Gay v. Shadle
| Decision Date | 10 March 1920 |
| Docket Number | No. 33102.,33102. |
| Citation | 176 N.W. 635 |
| Parties | GAY v. SHADLE. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Boone County; H. E. Fry, Judge.
“Not to be officially reported.”
Action to recover damages because of the alleged negligence of defendant in an automobile collision. The damages claimed are for injuries to the automobile. Trial to a jury, and a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $183. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.Frank Porter, of Ogden, and F. W. Ganoe, of Boone, for appellant.
Dyer, Jordan & Dyer, of Boone, for appellee.
The evidence is conflicting. Defendant's evidence tends to show that he was not negligent, and that plaintiff was, at least, partly to blame. On the other hand, plaintiff's evidence tends to show the reverse of these propositions, and the jury could have properly so found. Plaintiff's theory is that defendant was driving his car at such speed as to be negligent, and that it was in violation of the city ordinance; that defendant was on the wrong side of the street. Plaintiff's evidence tends to show that he was on the right side of the street near the curb, proceeding slowly, not over 6 or 7 miles an hour; that the lights were not bright and blinding, as contended by defendant; that defendant was driving from 20 to 25 miles an hour; defendant had been drinking before the accident; he was arrested and charged with violating a city ordinance by driving on the wrong side of the street, and pleaded guilty.
[1] 1. Defendant requested an instruction, which was refused, as follows:
“You have a right to take into consideration all the facts shown, if any, in relation to the manner in which plaintiff's automobile had been driven and used previous to the accident, and if you find that it had been out of repair and had been sent or taken to the shop for repairs previous to the accident, and that it was a secondhand 1917 model automobile when plaintiff purchased it, you have a right to consider such facts, together with all the other evidence in arriving at its value just immediately before and just immediately after the accident.”
It is thought by appellant that the thought of the offered instruction is not covered by any instruction given by the court. We think it was. In the instructions given, the court, among other things, said:
“But in arriving at such value, you should consider all the circumstances and evidence bearing on its value, immediately before and immediately after the accident,” and “in determining this difference in value, you should consider all the evidence in the case that may throw any light on that question.”
The criticism is that the instructions given in some way limit the jury in considering the matters referred to in the offered instruction, and that the instructions given did not instruct the jury as to whether or not they had a right to determine the facts referred to in the offered instruction. The jury were told to take into consideration all the evidence in the case bearing on that question which would include the matters referred to in the instruction which was refused. We do not understand it is necessary that the court shall point out and emphasize any particular item of...
To continue reading
Request your trial