Gawenda v. Werner Co.

• Decision Date: 23 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-71808.,95-71808.
• Citation: 932 F. Supp. 183
• Parties: Daniel GAWENDA and Audrey Gawenda, Plaintiffs, v. WERNER CO., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

932 F. Supp. 183

Daniel GAWENDA and Audrey Gawenda, Plaintiffs, v. WERNER CO., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Defendant.

No. 95-71808.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

May 23, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard Worsham, Southfield, MI, for plaintiffs.

James Kohl, Detroit, MI, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EDMUNDS, District Judge.

This diversity product liability action comes before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff Daniel Gawenda, who was injured when he fell from the fourth step of an 8-foot aluminum stepladder allegedly manufactured by Defendant Werner Co., bought suit against Defendant claiming the ladder was defectively designed under theories of negligence and breach of an implied warranty. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ladder's rear rails are too flexible. Plaintiff has not presented a prima facie case of design defect under either theory, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I. Facts

On September 28, 1993, Plaintiff, an elevator repairman, climbed an 8 foot aluminum step ladder so he could inspect the motor of a freight elevator at Oshkosh Office Systems, Oshkosh, Wisconsin. The motor was housed in a cage directly adjacent to the freight elevator and maintenance required use of a ladder. Plaintiff used a ladder he found nearby. Plaintiff claims the ladder was manufactured by Defendant Werner between April 1982 and November 1985.¹ It is undisputed that the ladder was designed to support 250 pounds and was approved under both ANSI and Underwriter's Laboratory standards. Plaintiff testified the ladder appeared to be new; it had no observable deformities or abnormalities.

Plaintiff set the ladder up to the left of the caged area. He opened the ladder, locked the spreaders in place, jiggled the ladder after he opened it to make sure it was steady, made sure there was no rocking, tilting or movement of any kind, then grabbed his flashlight and started to climb the ladder. D. Gawenda Dep. at 84-85, 88, 90-91. Plaintiff testified he has used a ladder "millions of times" and learned in a safety class to make sure a ladder is level and resting on all four feet before climbing it. Id. at 73-74.

Plaintiff testified that after placing his right foot on the fourth step, he turned to the right to look at the motor with his flashlight at the same time he was bringing his left foot up to the fourth step. This is the last thing he remembers prior to his fall. He next remembers lying on the floor away from the fallen ladder, felt pain in the left side of his chest, and thought at first that he may have had a heart attack. Id. at 93-94, 96.

Plaintiff testified that before his fall there was no movement in the ladder. After the fall, he looked at the ladder and noticed that the rear rails were twisted to the left and the left rear side rail was bent in toward the front rails.

Plaintiff subsequently filed this product liability action against Defendant Werner asserting claims of design defect under theories of negligence and breach of an implied warranty.² Plaintiff supports his theories with testimony from his expert, Steven F. Biehl, an engineer who opines that Defendant Werner negligently designed the subject ladder with rear rails that were not rigid enough and this design defect caused the left rear rail to fail under Plaintiff's 210 pounds resulting in Plaintiff's fall and injuries.

Mr. Biehl theorizes that each of the four rails moved a little as Plaintiff climbed the ladder because they lacked rigidity. He admits that when a ladder is opened and the spreader bars locked, the legs or rails will deflect outward. Id. at 50. To explain how the left rear rail in the subject ladder would have deflected inward rather than out, Mr. Biehl surmises the left rear rail was likely pushed against a nearby column base. Plaintiff did not testify that he placed the ladder at or near the column base. Mr. Biehl further theorizes that as Plaintiff climbed the steps, rather than moving outward, this left rear rail deflected in toward the front rails. Finally, when Plaintiff reached the fourth step, the force of his weight and motion caused the left rear rail to collapse. This, in turn, caused the ladder to twist to the left and caused both Plaintiff and the ladder to fall.

Defendant brings this motion arguing (1) Plaintiff has not presented a prima facie case of design defect because he has not presented evidence that a safer, feasible alternative design was available when the subject ladder was designed; (2) Plaintiff's expert's opinion is inadmissible because it lacks the foundation required to establish reliability; and (3) Plaintiff's theory of causation is based upon impermissible speculation and conjecture.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The movant has an initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553. Once the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant; a "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

The court must believe the non-movant's evidence and draw "all justifiable inferences" in the non-movant's favor. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14. The inquiry is whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying the relevant evidentiary standard could "reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514.

III. Analysis

Michigan law, which governs this diversity action, imposes a duty on manufacturers "to design their products so as to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury." Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co., 421 Mich. 670, 693, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413, 425, 326 N.W.2d 372 (1982). Plaintiff alleges Defendant's design was unreasonable because the rear rails of its ladder were not sufficiently rigid and relies on his expert's opinion testimony to establish his prima facie case of design defect.

Because Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence of an available, reasonably safe and feasible alternative design, this court concludes Plaintiff has not established his prima facie case of design defect. Plaintiff is wrong when he argues that Owens does not apply to his design defect claims; that it is unnecessary for him to present evidence of a proposed alternative design that is available, reasonably efficient and safe; that he is not required to show that the ladder could be made safer because he has presented evidence that the ladder was not fit for its intended and foreseeable use. Plf.'s Br. at 15-17.

As recognized in Prentis, manufacturers have a duty to design their products only to eliminate unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury. Prentis, 421 Mich. at 693, 365 N.W.2d 176. Michigan courts recognize that product "manufacturers are not insurers that `in every instance and under all circumstances no injury will result from the use' of their products." Owens, 414 Mich. at 432, 326 N.W.2d 372 (quoting E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26 (8th Cir.1934)).

The Michigan Supreme Court has adopted a pure negligence, fault-based, risk-utility balancing test to give content to the duty and breach elements a plaintiff's prima facie design defect case. This is true whether plaintiff's design defect claim is based upon a theory of negligence or a theory of breach of an implied warranty. Prentis, 421 Mich. at 693-95, 365 N.W.2d 176. The emphasis is on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct rather than simply the product. Id. at 684, 691, 365 N.W.2d 176. To hold the defendant manufacturer liable, a plaintiff must prove, under a risk-utility analysis, that an available, safer, alternative design should have been adopted. Id. Contrary to Plaintiff's position here, evidence of available, safer, feasible alternative designs are necessary to establish Plaintiff's prima facie case of design defect. See Siminski v. Klein Tools, Inc., 840 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir.1988); Phillips v. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc., 762 F.2d 46 (6th Cir.1985) (plaintiff's expert's testimony that slip-on removable rubber pads on ladder's feet were an available, reasonably feasible and safe alternative to defendant manufacturer's design was sufficient to allow case to go to the jury); Fisher, 854 F.Supp. at 470-472; Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc., 176 Mich.App. 181, 187-88, 439 N.W.2d 326 (1989); Petto v. The Raymond Corp., 171 Mich.App. 688, 695, 431 N.W.2d 44 (1988).

The Court recently reaffirmed these principles in Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 450 Mich. 1, 538...