Gauthier v. Penobscot Chem. Fiber Co.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1921
• Citation: 113 A. 28
• Parties: GAUTHIER v. PENOBSCOT CHEMICAL FIBER CO. et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

113 A. 28

GAUTHIER

v. PENOBSCOT CHEMICAL FIBER CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 25, 1921.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot County, in Equity.

Proceeding by Mathias Gauthier under the Workmen's Compensation Act to obtain compensation for personal injuries, opposed by the Penobscot Chemical Fiber Company, the employer, and the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company. There was an award of compensation, and the employer and insurance carrier appeal. Appeal sustained, decree reversed, and case remitted for further proceedings.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, PHILBROOK, DUNN, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.

Andrews & Nelson, of Augusta, W. T. Gardiner, of Gardiner, and Eben F. Littlefield, of Portland, for appellants.

George H. Morse, of Bangor, for appellee.

DEASY, J. The record shows that on April 23, 1918, the petitioner, Mathias Gauthier, of Old Town suffered a broken leg as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by Penobscot Chemical Fiber Company.

Under an agreement filed with, but not approved by, the Industrial Accident Commission, compensation was paid from the date of injury to January 20, 1919. Then payment of compensation was discontinued; such discontinuance being impliedly approved by decree signed by Chairman Dutton dated May 17, 1919.

The petitioner returned to work but his condition apparently grew worse and on January 19, 1920, his leg was amputated.

The petition now under consideration is dated May 31, 1920. Upon this petition Chairman Thayer, by decree dated October 13, 1920, ordered payment of compensation for total incapacity of $11.15 per week from October 2, 1919, to January 19, 1920, less certain payments and for loss of the leg, specific compensation at the same rate for 150 weeks beginning January 19, 1920. This weekly allowance is, conforming to the act of 1919 (Laws 1919, e. 238), on the basis of three-fifths of the petitioner's average weekly wage.

From a decree of a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, rendered in accordance with the chairman's decision, an appeal is taken. The grounds of appeal urged before this court are these:

1. That the claim is barred by limitation. Except that under section 17 certain conditions precedent are required to be performed within periods therein limited, no breach of which conditions is in this case complained of, the only limitations affecting petitions under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Rev. St. c. 50) are found in sections 36 and 39.

Section 36 applies only to reviews in cases wherein agreements have been approved or decrees fixing compensation entered. In the pending case no agreement has been approved and no decree has been entered "fixing compensation" except the decree of May 31, 1920, which is the subject of this appeal.

Section 39 relates to original petitions which under section 30 may be filed by either employee or employer. Section 39 provides in effect that in the absence of an agreement between the parties an original petition must be filed within two years.

An agreement may, however, be filed within the same period. If approved, no original petition is necessary or appropriate. The remedy, if any, needed by reason of changed conditions or otherwise must be by application for review. If refused approval or if unapproved (as in this case), an original petition is obviously the appropriate remedy, and no time is limited for its filing. Doubtless a limitation was deemed by the Legislature unnecessary in view of the mutuality of the right to invoke the remedy.

2. That the petition is defective in form, not being sufficient "to apprise respondent of the nature of the claim made therein."

This point is well taken. The petition should give the defendant, howsoever informally, the information within the contemplation of R. S. c. 50, § 30. In this ease the petition does not conform to the requirements of section 30.

However, the case was apparently fully heard. The defendants ask no further time or opportunity for investigation or for the production of further evidence. It not appearing that the petitioner acted contumaciously, or that the defendants were misled or prejudiced by any fault or omission in the petition, we should not for this reason alone reverse the decree.

3. That the chairman erroneously applied to the case chapter 238 of the Laws of 1919, and thus awarded larger compensation than was provided by the law in force when the accident occurred.

It is contended that chapter 238 of the Laws of 1919 by its terms applies to all injuries by industrial accidents occurring after January 1, 1916, this being necessarily implied from section 49, which expressly negatives its application to accidents of earlier dates, and further that by section 50 the workmen's compensation statute in force in 1918 was wholly repealed without any clause saving rights previously accrued.

For these reasons it is claimed that chapter 238 of the Laws of 1919 must be held to be retroactive.

If such be the intention of the act, it cannot under the plain provisions of both the federal and state Constitutions be given that effect so far as concerns rights and obligations which accrued before its passage. Our Workmen's Compensation Law is elective. Rights and obligations under it are contractual. Mailman's Case, 118 Me. 175, 106 Atl. 606.

Upon the happening of an industrial accident the right to receive compensation becomes vested, and the obligation to pay it fixed. To change such vested rights and fixed obligations by statute would clearly be to impair the obligation of contracts.

The procedure may be changed if a substantially equivalent remedy remains; but contractual rights that have become vested remain unaffected by the repeal of an old or the enactment of a new statute.

A few of the many cases through which this principle of constitutional construction has become embedded in the law are Proprietors v. Laboree, 2 Me. (Greenl.) 275, 11 Am. Dec. 79; Palmer v. Hixon, 74 Me. 448; Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450, 17 Atl. 405. 4 L. R. A. 348, 10 Am. St. Rep. 266; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. Ed. 529; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 11 L. Ed. 397.

To the point that the repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair, but preserves and protects vested contractual rights based upon it, see Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 17 L. Ed. 805; State v. Bank, 68 Me. 515; Swan v. Kemp, 97 Md. 686, 55 Atl. 441; K. of A. v. Logsdon, 183 Ind. 183, 108 N. E. 592.

In the following cases arising under Workmen's Compensation Laws the principle has been applied to facts in effect parallel to those in the case at bar. Schmidt v. Baking Co., 90 Conn. 217, 96 Atl. 963; Collwell v. Bedford Co. (Ind. App.) 126 N. E. 439; Baur v. Court of Common Pleas, 88 N. J. Law, 128, 95 Atl. 627.

Two cases are cited which at first blush might seem to be at variance with our conclusion. Talbot v. Ind. Commission, 108 Wash. 231, 183 Pac. 84, 187 Pac. 410; Carlson v. Dist. Court, 131 Minn. 96, 154 N. W. 661. But in neither of these cases is the effect of the constitutional limitation passed upon, or, so far as appears, presented for the consideration of the court.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submits these cases, but with commendable frankness admits that the judicial authorities almost, if not quite, universally sustain the principle of constitutional construction which we have adopted.

The error which we have pointed out is one of law which the court might correct by modifying the decree. For another reason, however, the decree must be reversed.

4. That the decree is based in part upon alleged facts recited in the Commission's findings which do not appear in evidence.

That the amputation of Gauthier's leg was a necessary result of the accident is disputed. This important issue is found in favor of the petitioner. The decree runs thus:

"In view of...