Gattis v. State

• Decision Date: 13 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 37,1996,37
• Parties: Robert Allen GATTIS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1174

697 A.2d 1174

Robert Allen GATTIS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

No. 37, 1996.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: May 13, 1997.

Decided: July 10, 1997.

As Revised on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 8, 1997.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Cr. A. Nos. IN90-05-1017 through IN90-05-1019-R2 and IN90-05-1106 and IN90-05-1107R2.

Kevin J. O'Connell (argued), and Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Wilmington, for Appellant.

Timothy J. Donovan, Jr. (argued), William E. Molchen, Thomas E. Brown, and Marsha J. Epstein, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, for Appellee.

Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT and BERGER, JJ., constituting the Court en banc.

VEASEY, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the Superior Court's denial of Robert Allen Gattis' motions for postconviction relief. Gattis was convicted of Murder First Degree, Burglary First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited and two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon during Commission of a Felony. These offenses all related to the May 9, 1990 shooting death of Shirley Y. Slay. During the penalty phase of his trial, the jury, by a count of ten to two, found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Such a finding is tantamount to a recommendation of a sentence of death. After hearing additional argument from counsel, the Superior Court concurred with the jury's recommendation and sentenced Gattis to death by lethal injection.

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision. ¹ Gattis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. That Court denied his petition. ² On November 21, 1994, and February 8, 1995, Gattis filed motions for postconviction relief in the Superior Court. The Superior Court denied the motions. ³ This appeal followed.

Gattis alleges, inter alia, that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated, primarily due to his having received ineffective assistance of counsel. After Gattis filed this appeal, this Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for further inquiry into two questions raised by the appeal: (a) whether the State's theory of the homicide at trial was impossible and (b) whether the State improperly excluded a potential juror for gender related reasons. ⁴ After considering all of the arguments presented by Gattis in support of his appeal and after reviewing the Superior Court's decisions upon remand, we are satisfied that these questions are to be answered in the negative and that Gattis' remaining arguments are not persuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's decision to deny Gattis' motions for postconviction relief.

The Facts

A full exposition of the facts of this case is recorded in this Court's opinion upon Gattis' direct appeal. ⁵ Therefore, we include in this opinion only those facts that are pertinent to our resolution of the issues presented in this appeal.

On the evening of May 9, 1990, Robert Allen Gattis entered Shirley Y. Slay's apartment, beat her about the head and then stalked out of the apartment. After retrieving a loaded handgun and obtaining a different car from a friend, Gattis returned to Ms Slay's apartment, even after being told by police to stay away. Gattis forcefully opened the door to Ms. Slay's apartment. He fired one round which struck her directly between the eyes. She fell where she stood and died shortly thereafter. The autopsy revealed that Ms. Slay was shot by a .38 caliber handgun from a distance of 4 to 18 inches. Gattis testified at trial and maintains on appeal that the shooting was an accident and that the gun discharged while he struggled to enter Ms. Slay's apartment.

There was some dispute at trial over the width of the door opening when Ms. Slay was shot. At trial, Gattis testified that the door was open between 24 and 30 inches. The first witness to arrive at the scene after the shooting testified that the door would open between 8 and 12 inches before hitting Ms. Slay's feet. The second witness to arrive at the scene testified that the door was open about two feet, that he had to push the door slightly to get inside and that Ms. Slay's body was lying right at the door. One of the investigating officers who arrived at the scene testified that the door would open about three-quarters before hitting Ms. Slay's feet. ⁶

Gattis was charged with first degree murder, first degree burglary, possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited and possession of a deadly weapon during commission of a felony (2 counts). Trial commenced on September 9, 1992. On September 22, 1992, the jury convicted Gattis on all counts in the indictment. Then, by a vote of ten to two, the jury found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweighed the mitigating circumstances.

The Superior Court then made its independent determination that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and on October 29, 1992 the Superior Court ordered that Gattis be executed by lethal injection.

Subsequent Procedural History

On Gattis' automatic direct appeal, this Court, sitting en Banc, affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. ⁷

Counsel for Gattis filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied October 3, 1994.

On October 21, 1994, the Superior Court set a new execution date of December 2, 1994. On November 21, 1994, Gattis filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. On that same date, the Superior Court entered an order staying the scheduled execution and setting a schedule for the filing of an amended motion for postconviction relief.

On February 8, 1995, Gattis filed an amended motion for postconviction relief. By initial decision dated August 24, 1995, the Superior Court denied Gattis' motions for postconviction relief. Gattis filed a timely motion to reargue, and the Superior Court conducted a Rule 61 hearing on October 20, 1995. By memorandum opinion dated December 28, 1995, the Superior Court decided that none of the facts adduced at the Rule 61 hearing had altered the conclusions reached in its initial decision of August 24, 1995, and denied Gattis' motions for postconviction relief. ⁸ The Superior Court rescheduled Gattis' execution for March 29, 1996. ⁹

Gattis appealed to this Court the denial of his motions for postconviction relief. In his appeal, he argued, inter alia, that, if given the opportunity, he could show that the State's theory of the case was impossible. He also argued that the State unconstitutionally struck a potential juror on the basis of his gender. This Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings on these two matters.

On remand, the Superior Court again denied Gattis' motions. ¹⁰ This is Gattis' appeal of the Superior Court's decisions both before and after remand.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the Superior Court's decision on a motion for postconviction relief, ¹¹ including a motion for postconviction relief based upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. ¹² We review questions of law de novo. ¹³ Several of Gattis' claims were not raised below or on direct appeal because, he alleges, the assistance of counsel was ineffective. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), such issues are procedurally barred from appellate review unless the defendant successfully demonstrates that counsel was ineffective and that counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced his rights. We find Gattis has not overcome the procedural bar.

Right to a Fair Trial

Gattis contends that his right to due process and a fair trial were violated when the State waited until the penalty phase to apprise the defense of a statement Ms. Slay made in a 1987 police report stating that the discharge of Gattis' gun during an earlier incident at an American Legion Hall was accidental. Gattis argues that earlier disclosure of this statement would have diluted the State's argument that the discharge of Gattis' gun on the day of Ms. Slay's death could not have been accidental. This issue was neither raised at trial nor on direct appeal. Gattis alleges that the issue was never raised because he received ineffective assistance from counsel.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Gattis is required to show that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the deficiencies in counsel's representation caused Gattis actual prejudice. ¹⁴ To show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Gattis bears a heavy burden. He must overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's representation was professionally reasonable. ¹⁵ Moreover, this Court will strive to eliminate "the distorting effects of hindsight," and evaluate the trial from counsel's perspective at the time. ¹⁶

To show actual prejudice, Gattis must show that there existed a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been different. ¹⁷ Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice. Rather, a defendant must make, and substantiate, specific allegations of actual prejudice. ¹⁸

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court established that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." ¹⁹ Here, Gattis argues that the State violated this precept when it withheld, until the penalty phase of his trial,...