Gaster v. Coldiron

• Decision Date: 06 September 1972
• Citation: 73 A.L.R.3d 510,297 A.2d 384
• Parties: Donald S. GASTER, General Contractor, et al., Defendants Below, Appellants, v. J. R. COLDIRON, t/a Coldiron Drywall Construction Co., Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 384

297 A.2d 384

73 A.L.R.3d 510

Donald S. GASTER, General Contractor, et al., Defendants Below, Appellants, v. J. R. COLDIRON, t/a Coldiron Drywall Construction Co.,

Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Sept. 6, 1972.

Upon appeal from Superior Court.

William F. Lynch, II, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for defendants below, appellants.

Morton Richard Kimmel, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.

CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., and DUFFY, Chancellor, sitting.

CAREY, Justice:

J. R. Coldiron, t/a Coldiron Dry Wall Construction Co. (herein 'Coldiron'), the appellee, as a subcontractor filed a mechanics lien action in Superior Court against the appellants, Donald S. Gaster and wife (herein 'Gaster'), as general contractors, and the leaseholder and the owner of a property in New Castle County, upon which is erected an apartment building. After a jury trial, judgment was entered against the defendants below (278 A.2d 328), whereupon they appealed. Appellants contend that the amount of the judgment is excessive in that: (1) although the Court granted a remittitur, it did not include all credits which should be allowed; and (2) the Court erred as a matter of law in allowing a counsel fee to Coldiron as part of the award.

I.

Appellants' first contention is based upon certain testimony which they rely upon as showing that some of the work was not properly done according to the specifications; other testimony was to the contrary. The issue was one of fact and the jury obviously accepted as true much of the evidence which favored the appellee. The credits allowed by the trial Judge covered items found by him to be unsupported by any evidence. He properly held that those items could not be allowed; he refused to apply that same ruling to the items which were supported by testimony, even though it was contradicted by other witnesses. We find no reversible error with respect to this issue. The findings of a jury are conclusive, on appeal, if supported by any evidence. Del.Const., Art. 4 § 11(1)(a), Del.C.Ann.

II.

Appellants' second contention is that the statute, which allows a recovery of attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff in a mechanics lien case, is unconstitutional. They contend that it is discriminatory because it permits no such allowance to a successful defendant and therefore violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. The Act (T. 10, Del.C. § 3912) reads as follows:

' § 3912. In all causes of action, suits, matters, or proceedings brought for the enforcement of any note, bond, mechanics lien, mortgage, or other instrument of writing, if the plaintiff or lien holder in the action, suit or proceeding recovers judgment in any sum, he may also recover reasonable counsel fees, which shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the action, suit or proceeding. Such counsel fees shall not in any such action, suit or proceeding, exceed five per cent of the amount adjudged for principal and interest. Such counsel fees shall not be entered as a part of such judgment unless the note, bond, mortgage, or other instrument of writing sued upon, by the terms thereof, expressly provides for the payment and allowance thereof, except in the cases of mechanics liens in which no express agreement shall be necessary in order to entitle the lien holder to his reasonable counsel fees.'

We are, of course, concerned only with that part of the last sentence which deals with mechanics liens, involving no agreement between the parties concerning counsel fees.

It is well-established law that any legislation which discriminates for or against a limited class of litigants is unconstitutional unless it is based upon a legally-cognizable distinction or reason. Betts v. Zeller, Del.Supr., 263 A.2d 290 (1970); Mills v. State, Del.Supr., 256 A.2d 752 (1969); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 489, p. 239. The question in this case, is therefore, whether there is a proper reason or basis for requiring a losing defendant in a mechanics lien action to pay a fee for his opponent's attorney when no such burden is placed upon a losing plaintiff.

It is argued, first, that this distinction is justified by the fact that the plaintiff in the action has a greater burden than does a defendant. If this be the reason for the distinction, one wonders why it is permitted in mechanics lien cases and not in other contract actions; the burden imposed upon a plaintiff is the same in both types of cases. The appellee cites Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 34 S.Ct. 678, 58 L.Ed. 1135, as holding that this distinction--the extra burden upon a plaintiff--is sufficient to support the statutory allowance. But that decision does not hold that a party's position as plaintiff is of itself a sufficient ground for the distinction. In discussing the matter, the Court prefaced its comment with the clause, 'If the classification is otherwise reasonable'. Actually, as we understand the decision, it stands only for the proposition...