Gaynon v. Statum

• Decision Date: 17 November 1942
• Citation: 151 Fla. 793,10 So.2d 432
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: GAYNON et al. v. STATUM.

10 So.2d 432

151 Fla. 793

GAYNON et al. v. STATUM.

Florida Supreme Court

November 17, 1942

Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Miles W. Lewis judge.

Adair Kent, Ashby & McNatt, C. G. Ashby, and John H. McNatt all of Jacksonville, for appellants.

John E Teate and George C. Bedell, both of Jacksonville, for appellees.

BUFORD, Justice.

The appellee here and his wife, Edna Statum, joined by her husband, instituted suit in the Circuit Court of Duval County to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligent act of appellant's servant in the operation of a truck on the highway. In that suit H. A. Statum sought to recover damages for personal injuries to himself, for injuries to his property and also for injuries sustained by reason of loss of his wife's services, companionship consortium, etc., and expenses incurred in the treatment of her made necessary by injuries received by her at the time of the accident; and the wife, Edna, sought damages in her own right resulting from injuries received.

The declaration was demurred to, among other grounds, on the ground that it was duplicitous in that it set up a cause of action in behalf of the husband for a loss of property and personal injuries to himself and also set up a cause of action in favor of the wife for injuries to her individually. The demurrer was sustained upon the ground that the declaration was duplicitous.

Plaintiff amended, eliminating the wife as a party and eliminating his claim for damages on account of loss sustained by him by reason of her injuries. The Statums then filed a suit in the Civil Court of Record wherein Mrs. Statum claimed damages for injuries to herself and H. A. Statum claimed damages to him by reason of injuries to his wife.

The case in the Civil Court of Record came to trial first and resulted in verdict and judgment in favor of each of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the defendant attempted to file plea in abatement in the Circuit Court case wherein it was averred in effect that Statum had elected to sue his claim in the Civil Court of Record, that he had pursued that suit to judgment and had not included in his claim for damages therein the items for which he had sought to recover in the Circuit Court, that this constituted a splitting of cause of action and the plaintiff in the Civil Court of Record was estopped to proceed with the suit in the Circuit Court because he was bound to present his entire claim for damages growing out of one transaction or occurrence in one suit. The court declined to allow the plea. Exception was noted. Judgment was in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant perfected appeal to this Court.

The first question posed by appellant is:

"Where a plaintiff obtains a judgment for a portion of the damages sustained by him by reason of an alleged wrongful act, may he thereafter maintain another action against the same wrongdoer for other damages sustained by such litigant by reason of the very same wrongful Act?'

'Stated differently: May one plaintiff obtain more than one judgment against one alleged wrongdoer for damages sustained by reason of one wrongful act?'

Section 46.09, Fla.Statutes 1941, provides: 'Action by man and wife.--In any action brought by a man and his wife for injury done to the wife, in respect of which she is necessarily joined as co-plaintiff, the husband may add thereto claims in his own right, and separate actions brought in respect of such claims may be consolidated, if the court shall think fit. In case of the death of either plaintiff, such suit, so far as it relates to the causes of action, if any, which do not servive, shall abate, but to that extent only.' This was originally Section 11 of Chapter 1096, Acts of 1860-61, brought forward as Section 2586, R.G.S., 4226, C.G.L. We have never had the precise question presented in this court. A like question has been presented in many other cases and the courts have not been entirely in harmony in the determination thereof. We recognize the rule against the splitting of causes of action and that as a general rule the law mandatorily requires that all damages sustained or accruing to one as a result of a single wrongful act must be claimed and recovered in one action or not at all. As is stated in 1 Am. Jur. 481, 'the rule is founded upon the plainest and most substantial justice--namely, that litigation should have an end and that no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of suits.'

It, therefore appears that if the so-called splitting of the cause of action does not result in the multiplicity of suits then the reason for the rule does not exist in that case and the rule would not apply. Such is the condition which we find here. Statum had a cause of action in his capacity as husband for damages sustained by him growing out of the injuries to his wife, which, under the statute, supra, he could recover in the same suit in which the wife is allowed to recover for injuries to her. He also claimed other damages which he could not recover in that suit and, therefore, it was necessary to institute and maintain two causes of action, one for damages accruing by reason of injuries to the wife, and the...