Gebers v. Murfreesboro Laundry Co.

• Citation: 15 S.W.2d 737,159 Tenn. 51
• Parties: GEBERS v. MURFREESBORO LAUNDRY CO. et al.
• Decision Date: 13 April 1929
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

15 S.W.2d 737

159 Tenn. 51

GEBERS v. MURFREESBORO LAUNDRY CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April 13, 1929

Appeal from Circuit Court, Rutherford County; John E. Richardson Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Sue Bearden Gebers, opposed by the Murfreesboro Laundry Company and others. Compensation was denied by the circuit court, and claimant appeals. Affirmed.

Tyne Peebles, Henry & Tyne, of Nashville, for plaintiff in error.

Jas. D Richardson, of Murfreesboro, for defendant in error.

McKINNEY J.

The trial court was correct in holding that a member of a partnership, who receives wages for his services, is not an employee within the purview of our Compensation Act (Pub Acts 1919, c. 123). Cooper v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 177 Cal. 685, 171 P. 684; Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 187 Cal. 615, 203 P. 95; Rockefeller v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah, 124, 197 P. 1038; McMillen v. Industrial Commission, 13 Ohio App. 310; Bowne v. S.W. Bowne Co., 221 N.Y. 28, 116 N.E. 364; Lyle v. Lyle Cider & Vinegar Co., 243 N.Y. 257, 153 N.E. 67, 47 A. L. R. 840; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Patten (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S.W. 240, cited in 25 A. L. R. 379; Berger v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 293 S.W. 235; Ellis v. Ellis, 1 K. B. 324; 28 R. C. L. 765. Contra: Knox v. Knox, 120 Okl. 45, 250 P. 783.

The reasons for holding a member of a firm not an employee are thus stated in Cooper v. Industrial Acci. Commission supra to wit: "The Workmen's Compensation Act [St. 1913, p. 279] clearly does not contemplate such a mixed relation as that existing between partners, wherein each member of the partnership is at the same time principal and agent, master and servant, employer and employee; and wherein each, in any services he may render, whether under his general duty as a partner or under a special agreement for some particular service, is working for himself as much as for his associates in carrying on the business of the firm. The obvious intent of the act was to substitute its procedure for the former method of settling disputes arising between those occupying the strict relationship of master and servant, or employer and employee, by means of actions for damages. * * * The law relative to compensation as between master and servant or employer and employee for injuries suffered by the latter contemplates two persons standing in this opposed relation and not the anomaly of one person occupying the dual relation of master and servant, employer and employee, plaintiff and defendant, person...