Geer v. Geer
| Decision Date | 03 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 8615DC517,8615DC517 |
| Parties | , 55 USLW 2551 Linda Lou Kinser GEER v. Robert Donald GEER |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Long & Long by Lunsford Long, Chapel Hill, for plaintiff-appellant.
Lewis and Associates by Susan H. Lewis, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1970. During the first year of the marriage, plaintiff worked in Dayton, Ohio as a school teacher, and defendant went to school. After graduation in 1972 defendant worked for Roberts Consolidated as a research and development chemist. Defendant was subsequently promoted to quality control supervisor and, during his last year with Roberts Consolidated, to technical director.
Plaintiff taught full time in the public school system in Ohio until the birth of their two children in 1974 and 1976, at which time plaintiff taught part-time at Sinclair College. When the children were four years old and two years old respectively, plaintiff enrolled in Ohio State Medical School in Columbus, Ohio. The entire family moved to Columbus, Ohio in order for plaintiff to go to medical school there. Defendant gave up his job with Roberts Consolidated. In Columbus defendant was unable to find comparable employment. After one month and a half of trying to find work he took a job working from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Approximately six months later he found day work as a chemist.
After plaintiff completed her medical degree the family moved to Chapel Hill so that plaintiff could obtain specialization in radiology at the University of North Carolina. Defendant took odd jobs to support the family from May to October 1981. In October 1981, he found permanent work with U.S. Floor Systems as the manager of chemical products.
At the time of trial defendant worked as a general manager for Carolina Aerosol in Durham earning $25,000.00 annually. At the time of trial plaintiff worked half time as a radiologist with Wayne Radiology in Goldsboro earning $50,000.00 annually. Plaintiff has custody of the two children and is remarried to a radiologist. Defendant pays no child support and plaintiff has not requested a child support order.
The court found as fact that the parties owned the following marital property: the marital home, net value $64,800.00; a 1974 Mazda pickup truck, net value $300.00; a 1981 Subaru automobile, net value $4,000.00; a 1974 Peugeot automobile, net value $800.00; household effects previously distributed between the parties, net value to plaintiff $4,320.00, net value to defendant $4,859.00; household effects desired by neither party, to be sold, net value $650.00; bank accounts, including IRA's previously distributed between the parties, net value to plaintiff $2,900.00, net value to defendant $1,300.00; and two marital debts, each for loans from defendant's parents, one valued at $5,000.00 including interest and one valued at $4,000.00 including interest. The court concluded that an equal distribution of the marital property would not be equitable "because of the direct and indirect contributions made by the Defendant to help educate or develop the career potential of the Plaintiff and the consequent disparity in the income of the Plaintiff at the time of the distribution." To effectuate defendant's reimbursement for the costs of plaintiff's medical education, plaintiff was ordered to execute a deed of the marital residence to defendant and defendant assumed liability for the marital debts to his parents.
In plaintiff's first Assignment of Error plaintiff contends that the court exceeded the scope of North Carolina's equitable distribution statute when it distributed an unsecured marital debt by assigning one half of the loan to each party. Specifically, plaintiff contends that unsecured debts do not qualify as marital property as defined in G.S. 50-20(b)(1) and therefore are not subject to distribution by the court. In a separate Assignment of Error, plaintiff contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of fact that the value of the marital debts is $9,000.00.
In Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C.App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (1985), the appellant assigned error to the court's failure to consider and assign liabilities for "all the parties' marital debts." Id. at 678, 336 S.E.2d at 422 (emphasis added). However, this Court in Dorton did not define marital debts and discussed only debts that were incurred individually by one former spouse. The Court acknowledged that pursuant to G.S. 50-20(c)(1), the court is required to consider the liabilities of each party when making an equitable distribution. Id. We hold that G.S. 50-20(c)(1) requires the court to consider all debts of the parties, whether a debt is one for which the parties are legally, jointly liable or one for which only one party is legally, individually liable. Regardless of who is legally obligated for the debt, for the purposes of an equitable distribution, a marital debt is defined as a debt incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties. Allen v. Allen, 287 S.C. 501, 506, 339 S.E.2d 872, 875-76 (1986). The court has the discretion, when determining what constitutes an equitable distribution of the marital assets, to also apportion or distribute the marital debts in an equitable manner. See id. In today's society debt is commonplace and distribution of the debts can be as great a concern to divorced persons as distribution of the assets. Distribution of marital debts has the benefit of resolving all issues flowing from the former marriage relationship. In particular, "loans from close family members must be closely scrutinized for legitimacy." Id. at 507, 339 S.E.2d at 876. It is incumbent upon the court distributing a debt to ensure that it was a marital debt, that is, incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties during the marriage. Id. at 506, 339 S.E.2d at 875-76. Accordingly, when the court distributes debts the court must make findings to show it considered all debts of the parties and to identify those which comprise marital debts.
In the case sub judice, there was evidence to support the court's finding of fact that the parties borrowed $5,000.00 from defendant's parents in 1970 for the purchase of a mobile home with the promise that it would be repaid with interest. There is also evidence to show that subsequently the parties bought defendant's parents' Peugeot automobile by paying them $800 at the time of the purchase and promising to pay the balance of $3,700.00 plus 6% interest at a later time. Plaintiff did not deny the existence or amount of the loan from defendant's parents in her testimony. This evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding that the loans from defendant's parents were legitimate debts and that the value of the two debts totaled at least $9,000.00, inclusive of interest; therefore, this finding of fact is conclusive on appeal. Little v. Little, 9 N.C.App. 361, 365, 176 S.E.2d 521, 523-24 (1970). We note that the evidence would have supported a finding that the parties owed defendant's parents $11,500.00, as shown on defendant's Exhibit 9. However, it was not prejudicial to plaintiff that the court found as fact that the marital debt was less in amount. Further, the court was required to consider the evidence pursuant to G.S. 50-20(c)(1). The court had the discretion to assign one-half of the marital debts to each party and to then award defendant additional funds sufficient to pay his parents plaintiff's one-half share of the debt. See White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985). The court properly made findings to support the conclusion and award with respect to the parties' marital debts. Plaintiff's first two Assignments of Error are overruled.
In plaintiff's next Assignment of Error she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of fact that defendant "gave up his career so that the Plaintiff could obtain a medical education and license to practice medicine."
We find that the record on appeal and the transcript of the proceedings is replete with evidence from which the court could find that defendant interrupted his career to its likely detriment as he followed plaintiff while she pursued a medical career, notwithstanding the fact that it was a joint decision that plaintiff go to medical school. Accordingly, this finding of fact is conclusive on appeal, see Little, supra, and this Assignment of Error is overruled.
Finding of Fact 14 states in pertinent part as follows:
14. Pursuant to a plan of the parties to improve the economic situation of the family, the Defendant gave up his career so that the Plaintiff could obtain a medical education and license to practice medicine.... These costs are approximately $29,824.50 and consist of the following items of expenditure:
Costs of Medical Education
Costs Incurred in Sale of First Home and Move $ 4,465.70
Costs Incurred in Sale of Second Home 5,126.04
Moving Expenses to Chapel Hill 4,046.00
Extra Child Care 4,756.09
Payments for Medical School 10,736.67
Payments for Medical School Supplies 694.00
Total Out-Of-Pocket Payments
Directly Attributable to Plaintiff's
Medical Education: 29,824.50
In plaintiff's next Assignment of Error she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support four of the itemized amounts shown as costs of plaintiff's medical education, to wit: the costs incurred in the sale of the second home ($5,126.04), the moving expenses to Chapel Hill ($4,046.00), the costs for extra child care ($4,756.09), and payments for medical school supplies ($694.00). Specifically plaintiff contends that the record contains no testimony to support these figures and that the exhibits upon which defendant relies were never offered or received into...
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