Gavillan-Martinez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
Decision Date | 26 April 2021 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-1031-MMH-MCR |
Parties | VICTOR GAVILLAN-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Victor Gavillan-Martinez, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on August 12, 2018,1 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). Gavillan-Martinez is proceeding on a second amended petition (Amended Petition; Doc. 17). In the Amended Petition, Gavillan-Martinez challenges a 2013 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for second-degree murder and tampering with evidence. Gavillan-Martinez raises four grounds for relief. See Amended Petition at 6-16.2 Respondents have submitted a memorandum inopposition to the Amended Petition. See Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause (Response; Doc. 18) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.).3 Gavillan-Martinez filed a brief in reply. See Reply to Respondent's Answer to Order to Show Cause (Reply; Doc. 31). This action is ripe for review.
On August 26, 2013, Gavillan-Martinez entered a negotiated plea of guilty to second-degree murder (count one) and tampering with evidence (count two). Resp. Ex. A2 at 49-50. That same day, pursuant to the plea agreement, the circuit court sentenced Gavillan-Martinez to a term of incarceration of twenty-eight years as to count one and five years in prison as to count two. Id. at 51-57, 61-74. The circuit court ordered the sentence imposed on count two to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on count one. Id. Gavillan-Martinez did not appeal.
On April 18, 2014, Gavillan-Martinez filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. A1 at 6-13. In the Rule 3.850 Motion, he argued that his counsel was deficient for failing to advise him of the possibility ofraising a stand your ground defense. Id. On December 18, 2014, Gavillan-Martinez supplemented his Rule 3.850 Motion with two additional claims; he asserted that he was not given the opportunity to have a grand jury indict him and the cumulative errors in his case prejudiced him. Id. at 15-22. Gavillan-Martinez later amended his Rule 3.850 Motion on June 8, 2015 (Amended Rule 3.850 Motion). Id. at 43-67. In the Amended Rule 3.850 Motion, he argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) file a motion to dismiss count one; (2) file a motion to suppress evidence; and (3) advise him concerning the statutory maximum sentence he faced if he rejected the plea deal. Id. Gavillan-Martinez amended his motion again (Second Amended Rule 3.850 Motion) on September 23, 2015, raising the same claims previously brought in the Amended Rule 3.850 Motion. Id. at 82-106. Gavillan-Martinez supplemented the Second Amended Rule 3.850 Motion with one additional claim, that his counsel was deficient for failing to request a presentence investigation (PSI) report. Id. at 124-26. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief. Id. at 150-54. On March 6, 2018, Florida's First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) per curiam affirmed the denial of relief without a written opinion and issued the Mandate on December 5, 2018. Resp. Ex. E.
This proceeding was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Gavillan-Martinez's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, suchas persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2298 (2017). Also, deferential review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) ( ).
Thus, "AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burt v. Titlow,134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). "Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court blundered in a manner so 'well understood and comprehended in existing law' and 'was so lacking in justification' that 'there is no possibility fairminded jurists...
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