GDK v. State, Dept. of Family Services, C-03-10.
| Decision Date | 30 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. C-03-10.,C-03-10. |
| Citation | 2004 WY 78,92 P.3d 834 |
| Parties | GDK, Appellant (Respondent), v. STATE of Wyoming, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES; State of Wyoming, ex rel., DDK and MK, a/k/a MW, minor children, Appellees (Petitioners). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Matthew F.G. Castano of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.
Representing Appellees: Cynthia L. Harnett of Harnett Law Office, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and PARK, D.J.
[¶ 1] TAK, mother of the children in question, was married to GDK, appellant herein, at the time her children, DDK and MK, were born; however, she had a relationship with JMW and was living with him at the time of both births. Genetic testing established that JMW was the biological father of the children. Both GDK and JMW asserted paternity as to both children. The district court determined that JMW was the legal father of the minor children. GDK appeals from the decision on several grounds.
[¶ 2] We affirm.
[¶ 3] TAK and GDK were married on December 31, 1998, and two children were born during this marriage: DDK born July 17, 2001, and MK (also known as MW) born May 3, 2002. During a period from prior to DDK's birth until shortly after MK's birth, TAK and JMW had a relationship and lived together in an on-again, off-again manner. TAK and JMW had a disagreement, and TAK moved out shortly after MK was born. Shortly thereafter, on June 4, 2002, TAK and GDK were divorced, but then remarried on November 2, 2002.
[¶ 4] The State of Wyoming filed a Petition to Establish Support on March 21, 2002, and then filed an Amended Petition to Establish Paternity and Support after the birth of MK. Both GDK and JMW responded to the amended pleadings and each sought a declaration that he was the father of both children. TAK, the mother, also responded, seeking a declaration of paternity and asking for custody of the children. The district court ordered genetic testing, and these tests resulted in a finding that there was a 99.9% probability that JMW was the father of both children.
[¶ 5] JMW's request to establish paternity was made within six months of the birth of MK but not within six months of DDK's birth. The statute in effect at the time had a time limit of six months within which a man could bring an action to establish paternity. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104(c) (LexisNexis 2001). JMW was time-barred as to DDK; however, he did bring his action to establish paternity in a timely manner for MK. Because of the statutory time limitations, the district court was required to do a separate analysis for each child. The determination of paternity for DDK involved determination of conflicting statutory presumptions, and the determination of paternity for MK involved a statutory presumption on one hand and the impact of a positive genetic test on the other.
[¶ 6] Regarding DDK, the district court had to make a determination as between two different conflicting presumptions in the applicable statute. GDK claimed paternity under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102(a)(i) (Lexis-Nexis 2001), which provided that a man was presumed to be the natural father of a child if the child was born during the marriage. The claim of JMW rested on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001), providing that a man was presumed to be the father of a child if he "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." The district court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that JMW had received the child into his home and openly acknowledged DDK as his. The parties agreed that TAK and GDK were married at the time of DDK's birth. Therefore, as to DDK, each man could assert a statutory presumption. The controlling statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102(b) (Lexis-Nexis 2001), provided that when there were two or more conflicting presumptions, the presumption based on the weightier considerations of policy and logic would control.
[¶ 7] As to DDK, the district court found that the "holding out" presumption took priority; and as to MK, the district court found that, in addition, there was no evidence to rebut the results of the genetic testing. Thus, for different reasons, the district court determined that JMW was the legal father of both children.
[¶ 8] GDK argues that the district court improperly weighed the conflicting presumptions asserted by each of the men who claimed paternity. Resolution of this issue requires interpretation of the paternity statutes in effect at the time of the action. Therefore, the standard of review for statutory construction applies. The first consideration, when interpreting statutes, is to determine the legislature's intent. In re State, Div. of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. NDB, 35 P.3d 1224, 1229 (Wyo.2001). When a court seeks to ascertain the meaning of a given law, all statutes must be construed in pari materia and all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Id. Since statutory construction is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo. Id. We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. Id. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia. Fontaine v. Board of County Commissioners of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 895 (Wyo.2000).
[¶ 9] At the time of this action, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102 (LexisNexis 2001) set forth certain presumptions to be used by a court to determine paternity. This statute provided, in pertinent part:
[¶ 10] The first issue mandates a discussion of the evolution of a presentation necessary to overcome the enduring and strongly supported marital presumption. The marital presumption was derived from Roman civil law and adopted as part of English common law. Edward R. Armstrong, Putative Fathers and the Presumption of Legitimacy— Adams and the Forbidden Fruit: Clashes Between the Presumption of Legitimacy and the Rights of Putative Fathers in Arkansas, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L.Rev. 369, 373 (2003). This common law rule was in place to prevent the "bastardization" of children with the attendant lack of legal rights. Armstrong, supra. Furthermore, the courts wanted to provide families for children because such families "were desirable for such children and for the kingdom as a whole." Judge Chris W. Altenbernd, Quasi-marital Children: The Common Law's Failure in Privette and Daniel Calls for Statutory Reform, 26 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 219, 234 (1999).
[¶ 11] Challenges to the marital presumption arose from many quarters, including the push to obtain child support from fathers in lieu of public support. Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. Va. L.Rev. 547, 557-58 (2000). Part of this challenge also derived from the advances in science, including DNA testing. This testing provided substantially improved reliability in paternity determinations. Glennon, supra. Thus, courts have increasingly been required to make decisions as to whether the mother's husband or the biological father should be declared to be the legal father of the child in question. This has generated discussions as to the proper role of the "best interests of the child" as a factor in resolving paternity issues.
[¶ 12] The district court recognized this conflict and applied the statute to resolve which presumption should control. GDK argues that the court's finding is not proper because it improperly considered the children's best interest and the dissolution of the first marriage between TAK and GDK. The propriety of...
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...psychological ramifications of its decision as to which man should be adjudicated" as the father. GDK v. State, Dept. of Family Servs., 92 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo. 2004). Similarly, the Supreme Court ofPage 35 Colorado held that this standard demands a "fact-intensive" inquiry to ensure a "child......
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...psychological ramifications of its decision as to which man should be adjudicated" as the father. GDK v. State, Dept. of Family Servs., 92 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo. 2004). Similarly, the Supreme Court ofPage 34 Colorado held that this standard demands a "fact-intensive" inquiry to ensure a "child......
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...psychological ramifications of its decision as to which man should be adjudicated" as the father. GDK v. State, Dept. of Family Servs., 92 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo. 2004). Similarly, the Supreme Court ofPage 34 Colorado held that this standard demands a "fact-intensive" inquiry to ensure a "child......
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