Gaulden v. State

• Decision Date: 07 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC14–399.,SC14–399.
• Citation: 195 So.3d 1123
• Parties: Jacob Thomas GAULDEN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

195 So.3d 1123

Jacob Thomas GAULDEN, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC14–399.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 7, 2016.

Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and Mary Jane Lord, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Giselle Denise Lylen, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Gaulden v. State (Gaulden II), 132 So.3d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 145 So.3d 824 (Fla.2014), in which the First District Court of Appeal interpreted the meaning of the phrase “involved in a crash” in Florida's hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2010). Having concluded that a driver's vehicle may be “involved in a crash” under this statute when a passenger separates from a moving vehicle and lands on the roadway or adjacent area, the district court affirmed Petitioner's conviction for leaving the scene of a crash resulting in a person's death, a first-degree felony. Accordingly, the district court certified to this Court a question of great public importance concerning whether a violation of the statute requires a collision with the driver's vehicle. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons we explain, we disagree with the First District's conclusion and answer the certified question in the negative.

I. BACKGROUND

Jacob Thomas Gaulden was charged with leaving the scene of a crash involving a death, a first-degree felony under section 316.027(1)(b). State v. Gaulden (Gaulden I), 134 So.3d 981, 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). In brief, the statute requires “[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in a crash ... that results in the death of any person” to “immediately stop” at the scene, comply with certain reporting requirements, and render assistance to anyone injured. § 316.027(1)(b), Fla. Stat.; see § 316.062, Fla. Stat. (containing reporting and assistance requirements). Gaulden moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that he was not “involved in a crash” within the meaning of the statute. Gaulden I, 134 So.3d at 982. The trial court agreed, concluding that “when a passenger suffers death as a result of being separated from the driver's moving vehicle[,]” there is no “crash” within the meaning of the statute. Id.

The State appealed the dismissal of the charge, and the district court reversed. Id. at 984. The majority of the district court panel in Gaulden I held that the hit-and-run statute requires a driver to stop when “his vehicle is a participant in, or has an effect on, a collision that results in injury or death[,]” and noted that the law “does not require that the collision be between two vehicles or even that a vehicle be one of the colliding objects.” Id. at 983. The district court reasoned that because “a passenger of [Gaulden's] moving vehicle collided with the road as he became separated from the vehicle[,]” and was killed, the decedent's “collision [with the roadway] constituted a crash.” Id. at 984. Accordingly, the district court concluded Gaulden was “properly subject to criminal prosecution” under the hit-and-run statute. Id. The district court reversed the dismissal of the charge and remanded the case to the trial court. Id.

On remand to the circuit court, the evidence at retrial showed that in the early morning hours of December 19, 2010, a number of people were gathered near a chicken stand when the decedent recognized a red truck stopped nearby on the side of the road. The decedent walked over to the red truck, spoke to the driver, and the driver waved the decedent into the vehicle. The decedent got in, and the truck drove away. Approximately ten minutes later the truck returned and stopped in the roadway. Petitioner admitted that he and the decedent began fighting. As they fought, the decedent opened the passenger door, and the interior light came on. The truck suddenly accelerated and swerved, and the passenger door slammed shut. The decedent was no longer in the truck. Although the truck was moving when the decedent exited the vehicle, Petitioner did not think the truck was traveling fast enough to seriously hurt the decedent. The decedent's body was found on the ground adjacent to the roadway. His body evidenced road rash consistent with tumbling across the surface of the road, lacerations from blunt force trauma, contusions of the brain, and a fractured skull. Gaulden was convicted of leaving the scene of a crash that resulted in death in violation of section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

On appeal to the First District in Gaulden II, Gaulden argued that the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing the jury that a guilty verdict could be based on a finding that Gaulden “knew or should have known that injury or death had occurred.” Gaulden II , 132 So.3d at 918–19 (emphasis in original). He contended the State must prove “that he should have known (from the nature of the ‘crash’) that a fatal injury had occurred, not merely that an injury of some kind had resulted.” Id. 919. The district court correctly rejected this contention, citing our decision in State v. Dumas, 700 So.2d 1223, 1225–26 (Fla.1997). Id. at 919–20. In Dumas, we explained that “[t]he fact that a death rather than an injury has occurred does not trigger a different set of duties [under the statute]. Thus, the knowledge element that triggers the affirmative duty is the same in each circumstance, but the sanction imposed is determined by the results of the accident.” Dumas, 700 So.2d at 1225–26.

The issue in this review concerns Gaulden's second argument to the district court. He claimed that fundamental error occurred when the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the State had to prove the defendant had actual knowledge of the crash. Gaulden II, 132 So.3d at 920. The district court rejected this argument because “Gaulden conceded he knew his passenger suddenly left the moving vehicle, and could not have been unaware that, whether the passenger jumped or was pushed, he was destined to hit the paved shoulder, if not the roadway itself.” Id. Accordingly, under the definition of “involved in a crash” the district court announced in Gaulden I, the district court in Gaulden II rejected Gaulden's claim and affirmed without discussion the other issues raised. The First District certified the following question as one of great public importance:

WHEN A PASSENGER SEPARATES FROM A MOVING VEHICLE AND COLLIDES WITH THE ROADWAY OR ADJACENT PAVEMENT, BUT THE VEHICLE HAS NO PHYSICAL CONTACT EITHER WITH THE PASSENGER, AFTER THE PASSENGER'S EXIT, OR WITH ANY OTHER VEHICLE, PERSON, OR OBJECT, IS THE VEHICLE “INVOLVED IN A CRASH” SO THAT THE DRIVER MAY BE HELD CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAVING THE SCENE?

Gaulden II, 132 So.3d at 922.

II. ANALYSIS

The answer to the certified question turns on the meaning of the operative phrase—“involved in a crash”—in section 316.027, which is a criminal statute. Our review is de novo. Kasischke v. State, 991 So.2d 803, 807 (Fla.2008) ; Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1269 (Fla.2006). To answer the certified question, we must examine the plain language of the statute and be guided by certain rules in our analysis. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is ‘that a statute should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.’ ” City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp., 445 So.2d 578, 579 (Fla.1984) (quoting Deltona Corp. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 220 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1969) ). Thus, “[w]hen the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.” Borden v. East–Eur. Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006) (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla.2005) ). But “if the statute is ambiguous on its face, the Court can only then rely upon the rules of statutory construction in order to discern legislative intent.” Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1233 (Fla.2006). The statute at issue in this case provides in pertinent part as follows:

(1)(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in injury of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in the death of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph while driving under the influence as set forth in s. 316.193(1) shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 2 years.

§ 316.027(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). The statute requires the “driver of any vehicle involved in a crash ” that results in the injury or death of a person to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene, and in accordance with section 316.062, remain at the scene to comply with certain reporting requirements and to render aid to anyone injured. Id. (emphasis added). Violation of this provision is a felony offense. Because this is a criminal statute, the language must be strictly construed. § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly...