Gatlin v. Unity Healthcare
| Docket Number | 21-cv-432 (APM) |
| Decision Date | 25 March 2022 |
| Parties | MICHAEL GATLIN, Plaintiff, v. UNITY HEALTHCARE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Pro se Plaintiff Michael Gatlin alleges that over a period of nine months Unity Healthcare (“Unity”) negligently treated him-by failing to provide adequate pain medication or order an MRI-for pain from a left-shoulder injury that he sustained on September 2, 2017, while he was an inmate at the District of Columbia Jail (“the Jail”). Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, Compl., ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter Compl.] at 1; Def.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 10 [hereinafter Def.'s Mem.], Ex. 1 [hereinafter Administrative Tort Claim]. Unity at the time was a federally certified provider of medical services at the Jail, which means Plaintiff was required to file any tort claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) before filing suit. He did so on January 10, 2020. Administrative Tort Claim. HHS sent him a letter on July 21, 2022, notifying him that his claim was denied for lack of timeliness. Def.'s Mem., Ex. 3 [hereinafter Denial Letter], at 48-49.[1] Then, on September 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed this damages action against Unity in D.C. Superior Court. Compl. It was removed to this court in February 2021. Notice of Removal ECF No. 1.
Before the court are the United States' motion to substitute itself as defendant and its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, Def.'s Combined [1] Mot. to Substitute U.S. as Def. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A), & [2] Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J., ECF No. 9 [hereinafter Def.'s Mot.], and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, Pl.'s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 22 [hereinafter Pl.'s Cross-Mot.]. For the reasons outlined below, the court grants the United States' motions to be substituted as defendant and for summary judgment and denies Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff seeks money damages for claims arising from medical treatment that Unity and its employees provided while he was detained at the Jail. The United States argues that pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), it “is the only proper defendant in a suit cognizable under the FTCA that is a tort suit seeking monetary damages for medical malpractice allegedly caused by entities deemed Public Health Service employees, ” like Unity, and so it should be substituted as defendant in this action. Def.'s Mem. at 5. The court agrees.
The FTCA provides an “exclusive” remedy against the United States for personal injuries resulting from the acts or omissions of entities “deemed to be an employee of the Public Health Service.” 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A). “Upon a certification by the Attorney General that the defendant was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which the suit arose, . . . the proceeding [shall be] deemed a tort action brought against the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d)(1). In this case, Brian P. Hudak, Acting Chief of the Civil Division, United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, has certified that Unity “was acting as a deemed employee of the Public Health Service at the time of the alleged incident.” Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, Certification, ECF No. 1-2 [hereinafter Attorney General's Certification].
The Attorney General's certification that the defendant was acting in the scope of his employment “is prima facie evidence of that fact.” Jacobs v. Vrobel, 724 F.3d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Such a certification raises a rebuttable presumption that the United States should be substituted as defendant. Id. “To rebut the certification, the plaintiff must allege, in either the complaint or a subsequent filing, specific acts that, taken as true, would establish that the defendant's actions exceeded the scope of his employment.” Id. at 220-21 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Here, Plaintiff presents no such facts. Instead, he merely argues that “Unity was not acting in the service of the United States but was in fact acting in service of the government of Washington DC.” Pl.'s Opp'n to Def's Mot., ECF No. 21 [hereinafter Pl.'s Opp'n], at 1.[2] Not so. Per the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act, Unity is a grantee of HHS; employees of such grantees act within the scope of their employment as if they are employees of the Public Health Service. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)-(n); Attorney General's Certification; see also, e.g., Young-Bey v. Unity Medical Healthcare, 217 F.Supp.3d 304, 308 (D.D.C. 2016). Plaintiff has not met his burden to rebut the Attorney General's certification that Unity employees who treated him in the Jail were acting in the scope of their employment.
In sum, the United States has “demonstrate[d] that . . . the FTCA is [P]laintiff's sole route to recovery” and “[t]he United States is the only proper defendant.” Young-Bey, 217 F.Supp.3d at 308. The United States is therefore substituted as the sole defendant in this case. See id. (treating pro se even though he had not named the United States in his complaint).
The United States has also moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff's claim is time barred by the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations. Def.'s Mem. at 3, 7. It attaches to its motion Plaintiff's medical records as well as documentation related to his administrative tort claim, acknowledging that the court may consider these documents only for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. Def.'s Mem. at 2 n.3. The court considers these attached documents and therefore treats the motion as one for summary judgment, not as a motion to dismiss. See Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ().
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A “genuine dispute” of a “material fact” exists when the fact is “capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation” and “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Elzeneiny v. District of Columbia, 125 F.Supp.3d 18, 28 (D.D.C. 2015).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court looks at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put forward “more than mere unsupported allegations or denials”; its opposition must be “supported by affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” and that a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Elzeneiny, 125 F.Supp.3d at 28 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).
Construing Plaintiff's filings liberally, [3] he has brought two claims in this action. First, Plaintiff alleges that Unity negligently treated his left-shoulder injury for nine months starting in September 2017. Compl. at 1; Administrative Tort Claim. Second, Plaintiff contends that Unity committed negligence by prescribing Naproxen for his left-shoulder injury for an extended period of time. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. The court takes these claims in reverse order.
Plaintiff alleges that Unity negligently prescribed him the anti-inflammatory medicine Naproxen starting in June 2018. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. He asserts that he “received Naproxen for the next 13 months only to later find out later . . . that long term use of [the] medication is toxic to the human body.” Id. The United States has moved for summary judgment on this claim on the basis that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. The court agrees.
The United States argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available remedies for his Naproxen-related medical malpractice claim, as he must do under the FTCA. Mot. to File Under Seal, ECF No. 26, Combined [1] Reply in Further Supp. of Def.'s Mot. & [2] Mem. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Cross-Mot., ECF No. 26-2, at 6-7. The Act makes clear that a claimant must “first have presented [his] claim to the appropriate Federal agency, and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing, ” before the claimant can file a legal action. 28 U.S.C. § 2675. This exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. See Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff filed only one administrative tort claim: the one he filed with HHS on January 10, 2020. Administrative Tort Claim. The statement of facts Plaintiff attached to his administrative tort claim mentions that he was prescribed Naproxen in June 2018 and that he took it, on and off, until his release from the Jail in July 2019. Id. at 26-31. But the claim nowhere references any injury arising from Plaintiff's use of Naproxen over that thirteen-month period. It therefore does not “describe the alleged injury with sufficient particularity to allow the agency to investigate and assess the strength of” Plaintiff's Naproxen claim GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 919-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As a...
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