GEICO Cas. Co. v. Mangai
| Citation | 476 F.Supp.3d 757 |
| Decision Date | 04 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 1:18cv105 |
| Parties | GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Nerad Grace MANGAI, Decedent, BY her parent, James MANGAI, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Thomas E. Rosta, Metzger Rosta LLP, Noblesville, IN, for Plaintiff.
Edward C. Lawhead, III, Malloy Etzler & Lawhead PC, Highland, IN, for Defendants Nerad Grace Mangai, Brooke Mekete Dagnew, Kirubel Alemayehu Hailu, Israel Solomon Tamire, Mercedez Main, David A. Sollenberger, Mary L. Sollenberger.
Edward C. Lawhead, III, Malloy Etzler & Lawhead PC, Crown Point, IN, for Defendant Deangelo R. Evans.
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the Plaintiff, GEICO Casualty Company ("GEICO"), on May 18, 2020. Defendants, Nerad Grace Mangai, Decedent, by her parent, James Mangai, Brooke Mekete Dagnew, Decedent, by his parent, Mekete Dagnew, Kirubel Alemayehu Hailu, Decedent, by his parent, Alemayehu Hailu, and Israel Solomon Tamire, (collectively "Students"), filed their response on July 10, 2020. GEICO filed its reply on July 20, 2020.
For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be denied.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry of summary judgment against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). Summary judgment is appropriate – in fact, is mandated – where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.
Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply " ‘showing’–that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials and, if the moving party has "produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial", then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc. , 914 F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmoving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; Donovan v. City of Milwaukee , 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) provides that "if a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court ... may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion or grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials – including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it ...". Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
It is true that in viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. Anderson at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle , 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In deciding what insurance coverage, if any, a party is entitled to, the Court should apply Indiana law for contract interpretation. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keca , 368 F.3d 793, 796 (7th Cir. 2004). An insurance contract "is subject to the same rules of interpretation as are other contracts". Morris v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. , 848 N.E.2d 663, 666 (Ind. 2006). As with other contracts, the interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law. Cinergy Corp. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. , 865 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ind. 2007). Accordingly, questions as to the interpretation of an insurance policy are "particularly well-suited for summary judgment." Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Jones , 953 N.E.2d 608, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
This original action is a declaratory judgment action filed by GEICO Casualty Company, seeking that this Court (a) declare and determine that the Students were not "occupying" an insured automobile on the date of the accident; (b) declare and determine that GEICO Casualty Company does not owe coverage, benefits, or payments under either the Uninsured Motorist Coverage or Underinsured Motorist Coverage based on the definitions contained in the applicable policy of insurance in effect on the date of the accident; and (c) declare and determine that GEICO Casualty Company has no obligation to pay the Students, or their designated representatives in this case, for any claims or defense or indemnification obligations pursuant to the terms of the applicable policy of insurance arising out of the February 21, 2016 accident. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" – Complaint for Declaratory Judgment).
The insurance policy at issue is a GEICO Casualty Insurance Indiana Family Automobile Insurance Policy issued to David A. Sollenberger and Mary L. Sollenberger under policy number 4288-83-43-20 with effective dates of coverage from November 28, 2015 through May 28, 2016. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "B" – Certified GEICO Policy). The GEICO Policy at issue included applicable uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) per person and Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) per accident. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "C" – Certified Declarations Page).
In the early morning hours of February 21, 2016, Deangelo Evans was operating a motor vehicle northbound on Interstate 69 near Fairmount, Indiana, when he drove off the roadway and into the grassy median separating northbound and southbound Interstate 69, and then struck Nerad Grace Mangai, Brooke Mekete Dagnew, Kirubel Alemayehu Hailu, and Israel Solomon Tamire, killing Mangai, Dagnew, and Hailu, and seriously injuring Tamire. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "D" – Complaint filed in Grant Superior Court). Mangai, Dagnew, Hailu and Tamire were outside a vehicle which was owned by David and Mary Sollenberger and which was a vehicle listed on the GEICO policy. The decedents, by their respective parents, as well as Tamire, filed suit in the Grant County Superior Court on December 13, 2017, against Evans, Mercedez Main (the owner of the vehicle operated by Evans on the date of the accident), as well as GEICO Casualty Company for possible uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits under the GEICO policy. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "D" – Grant County Complaint). That case was stayed pending this Court's determination of the applicable coverage and indemnification issues as requested by GEICO's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment filed in this matter. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "E" – Order Staying Grant County case).
GEICO contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims as presented by the Defendants in this matter, and GEICO seeks a judgment from this Court that it does not owe coverage, defense, or indemnification under the applicable Policy for any claims, particularly the pending uninsured or underinsured claims of the decedents and Tamire, arising out of the automobile accident which occurred on February 21, 2016.
GEICO has presented the following facts, which do not appear to be disputed, and are supported by the record. On February 21, 2016, the Students were students at Manchester College located in North Manchester, Wabash County, Indiana. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "D", ¶1-2 of Count I). On said date, Dagmawi Tadesse, Nebiyu Alemu, and Amanuel Atsbha were also students at Manchester College. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" – Deposition of Tadesse, page 6, lines 19-24; page 8, lines 7-13; page 10, lines 14-16).
At approximately 8:00 p.m. on February 20, 2016, Tadesse picked up a Pontiac van owned by Mary Sollenberger, which he had driven on numerous prior occasions.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" – page 10, line 24 through page 13, line 17). The Manchester students knew Mary Sollenberger as she was very close to the international community and often had the international students to her home for holidays. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" – page 11, lines 10-15). Tadesse had permission to operate the van on that evening. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" – page 11, lines 19-21).
Tadesse and the other Manchester students then traveled in the van to Taylor University, where they picked up another friend, Ruhama Mergia. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" – ...
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