GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez

• Decision Date: 10 May 2021
• Docket Number: 20-21549-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES
• Parties: GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. EILEEN GONALEZ et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. EILEEN GONALEZ et al., Defendants.

No. 20-21549-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

May 10, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PENDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EDWIN G. TORRES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Eileen Gonzalez's, Frank Bennar's, and Zabryna Acuna's (“Minor Acuna”) (collectively, “Defendants”) and Geico Insurance General Insurance Company's (“Geico”) motions for summary judgment. [D.E 52-53]. Each party timely filed their respective responses [D.E. 60-61] and replies [D.E. 66-67]. Therefore, the motions are now ripe for disposition. After careful consideration of the motions, responses, replies, relevant authorities, and for the reasons discussed below, Geico's motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED in all respects and Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be DENIED.^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

Given the quality of drivers in Miami-Dade County, and our exceedingly high insurance rates that lead the nation, it would come as a surprise to some that use of golf carts on our roadways is becoming more common. This trend seems unwise, to put it mildly, because bad things happen when a golf cart meets a two-ton vehicle. And when bad things happen, litigation ensues. Take this case.

On March 30, 2016, Geico issued a Florida Family Automobile Insurance Policy to Monika Caridad Acuna (“Mrs Acuna”) and Jesse Acuna (“Mr. Acuna”) (collectively, the “Acunas”). The policy included bodily injury limits of $10, 000 for each person and $20, 000 for each occurrence. Afterwards, Minor Acuna drove a 1987 golf cart with four passengers that collided with a 2008 Dodge Caliber on July 4, 2016 in Miami-Dade County. The accident resulted in significant injuries to the passengers in the golf cart, including Devin Bennar and his siblings. Those passengers then sued Minor Acuna in Florida state court for their injuries, hospitalization expenses, disfigurement and mental anguish. Geico provided a defense to Minor Acuna pursuant to a reservation of rights clause included in the automobile insurance policy, but the plaintiffs prevailed and the state court entered a final judgment in excess of the policy limits.

Following entry of the state court judgment, Geico filed this declaratory action on April 11, 2020 to determine the rights and obligations of the parties under the insurance policy. [D.E. 1]. Geico took the position that coverage does not exist for the motor vehicle accident and that the company had no obligation to defend or indemnify. Defendants filed an answer on June 1, 2020 with allegations that Geico breached the insurance contract “[b]y refusing to settle the Bennars claim against Ms. Acuna and by further refusing to indemnify her against the Final Judgment.” [D.E. 16 at 8]. The parties have now filed a motion for summary judgment and with the benefit of a response and reply, the motions are now ripe for disposition.

II. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND LAW

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986) (quoting another source).

In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on the pleadings, but must show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions that specific facts exist demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323B24 (1986). The existence of a mere “scintilla” of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position is insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). A court need not permit a case to go to a jury . . . when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, or upon which the non-movant relies, are implausible. See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. Of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 592-94).

At the summary judgment stage, the Court's function is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In making this determination, the Court must decide which issues are material. A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the case. See Id. at 248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”). “Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. General Principles of Insurance Contracts

“Under Florida law, an insurance policy is treated like a contract, and therefore ordinary contract principles govern the interpretation and construction of such a policy.” Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Wausau Bus. Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2900452, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2007) (citing Graber v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 819 So.2d 840, 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). The interpretation of an insurance contract - including the question of whether an insurance provision is ambiguous - is a question of law to be determined by the court. See id.; Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois v. Hutson, 847 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (stating that whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a matter of law); see also James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng'g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).

In addition, “[u]nder Florida law, insurance contracts are construed according to their plain meaning.” Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 473 F.3d 1131, 1135 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So.2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005)). The “terms of an insurance policy should be taken and understood in their ordinary sense and the policy should receive a reasonable, practical and sensible interpretation consistent with the intent of the parties-not a strained, forced or unrealistic construction.” Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So.2d 732, 736 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 260 So.2d 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)); see also Gilmore v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 708 So.2d 679, 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“The language of a policy should be read in common with other policy provisions to accomplish the intent of the parties.”); see also James River, 540 F.3d at 1274 (“In interpreting insurance contracts, ‘the language of the policy is the most important factor' [which] are construed according to their plain meaning.”) (quoting in part Taurus, 913 So.2d at 532).

However, if there is more than one reasonable interpretation of an insurance policy, an ambiguity exists and it “should be construed against the insurer.” Pac. Emp'rs Ins., 2007 WL 2900452, at *4 (citing Purrelli v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 698 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). Where an interpretation “involve[s] exclusions to insurance contracts, the rule is even clearer in favor of strict construction against the insurer: exclusionary provisions which are ambiguous or otherwise susceptible to more than one meaning must be construed in favor of the insured.” Sphinx Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 412 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986)). An insurance policy must, of course, be ambiguous before it is subject to these rules. See Taurus Holdings, Inc., 913 So.2d at 532 (“Although ambiguous provisions are construed in favor of coverage, to allow for such a construction the provision must actually be ambiguous.”). An ambiguous policy must, for example, have a genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity in meaning after the court has applied the ordinary rules of construction. See Deni Assocs. of Florida, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 1998). “Just because an operative term is not defined, it does not necessarily mean that the term is ambiguous.” Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Cutting & Drilling Co., 2009 WL 700246, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2009) (citing Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So.2d 161, 166 (Fla. 2003)).

On the other hand, “if a policy provision is clear and unambiguous, it should be enforced according to its terms whether it is a basic policy provision or an exclusionary provision.” Hagen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur Co., 675 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Ultimately “in the absence of some ambiguity, the intent of the parties to a written contract must be ascertained from the words used in the contract, without resort to extrinsic evidence.” Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Tropical Shipping & Const....