Gates v. State

• Decision Date: 06 October 1891
• Citation: 28 N.E. 373,128 N.Y. 221
• Parties: GATES v. STATE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

128 N.Y. 221

28 N.E. 373

GATES

v.STATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 6, 1891.

Appeal from board of claims.

Claim by William Gates against the state of New York for personal injuries. There was no award by the board of claims, and claimant appeals. Affirmed.

The appellant claimed to recover against the state for personal injuries received from the falling of a bridge over the Oswego canal, in the work of repairing which, at the time, he was engaged. His regular employment had been that of an ordinary laborer upon one of the state scows on the canal. The bridge had been reported to the canal commissioners, in the year previous to the accident, to be structurally unsound, and in a very dangerous condition. The foreman of the state scow, upon which the claimant was working, when he received his directions, proceeded to the bridge in question to make certain repairs upon it. When this work was almost completed the structure gave way, from its general unsoundness; and the claimant, being precipitated into the canal, received his injuries. In 1879, and within two years of the occurrence, a statement of claim for damages was made out for him, which was directed and mailed to the canal appraisers. It was conceded that no other steps were taken, and that this parer could never be found, and that there was no record of its receipt or filing in the office of the canal commissioners or of the board of claims. In 1886 the legislature passed an act authorizing and directing the board of claims to hear this claim, and to award ‘in like manner as though such claim had been filed within the time now provided by law.’ That tribunal awarded nothing, upon the grounds that no liability had been established against the state, and that the claim was barred by lapse of time. From that decision the claimant appeals to this court.

Louis Marshall, for appellant.

Chas. F. Tabor, Atty. Gen., for the State.

GRAY, J., ( after stating the facts.)

If this claim might be disposed of upon its merits, there would be no difficulty in establishing the liability of the state in damages. The claimant was a mere laborer, in the employ of the state upon ordinary canal work, and when, in obedience to orders, he proceeded to labor upon the bridge, he was not only inexperienced, but he was ignorant of its actual condition. He cannot be said to have assumed any of those risks which were incidental to such work from the existence of the serious defects in the bridge structure. He was entitled to believe that the place assigned to him for the performance of his work was an ordinarily safe one, and that his employers had no information concerning the risks attendant upon laboring there which he did not possess himself, or which ordinary observation and prudence would not have revealed. The state, in submitting itself to the jurisdiction of a tribunal with respect to claims against it for damages sustained by reason of any accident occurring upon its canals or connected with their care and management, subjected the determination of its liability to the government of those rules which usually obtain in cases between the employer and the employed. It is a cardinal rule of conduct in that relation that the former shall not expose the persons who are engaged in performing his work to unreasonable risks. They have the right to assume that where they are directed to work is as safe a place as is compatible with the nature of the undertaking, and that their employer has not neglected any means in his power or at his disposal to render its performance reasonably free from danger to life and limb. While, in work of an inherently dangerous nature, the workman is ordinarily held to assume that certain risk which must attend upon its execution, that rule involves, and depends for its application upon, the knowledge or means of knowledge upon the workman's part of the attendant peril to him. Such knowledge may be presumed to be possessed by reason of previous employment and experience, or to be suggested by ordinary observation and appearances. If the workman is without experience in the particular work required of him, and if, as here, danger for him exists, from causes not apparent, but which are known to his employer, I think it unquestionable in principle that an obligation should be deemed to rest upon him to communicate such information as would apprise the workman of the nature of the work, and of the possible risks in its execution. He should be placed on a par, as nearly as possible, in such respects, with his employer. This duty is not only within the letter and spirit of the rules established by many decisions, but it is one which should be dictated by every consideration of prudence and of responsibility towards others. But, however meritorious the claim here, the claimant's remedy against the state had ceased to exist...