Gates v. School-Dist.

Decision Date11 March 1893
Citation21 S.W. 1060
PartiesGATES v. SCHOOL-DIST. OF FT. SMITH.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from circuit court, Sebastian county; R. T. Powell, Special Judge.

Action by N. P. Gates against the school district of Ft. Smith to recover damages in the sum of $1,500 for unlawfully discharging plaintiff from his employment of school superintendent. There was judgment for plaintiff for $1,103, and he appeals. Modified.

J. B. McDonough and Edgar E. Bryant, for appellant. Rogers & Read, for appellee.

BATTLE, J.

The school district of Ft. Smith, in May, 1888, employed N. P. Gates to superintend its public schools for 12 months, commencing on the 1st of July, 1888, and ending on the 30th of June, 1889, and agreed to give to him for his services a salary of $1,800 per annum, payable in monthly installments of $150. He entered upon the discharge of his duties as such superintendent, and continued to discharge them from July 1, to November 7, 1888, when the school district discharged him without cause, and refused to allow him to act any longer as such superintendent, although he was willing and offered to perform his contract. On the 13th of February, 1891, he brought an action against the school district for $335, for services actually rendered the defendant from September 1 to November 7, 1888, and for $1,165 for damages sustained by him on account of the refusal of the defendant to permit him to fully perform his contract.

The defendant answered, saying that the plaintiff had failed, after his discharge, to make diligent and reasonable efforts to obtain employment in the line of his profession, and, instead thereof, removed to his farm in Washington county, in this state, a distance of nearly 100 miles from Ft. Smith, and there devoted a part of the year to farming and improving his fruit farm, and was benefited by so doing in the sum of $1,200, and insisted that this amount should be deducted from any damages the plaintiff might recover.

In the trial of the action the court gave to the jury an instruction numbered 10, and in the following language: "You are instructed that whatever plaintiff earned by his labor and the benefits received therefrom upon his farm, and whatever benefits he received by reason of his labor, residence upon, and personal supervision of his farm, should be deducted from the contract price in estimating plaintiff's damages."

And also gave an instruction numbered 11, in the words following: "You are instructed that the necessary expenses in carrying out plaintiff's contract with defendant that were saved by plaintiff and rendered unnecessary by his removal to his farm should be deducted from the damages recovered by the plaintiff."

And instructed them to return special verdicts in answer to the following questions: "No. 1. What do you assess, if any, under court's instruction number 11, for the amount of the expenses saved by plaintiff by his removal from Fort Smith to his farm? No. 2. What amount, under court's instruction number 10, do you assess for whatever was earned by plaintiff by his labor and benefits he received by reason of his labor, residence upon, and personal supervision of his farm?"

The jury returned into court a verdict as follows: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of $335, with interest from November 7, 1888, at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum; and we, the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of $768, with interest from June 30, 1889, at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. H. M. Tate, Foreman."

And answered the questions propounded to them by saying in reply to the first "$349" and to the second "$48." The plaintiff thereupon moved for a judgment for the sums found for him in the general verdict and the $349 and $48 and interest thereon, but the court denied the motion, and rendered a judgment in accordance with the general verdict.

Plaintiff presented his bill of exceptions, which were signed and made a part of the record; and he appealed to this court without filing a motion for a new trial.

The general verdict and special findings of the jury clearly show the facts upon which the judgment of the court was based. The error complained of by the appellant is the failure of the court to pronounce judgment according to such facts and the law of the case. He insists that judgment should have been rendered in his favor against the appellee for the $335 and $1,165 and interest, without deduction; and this is the only error of which he complains. Inasmuch as the facts upon which this complaint is predicated appear in the verdicts of the jury, upon which the judgment of the court was rendered, no motion for a new trial was necessary to bring it before this court for review. Mansf. Dig. § 5143; Smith v. Hollis, 46 Ark. 17; Railroad Co. v. Brice, 84 Ky. 298, 1 S. W. Rep. 483.

Did the court err? When one contracts to employ another for a stated time, at a certain compensation for the whole period, and discharges him, without cause, before the expiration of the time, he is liable for damages. If the employe sues after the term of service has...

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