Gattis v. Kilgo

• Decision Date: 07 November 1899
• Citation: 125 N.C. 133,34 S.E. 246
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: GATTIS. v. KILGO et al.

34 S.E. 246

125 N.C. 133

GATTIS.

v.KILGO et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 7, 1899.

SLANDER—PLEADING—PRAYER FOR RELIEF-PARTIES—MISJOINDER.

1. A separate portion of a complaint, which alleges that one defendant uttered certain slanderous words in public, intending thereby to charge plaintiff with an offense equivalent to willful and corrupt perjury, and that such words were intended to injure, and did injure, plaintiff in his name and credit, the same as though he had committed the offense, states a cause of action against such defendant, although it contains no prayer for relief against him individually.

2. Under Code, § 267, providing that causes of action united must affect all the parties to the action, and must be separately stated, a joinder of a cause of action against one who uttered a slander, with a cause of action against others who afterwards published such slanderous utterances, is demurrable.

Appeal from superior court, Granville county; Bryan, Judge.

Action by T. J. Gattis against John C. Kilgo and others. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Modified and affirmed.

Guthrie & Guthrie, Boone, Bryant & Biggs, A. W. Graham, and Hicks & Minor, for appellant.

Winston & Fuller and R. O. Burton, for appellees.

FAIRCLOTH, C. J. The defendant demurs to the complaint for that the plaintiff has unlawfully joined two separate causes of action in his complaint against different persons, and moves to dismiss the action. The first five sections of the complaint allege that the defendant John C. Kilgo in August 1898, uttered in public slanderous words against the character and business relations of the plaintiff, and set out specifically and at length the words complained of, and further allege as follows: "And so the plaintiff alleges that, in uttering and publishing and circulating the aforesaid false and defamatory words of and concerning the plaintiff, the defendant John C. Kilgo intended thereby to charge, and did charge, the plaintiff with an offense equivalent to the crime of willful and corrupt perjury, and thereby intended to injure, and did injure, the plaintiff, in his good name, fame, and credit, accordingly as if the plaintiff in his testimony upon the investigation aforesaid had been guilty of the crime of perjury." The complaint thereafter further alleges that the defendant Kilgo and his co-defendants in this action, Duke, Bronson, and Odell, contriving and wickedly and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff in his good name, etc., in September, 1898, did compose, print, and publish in certain newspapers circulating in this state, or caused itto be done, a certain pamphlet containing the aforesaid false, slanderous, libelous, and defamatory words of and concerning the plaintiff, and prays for damages. The demurrer was sustained, and his honor adjudged that the action be dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed.

The contention of the plaintiff is that the allegations against Kilgo individually do not amount to a cause of action, and that they are only matters of inducement to the charge against all the defendants. They (the defendants) aver that, in uttering the words by Kilgo alone, ...