Gautreaux v. Pierce
| Decision Date | 30 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | 81-2311 and 81-2361,Nos. 81-2308,s. 81-2308 |
| Citation | 690 F.2d 616 |
| Parties | Dorothy GAUTREAUX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Samuel R. PIERCE, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al., Defendants-Appellees, v. ROGERS PARK COMMUNITY COUNCIL, et al., Proposed Intervenors-Appellants. Dorothy GAUTREAUX, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Moon LANDRIEU, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al., Defendants, Appeal of Ginger MACK, Class Member. Dorothy GAUTREAUX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ILLINOIS HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Stephen B. Diamond, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Jeffery Jahns, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather, Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
Lawrence Jay Weiner, Fredric Bryan Lesser, Lawrence Jay Weiner & Assoc., Chicago, Ill., for intervenor.
Gershon M. Ratner, Associate Gen. Counsel for Litigation, Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Alexander Polikoff, Business and Professional People for Public Interest, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, DAVIS, Associate Judge, * and PELL, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from two consolidated actions in the district court, Nos. 66-C-1459 and 66-C-1460, brought by the plaintiffs against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) respectively. The plaintiffs, approximately 43,000 black tenants of and applicants for public housing, brought these suits alleging that CHA in conjunction with HUD had violated various statutory rights and their constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by selecting housing project sites in predominantly black neighborhoods and by using racial quotas to limit the number of blacks in housing projects in predominantly white neighborhoods. Both CHA and HUD were found to have been guilty of the alleged discriminatory practices at a relatively early stage in the course of this litigation. Over ten years of litigation followed the entry of the decree of liability against CHA in 1969. The task presently before this court is to review the validity of a consent decree, negotiated between the plaintiffs and HUD and approved by the district court, which purports to provide a workable remedy for HUD's discriminatory practices. Two parties are appealing from the district court's approval of the consent decree. The Illinois Housing and Development Authority (IHDA), one of the defendants, is claiming in essence that the provisions of the decree are beyond the parameters of HUD's authority and were approved without the procedural prerequisites to the entry of a consent decree. Ginger Mack (Mack), a member of the plaintiff class, alleges that the decree fails to remedy the discrimination and challenges the designation of "Revitalizing" areas, specifically that of the Hyde Park-Kenwood area, in which assisted housing may be placed under the decree. In addition, the proposed intervenor-appellant Rogers Park Community Council (RPCC) is appealing the district court's denial of its motion to intervene, and is seeking to have revised the decree's designation of a portion of the Rogers Park neighborhood as a "Revitalizing" area.
In 1966, the plaintiffs against CHA in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 66-C-1459 (N.D.Ill.1966), brought a companion suit against HUD, Gautreaux v. Romney, No. 66-C-1460 (N.D.Ill.1966), claiming that HUD had sanctioned and assisted CHA's racially discriminatory housing practices. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment against HUD, an injunction to prohibit HUD from making any federal funds available to CHA which would support or further the racially discriminatory practices, and "such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable." The district court dismissed the complaint against HUD primarily for failure to state a claim. On appeal in 1971, this court reversed and granted summary judgment against HUD on two counts of the complaint, finding that HUD had knowingly acquiesced in CHA's discriminatory practices. The case was remanded to the district court for appropriate relief. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971). The district court granted the plaintiffs the declaratory and injunctive relief sought against HUD, and grappled with the amorphous concept of "just and equitable" relief. The district court ordered HUD to use its "best efforts" to increase the supply of dwelling units in conformity with the relevant federal statutes, rules, and regulations and with the provisions of a 1969 Judgment Order entered against CHA in the companion case. See Gautreaux v. CHA, 304 F.Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The district court refused to order relief beyond the legal boundaries of the city of Chicago because it found the discriminatory practices to have been committed within those boundaries. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F.Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Shortly afterwards, the case against HUD was consolidated with that against CHA.
The 1969 Judgment Order against CHA contained a comprehensive plan designed to remedy the effects of and prevent continuation of the discriminatory practices by enjoining further construction of public housing in predominantly non-white areas without simultaneous construction in predominantly white areas. The 1969 Judgment Order mandated that CHA: (1) use its "best efforts" to increase the supply of family public housing units as rapidly as possible; (2) not commence construction of any family public housing units without first beginning construction of 700 units in the "General Public Housing Area" of Chicago (defined as census tracts which are both (a) 70% or more white as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census, and (b) not within one mile of a census tract 30% or more non-white (the criterion for the "Limited Public Housing Area") as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census; (3) locate 75% of all future family public housing units beyond the 700 units in the General Public Housing Area; (4) cease and desist discrimination on the basis of race; and (5) limit the size of new public housing projects and their concentration with other CHA projects. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F.Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
Numerous appeals followed from the district court's determination of the relief to be accorded against CHA and HUD. 1 Of these appeals, only those concerning the appropriateness of remedial efforts outside the city of Chicago have a significant bearing on the present appeals. This court reversed the previously discussed district court decision in Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F.Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973), in which the district court had refused to order metropolitan area relief, that is, relief beyond the legal boundaries of the city of Chicago. This court concluded that metropolitan area relief was not precluded simply because the wrongs had been committed within Chicago and against Chicago residents, and remanded the case to the district court for "the adoption of a comprehensive metropolitan area plan that will not only disestablish the segregated public housing system in the City of Chicago ... but will increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible." Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 1974).
This court's decision was appealed to the Supreme Court on the permissibility of "inter-district relief for discrimination in public housing in the absence of a finding of an inter-district violation." Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292, 96 S.Ct. 1538, 1543, 47 L.Ed.2d 792 (1976). The Supreme Court concluded metropolitan area 2 relief was not precluded by virtue of the constitutional and statutory violations having been committed in Chicago. Id. at 300, 96 S.Ct. at 1547. The more substantial question, according to the Court, was whether an order against HUD affecting its conduct beyond Chicago's boundaries would impermissibly interfere with local governments and suburban housing authorities that had not been implicated in HUD's unconstitutional conduct. It reasoned that an order directed solely to HUD would not force unwilling localities to apply for assistance but would merely reinforce the regulations guiding HUD's determination of which of the locally authorized projects to assist with federal funds. Id. at 303, 96 S.Ct. at 1549. The Court concluded:
In sum, there is no basis for the petitioner's claim that court-ordered metropolitan area relief in this case would be impermissible as a matter of law under the Milliken (v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1971) ) decision. In contrast to the desegregation order in that case, a metropolitan area relief order directed to HUD would not consolidate or in any way restructure local governmental units. The remedial decree would neither force suburban governments to submit public housing proposals to HUD nor displace the rights and powers accorded local government entities under federal or state housing statutes or existing land-use laws. The order would have the same effect on the suburban governments as a discretionary decision by HUD to use the statutory powers to provide the respondents with alternatives to the racially segregated Chicago public housing system created by CHA and HUD.
Id. at 305-06, 96 S.Ct. at 1550. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of this court. It remanded the case to the district court for further evidence and consideration on the issue of metropolitan area relief so that the district court could determine the nature and scope of relief "in the exercise of its equitable discretion." Id. at 306, 96 S.Ct. at 1550.
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