Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC
| Docket Number | Yor-22-93 |
| Decision Date | 06 July 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 ME 36 |
| Parties | NORMAN GAUDETTE et al. v. MAINELY MEDIA, LLC, et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Argued: January 12, 2023
Gene R. Libby, Esq. (orally), and Tyler J. Smith, Esq., Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellants Norman Gaudette and Joanne Gaudette
Jonathan W. Brogan, Esq., and Trevor D. Savage, Esq., Norman Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, and Cynthia Counts, Esq. (orally), FisherBroyles LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, for appellees Mainely Media, LLC, Ben Meiklejohn, and Molly Lovell-Keely
Panel STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.
[¶1] Former Biddeford police officer Norman Gaudette and his wife, Joanne Gaudette, appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court (York County, Mulhern, J.) entered upon a jury verdict in favor of Mainely Media, LLC; Ben Meiklejohn; and Molly Lovell-Keely (collectively, Mainely Media) on the Gaudettes' claims of defamation, false light, and loss of consortium. In their complaint, the Gaudettes alleged that Mainely Media had published false information indicating that Gaudette[1] had sexually abused minors decades earlier, while he was a police officer. On appeal, the Gaudettes argue that, during the trial, the court abused its discretion by refusing to strike a detective's testimony that his investigation of Gaudette in 1990 did not exonerate Gaudette because of "clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Gaudette was more likely than not a sexual predator." We conclude that, in the context of the trial, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the detective's testimony. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.[2]
[¶2] On June 24, 2015, the Gaudettes filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging defamation and five other causes of action, including Gaudette's claim of false light and Joanne Gaudette's claim for loss of consortium, arising from the 2015 publication of news articles in the Biddeford-Saco-Old Orchard Beach Courier (the Courier) reporting accusations that Gaudette sexually abused multiple teenage boys in the late 1970s and in the 1980s while he was a Biddeford police officer. The complaint alleged that the articles had portrayed Gaudette "as a sexual predator who has evaded justice." Gaudette named as defendants Mainely Media, LLC, the publisher of the articles; Ben Meiklejohn, a staff writer for the Courier in 2015; and Molly Lovell-Keely, a managing editor of the Courier in 2015.
[¶3] Mainely Media filed a special motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to Maine's statute providing protection from strategic lawsuits against public participation, 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2023). The court (O'Neil, J.) denied the motion, and we affirmed that decision in Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC, 2017 ME 87, 160 A.3d 539. Mainely Media then moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part, leaving for trial Gaudette's claims of false light and defamation regarding the reported accusations of two men (L.O. and R.K.) and Joanne Gaudette's claim for loss of consortium. The parties proceeded to a jury trial on these claims.
[¶4] The court (Mulhern, J.) held a thirteen-day trial over the course of three weeks in March 2022. The parties submitted several joint exhibits, including the two articles that generated Gaudette's defamation and false light claims. Gaudette challenged information in the articles reporting that (1) L.O. claimed that Gaudette had sexually abused him when he was a teenager, including by raping him while he was passed out in a camper in Naples and (2) R.K. claimed that Gaudette had repeatedly had sexual contact with him beginning when he was fifteen years old, including by touching his genitals while he was working for Gaudette cleaning banks after hours and by climbing on top of R.K. and putting his hands down R.K.'s pajama pants while R.K. was sleeping in a camper.
[¶5] The Gaudettes called R.K. as a witness in an effort to undermine his credibility and offered testimony suggesting that Gaudette had been "exonerated" or "cleared" because a grand jury had declined to indict him. When the Gaudettes rested their case after presenting voluminous evidence, Mainely Media moved for judgment as a matter of law. See M.R. Civ. P. 50(a). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Gaudettes, the court denied the motion.
[¶6] Mainely Media then presented documentary evidence and called several witnesses, including L.O., a third accuser who had spoken with Lovell-Keely, and Michael Pulire, the detective at the Maine Attorney General's Office who investigated multiple accusations against Gaudette in 1990. At the end of the direct examination of Pulire, the following exchange occurred:
The Gaudettes objected and moved to strike Pulire's final response, citing Rule 403 of the Maine Rules of Evidence.[3] The court noted, The court overruled the objection.
[¶7] After presenting its evidence, Mainely Media again moved for judgment as a matter of law. See M.R. Civ. P. 50(a). The court denied the motion. The parties presented closing arguments, and the court delivered jury instructions, including an instruction on the use of a special verdict form that the court provided to the jury.
[¶8] The jury found that the Gaudettes had failed to prove defamation, false light, or loss of consortium. In the special verdict form, the jury found that the Gaudettes had not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of the challenged statements made by L.O. or R.K. were false and defamatory, or that the published articles placed Gaudette in a false light that would be offensive to a reasonable person.[4] The jury thus did not have to make findings about whether the Gaudettes had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that either Meilklejohn or Lovell-Keely published the statements with actual malice.[5] The court entered a judgment for Mainely Media on April 1, 2022. The Gaudettes timely appealed. See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
[¶9] The Gaudettes argue that the court abused its discretion in denying their motion to strike Pulire's testimony that his 1990 investigation did not exonerate Gaudette because "there was clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Gaudette was more likely than not a sexual predator." The Gaudettes argue that the testimony lacked probative value and that allowing the use of terminology regarding standards of proof and the term "sexual predator" was highly prejudicial given that it was in the province of the jury-not the detective-to determine whether Gaudette or his accusers were credible.
[¶10] "The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . ." M.R. Evid. 403. A trial court has broad discretion in weighing the probative value of relevant evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Kimball, 2016 ME 75, ¶ 16,139 A.3d 914.
[¶11] "For purposes of Rule 403, prejudice means an undue tendency to move the fact finders to decide the issue on an improper basis." State v. Hussein, 2019 ME 74, ¶ 14, 208 A.3d 752 (quotation marks omitted). Often, the improper basis is an emotional one. State v. Marquis, 2017 ME 104, ¶ 29, 162 A.3d 818; see State v. Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶ 26, 82 A.3d 86 ("Prejudicial evidence is inherently inflammatory evidence that is likely to arouse the passion of the fact-finder.").
[¶12] The determination of the probative value of evidence depends on the causes of action sought to be proved. See, e.g., Freeman v. Funtown/Splashtown, USA, 2003 ME 101, ¶¶ 7-11, 828 A.2d 752; State v. Michaud, 2017 ME 170, ¶ 10, 168 A.3d 802. Here, the primary claim is for defamation, which ordinarily requires the plaintiff to prove the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: "(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication." Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 26, 941 A.2d 447 (quotation marks omitted); see Hudson v. Guy Gannett Broad. Co., 521 A.2d 714, 715-16 (Me. 1987). Due to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, when a published statement discusses a public figure's official conduct regarding a matter of public concern-a type of discussion that "deserves special favor in a democratic society"-the statement is "subject to a conditional privilege . . . that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of [actual malice, i.e.,] knowledge or disregard of falsity."[6] Plante v. Long, 2017 ME 189, ¶ 10, 170 A.3d 243 (quotation marks omitted); see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
[¶13] Gaudette's other claim-for false light-requires similar proof: "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and ...
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