Gautier v. Franklin

• Decision Date: 31 December 1847
• Citation: 1 Tex. 732
• Parties: PETER GAUTIER v. BENJAMIN C. FRANKLIN.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

1 Tex. 732

PETER GAUTIER

v.BENJAMIN C. FRANKLIN.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December Term, 1847.

Writ of Error from Brazoria County.

Statutes of limitation affect the remedy only. The validity, interpretation and obligation of contracts depend on the laws of the country where the contract originated, but the remedy for the enforcemement of the contract, is within the exclusive control of the sovereignty, in whose forums the litigation is conducted.

Statutes of limitation are justly held “as statutes of repose to quiet titles, to suppress frauds and to supply the deficiencies of proof arising from the ambiguity, obscurity and antiquity of transactions.” They should be regarded with favor by courts of justice and receive such interpretation, consistent with their terms, as will defeat the mischief intended to be suppressed, and advance the policy and remedy they were designed to promote.

The provision in our act of limitation of February, 1841, which declares “that no action shall be brought against any emigrant of the republic to recover a claim, which was barred by the laws of limitation of the state from which he emigrated,” was intended to embrace those claims only which were barred at the period of emigration.

Upon the substitution of a new term of limitation or prescription, the time which had elapsed after the maturity of the contract under the old law is to be computed in reference to its effect under that law, in ascertaining the time which would bar the right of action under the new law. If one-half of the time prescribed by the old law had elapsed when the new law was adopted, the lapse of one-half the time prescribed by the new law would bar the right of action; and the time which elapsed between the repeal of the old law, and the adoption of the new one is to be computed as though it had run under the old law. [14 Tex. 4;15 Id. 466.]

The decisions of courts must conform to the law. Hence cases may be determined in the supreme court upon grounds which were not taken or even suggested in the court below.

This action was instituted on the first day of February, 1845, on two promissory notes, one of which became due on the 1st day of April, 1838, and the other on the first day of January, 1839. On the first was indorsed a credit of one hundred dollars, received on the 17th day of August, 1838; on the other were indorsed several credits, one on the 27th of December, 1839, and the others, during the year 1840.

The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations of this country. He further pleaded that the notes were executed in Florida, one of the United States of America, where he, at the time of their execution, resided, and from whence he subsequently emigrated to this republic; and that, by the law of limitations of Florida, all action on said notes was barred before the institution of this suit.

The cause was submitted to the court below on an agreed statement of facts, the substance of which was that the notes were executed in Florida -- that the rate of interest in that territory was seven per cent.-- that under the limitation law of said territory suit was required to be brought upon notes within five years -- that the defendant resided in Florida during the year 1839 and had continued to reside there from the year 1837 -- that he emigrated from Florida to Texas after the statute of limitations had begun to run, but before the expiration of the five years.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Franklin, upon which the defendant brought this writ of error.

Harris, for the plaintiff in error, contended:

That the notes in question were barred both by the law of prescription of Mexico and by the first section of the act of limitations of Texas, approved February 5, 1841.

He cited the case of Ross et al. v. Duval et al., 13 Pet. 64, and in connection therewith Peck's Report from the 15th to 18th pages, showing that the construction given to the Texas statute does not violate that clause of the constitution which prohibits the passage of retrospective laws. Also 24th section of the same statute, and in connection the code of commerce of Spain.

He also cited the 13th section of the “act of limitations,” to show that the notes were barred by the laws of Florida. He further contended that the claim was barred by the rules of computation of the civil law, and in support thereof cited Xaupi v. Orso, 11 La. 59;Mayor v. Ripley, Id. 148.

Buckley, for defendant in error, made the following points, viz.:

1. The suit was commenced before the expiration of four years after the passage of the statute of limitations of this country, and not having been due more than five years when said act was passed, our statute does not bar a recovery.

2. The only provision in our statute that this case can possibly come under is the 13th section of the act of limitations. This section embraces no other cases than such as were barred by the law of the state or country from whence an emigrant came. The facts in this case show negatively that Gautier left Florida long before the notes sued on were barred, and therefore the act of that state has no bearing upon the case. To give the 13th section any other construction would be in effect to introduce the statutes of limitation of every state in the Union and the law of proscription of every other country on earth, as the statutory law of the land.

Had Gautier remained in Florida until five years had elapsed after the maturity of the notes, then the provisions of the 13th section would fully cover the case; but not having done so, he can only avail himself of the benefit of the statute of this state. In such cases as the one at bar, the “ lex fori” always governs. 2 Mass. 84;17 Id. 55;McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 327, and the cases cited; 7 Mart. (N. S.) 108; Story Confl. 483; 6 Cond. p. 1 and notes.

The section of the statute above referred to is in the past tense, and according to all rules of construing language, can only apply to what has already been done. When Gautier left Florida the debts were not barred. His leaving the state and removing to another before the bar had become complete deprived him of the benefit of the act of Florida and subjected him to the general provisions of the “ lex fori.” It was a voluntary act on his part, the consequences of which he must abide.

Chief Justice Hemphill, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

HEMPHILL, C. J.

There are two points presented by the record for consideration.

1st. Was the action barred by the laws of Florida?

2d. Was it barred by the laws of Texas?

The first arises from the pleadings and the facts as agreed upon by the parties, and the second is distinctly presented by the pleadings and the facts apparent on the notes themselves.

The effect of the limitation law of the territory of Florida upon the action was the only question discussed in the court below, and to which the attention of the court was alone directed; and we shall proceed to consider whether there was error in the judgment of the court below on that ground.

Statutes of limitation or prescription of actions are regarded by writers and authorities on international law as affecting the remedy and not the merits in controversies litigated before courts of justice.

From considerations of public policy nations generally have established within their respective territories some fixed period within which suits must be prosecuted before their tribunals, whether brought by foreigners or natives or on foreign or domestic claims or causes of action.

A foreigner cannot complain that he is compelled to institute suit at the time and under the circumstances prescribed for citizens, nor is the entire prohibition of suits by foreingers regarded as such a breach of international comity, as to constitute a just cause of offense to other nations; nor can suitors, whether foreigners or citizens, insist that the times and modes of litigating suits which have been adopted by the nation where the claim originated should supersede those of the country where the action is instituted. The validity, interpretation and obligation of contracts depend on the laws of the country where the contract originated, but the remedy for the enforcement of the contract is a matter of municipal regulation within the exclusive control of the sovereignty in whose forums the litigation is conducted, and whose regulations in relation to proceedings in suits must be complied with by all parties who have submitted to or been brought within the cognizance of her judicial tribunals. The defendant cannot, on the principles of international law, claim the protection of the limitation laws of Florida, as by his immigration to and residence in Texas, he voluntarily placed himself under the control of the laws of this country which are supreme and exclusive in relation to the times, modes and circumstances under which rights may be judicially controverted, and in relation to which foreign laws cannot be recognized except so far as they may be sanctioned by the laws of the country.

If statutes of limitation could in any just sense be regarded as forming a part of the contract, their operations should be admitted wherever the contract is litigated. But they are not so considered. In making contracts, the future time (if any) which is in the contemplation of the parties is the day of the maturity of the contract, and not that on which by lapse of time exemption may be claimed from its performance. A contrary doctrine would impute to the obligee a contemplated evasion of his obligation from the inception of his agreement, and would, in the language of Lord Brougham, turn a protection against laches into a premium for evasiveness. Story Confl. Laws, p. 482.

These are the well established doctrines of international law. There are exceptions however to the general rule that the statutes of limitation or prescription of the place where the suit is brought must control the...