. (“Defendant”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff alleges he is a senior citizen and is missing a leg; sometimes he uses a wheelchair for mobility, whereas at other times, he uses a prosthetic leg and a cane. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3-4.) Plaintiff lives in Casa Grande, Arizona, but he visits “the geographical area where the Stores are located [ i.e., California] on a regular basis, two to four times per year,” for unspecified reasons. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 20.) Plaintiff alleges he visited two of Defendant's clothing stores-one located in Fresno, California, and the other located in Bakersfield, California (id. at ¶¶ 5, 10, 14)-and discovered both stores violated the accessibility standards,^[3] thus “den[ying] Plaintiff full and equal access” under federal and California state law. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12, 15-16, 25, 26, 29, 32.)

The complaint asserts claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53, and California's Disabled Persons Act (“DPA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54-54.3. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 3-6.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under the ADA; he also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under the Unruh Act and DPA-plus actual damages, statutory damages and treble damages under the Unruh Act, and $1,000.00 per violation under the DPA, costs and expenses, and “lawyer's fees should Plaintiff hire a lawyer.” (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 30, 36.)

On December 19, 2022, Defendant filed an answer to the complaint. (ECF No. 6.) On February 1, 2023, the Court issued the instant order to show cause. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff filed a response to the Court's order to show cause on February 6, 2023 (ECF No. 13), and Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff's filing on February 17, 2023 (ECF No. 14). The matter is now fully briefed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are so related to claims over which the court has original jurisdiction that they form the same case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs (Gibbs), 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Kuba v. 1-A Agr. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 2004). Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right.”). “The propriety of exercising supplemental jurisdiction can be raised by the parties or sua sponte by the courts,” Carne v. Stanislaus Cnty. Animal Servs. Agency, 445 F.Supp.3d 772, 774-75 (E.D. Cal. 2020), so long as the district court provides reasoning “for the decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001, n.3 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, even where a plaintiff establishes standing sufficient to make the court's exercise of jurisdiction over federal claims appropriate, the court retains discretion over whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 provides a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if: (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1)-(4). The Supreme Court has explained that, in determining whether to decline jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c), courts must consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction would promote judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, and comity. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997) (noting discretion may be exercised “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims.”); see also Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court stressed that comity and fairness, in particular, are important considerations underlying the decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.

Elaborating on the Supreme Court's ruling in Gibbs, the Ninth Circuit recently held that, when declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for a state law claim under § 1367(c)(4), district courts must apply the following two-step inquiry: first, the district court must sufficiently explain why the circumstances of the case are exceptional under § 1367(c)(4); and second, the court must show the balance of the Gibbs values provides compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction in such circumstances. Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Arroyo v. Rojas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2021)).

III. DISCUSSION

In consideration of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, and comity, the Court finds Plaintiff's state law claims substantially predominate over the ADA claim and exceptional circumstances warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(2), (4); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.

A. The State Claims Substantially Predominate

A court may dismiss state law claims when “in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought,” the state law claims substantially predominate over the federal claims. Rutherford v. Ara Lebanese Grill, No. 18-CV-01497-AJB-WVG, 2019 WL 1057919, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(2).

As to proof and the scope of issues raised, the Court notes the Unruh Act is generally considered the state law analog to the ADA. Both acts seek to prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) with Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). Notably, the Unruh Act provides that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). However, an Unruh Act claim may alternatively be asserted “independent of an ADA claim,” where the plaintiff pleads intentional discrimination in violation of the statute. Schutza v. McDonald's Corp. (McDonald's), 133 F.Supp.3d 1241, 1247-48 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted) (finding state law claims predominated where California accessibility standards provided independent basis for liability on state law claims, and plaintiff alleged intentional discrimination). By contrast, “a plaintiff need not show intentional discrimination in order to make out a violation of the ADA.” Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2004).

Another crucial distinction between the ADA and the state law claims is the heightened procedural and filing requirements under the Unruh Act for “high frequency litigants” of accessibility claims, like Plaintiff.^[4] Under this heightened pleading standard, “[e]xcept in complaints that allege physical injury or damage to property, a complaint filed by or on behalf of a high frequency litigant” is required to: (1) identify the number of complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility claim that were filed during the last 12 months; (2) identify the reason the individual was in the geographic area of the defendant's business; (3) identify the reason why the individual desired access to the defendant's business, including the specific commercial, business, personal, social leisure recreational (or other) purpose; (4) be a verified complaint; and (5) the plaintiff must pay a $1,000 filing fee at the time of the filing of the initial complaint, in addition to the standard filing fees. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50; Cal. Gov't Code § 70616.5. When filing an accessibility claim in federal court, by contrast, a plaintiff is held only to the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and required to pay the filing fee of $405.00. Moreover, it is even possible that an indigent pro se plaintiff could seek and obtain a filing fee waiver pursuant to the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Thus, as Defendant aptly notes (see ECF No. 14 at 4), these heightened requirements result in a “massive difference” in terms of the issues raised in ADA versus Unruh Act/DPA...