Gates-Chili Central School Dist. v. State

Decision Date17 December 1976
Docket NumberNos. 1,GATES-CHILI,2,s. 1
Citation55 A.D.2d 44,389 N.Y.S.2d 716
PartiesCENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT and Helen L. Knaak, Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. Henry J. HARRINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Sullivan, Gough, Skipworth, Summers & Smith, Rochester, for appellants (Walter C. Eves, Rochester, of counsel).

Ruth Kessler Toch, Sol. Gen., Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Albany, for respondent (Douglas L. Manley, Albany, of counsel).

Before MOULE, J.P., and CARDAMONE, SIMONS, MAHONEY and DILLON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Claimants appeal in each action from an order of the Court of Claims granting the State's motion to dismiss the claim as untimely.

These actions arise from separate automobile accidents and each claim seeks contribution from the State based upon payments made by the respective claimants to settle Supreme Court actions brought against them by persons injured by motor vehicles which claimants owned and operated. The claims for contribution are predicated upon the State's alleged failure to discharge its statutory responsibility to ensure that the state highways are properly maintained and rest upon the principles of liability announced by the Court of Appeals in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288.

The relevant facts in Appeal No. 1 are as follows: On January 22, 1970 a motor vehicle owned by the claimant school district and operated by the claimant Helen Knaak skidded on an icy road surface and injured Theodore and Audrey Powell. On April 9, 1970 the Powells served upon the claimants a notice of claim and on October 9, 1970 commenced an action against them to recover damages for injuries sustained in the accident. On November 16, 1973 the action was settled for $175,000. The Powells were paid on January 18, 1974 and executed a release which expressly released the State of New York but recited that it did not release any right of contribution which the claimants might have against the State. The notice of claim against the State was filed on February 14, 1974.

The relevant facts in Appeal No. 2 are as follows: On February 21, 1971 a motor vehicle owned and operated by claimant, Henry J. Harrington, skidded on a patch of icy pavement and injured George and Mary DeLucia. On August 26, 1971 the DeLucias commenced an action against Harrington to recover damages for injuries sustained in the accident. On January 31, 1974 the action was settled for $8,500. The DeLucias were paid the following day and executed a release which also expressly released the State of New York. The notice of claim against the state was filed on March 22, 1974.

The Court of Claims granted the State's motion for dismissal on the grounds that the claimants had failed to file timely notices of claim under section 10 of the Court of Claims Act. We, however, disagree.

Initially, there can be no doubt that the Court of Claims possessed jurisdiction to entertain an action for Dole contribution. In the absence of an express contract, the right to indemnity is said to rest upon an implied contract which arises by operation of law to prevent a result which may be unjust or unsatisfactory (Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed., § 51, p. 310; McFall v. Compagnie Mar. Belge (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107 N.E.2d 463, 470). The action for contribution under Dole has it origins in the same implied-in-law contract which gives rise to the right to indemnification. (See Adams v. Lindsay, 77 Misc.2d 824, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356; see also Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts, § 259; Keener, Law of Quasi-Contracts, p. 408, cf. p. 406; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, p. 19 (1976--77 Supp.); C3019:34, p. 236).

Since New York's waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to suit for claims arising out of the 'breach of a contract, express or implied' (Court of Claims Act, § 9) encompasses claims for contracts implied in law as well as those implied in fact (see Guaranty Trust Co. v. State, 299 N.Y. 295, 302, 86 N.E.2d 754, 757; Davison, Claims Against the State of New York, par. 22.04), the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to entertain claims for contribution under Dole.

Having decided the issue of jurisdiction, the question still remains as to when these causes of action accrued for purposes of the six month statute of limitations in section 10, subd. 4 of the Court of Claims Act. 1 Since a claim for Dole contribution is essentially similar to one for indemnification, the accrual date principles in actions for indemnity should be applied in the instant case. (See Zillman v. Meadow-brook Hosp., 73 Misc.2d 726, 342 N.Y.S.2d 302, revd. on other grnds., 45 A.D.2d 267, 358 N.Y.S.2d 466; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, p. 19 (1976--77 Supp.); C3019:65, p. 289.) Although admittedly there is disagreement as to whether the precise accrual date accrues when payment is made to the tort victim (Berlin & Jones, Inc. v. State, 85 Misc.2d 970, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778; Adams v. Lindsay, 77 Misc.2d 824, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356; see also, Tarantola v. Williams, 48 A.D.2d 552, 555, 371 N.Y.S.2d 136, 140) or at the time of verdict or judgment against the party seeking contribution (see, e.g., Zillman v. Meadowbrook Hosp., supra; Marchese v. City of Albany, 81 Misc.2d 166, 364 N.Y.S.2d 140). A resolution of these conflicting decisions, however, is unnecessary to our decision in the instant case. While the tort actions giving rise to these suits for contribution were settled before they reached judgment, the courts and commentators have properly regarded a settlement as the equivalent of a judgment for the purposes of determining the date of accrual. Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 218,67 N.E. 439, 440; Lanser v. Baumrin, 2 Misc.2d 610, 611, 151 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467; see Occhialino, 'Contribution', Nineteenth Annual Report of...

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7 cases
  • People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 10 Aprile 1980
    ...710, 711; Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State (1977) 57 App.Div.2d 237, 394 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465; Gates-Chili Central School Dist. v. State (1976) 55 App.Div.2d 44, 389 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718. See also United States Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra, 470 F.2d 487 (action for "contribution or inde......
  • Green Bus Lines, Inc. v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 14 Aprile 1980
    ...851, 286 N.E.2d 241), it had its foundation in the judicial expansion of the indemnity theory (see Gates-Chili Cent. School Dist. v. State of New York, 55 A.D.2d 44, 45-46, 389 N.Y.S.2d 716; Adams v. Lindsay, 77 Misc.2d 824, 825-826, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356; Zillman v. Meadowbrook Hosp. Co., 73 Mi......
  • Barrett v. US
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 8 Settembre 1987
    ...case, New York law permits tort suits—as well as suits for contribution—against the state. See Gates-Chili Central School District v. State, 55 A.D.2d 44, 389 N.Y.S.2d 716 (4th Dep't 1976). The court, therefore, concludes that the United States states a claim for contribution against the 4.......
  • Trznadel v. E. W. Howell Corp.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 30 Dicembre 1981
    ...indemnity arises by operation of law to prevent a result which may be unjust or unsatisfactory. See Gates-Chili Central School Dist. v. State, 55 A.D.2d 44, 389 N.Y.S.2d 716 (4th Dept. 1976). The underpinnings of this doctrine of "implied" or "quasi-contractual" or "common law" indemnificat......
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