Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 23 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. SC01-1219.,SC01-1219. |
| Citation | 819 So.2d 732 |
| Parties | Carole M. SIEGLE, Petitioner, v. PROGRESSIVE CONSUMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Mike Peacock and W. Christian Hoyer of James, Hoyer, Newcomer & Smiljanich, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.
Francis A. Anania and Douglas H. Stein of Anania, Bandklayder, Blackwell, Baumgarten & Torricella, Miami, FL; and Barry Richard of Greenberg, Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:
Does an automobile collision policy which provides that the insurer must repair or replace the damaged vehicle "with other of like kind and quality" obligate the insurer to compensate the insured in money for any diminution in market value after the insurer completes a first-rate repair which returns the vehicle to its pre-accident level of performance, appearance, and function?
Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 788 So.2d 355, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
In 1997, the petitioner, Carole M. Siegle, was involved in an automobile accident. See Siegle, 788 So.2d at 357
. At the time of the accident, she was insured by the respondent, Progressive Consumers Insurance Company ("Progressive"), under a contract of insurance containing the following provisions:
As was its option, Progressive elected to repair Siegle's car.
Despite the petitioner's complete satisfaction with the repairs,1 she filed the instant cause of action for breach of contract seeking the recovery of the "inherent diminished value" caused to her auto by the collision. See id. at 357. Petitioner defined inherent diminished value as "the difference between the pre-loss value of the insured automobile and its value after it was repaired and returned." Citing Morrison v. Allstate Indemnity Co., No. 98-377-Civ-J-20c (M.D.Fla. Sept. 9, 1999), the trial court dismissed Petitioner's complaint with prejudice.
On appeal, the Fourth District quoted extensively from Carlton v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., 32 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.2000), and stated:
Siegle, 788 So.2d at 360-61. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's complaint, and also certified the above-stated question to this Court as one of great public importance.
As this cause comes to us from a trial court order of dismissal, two important principles govern our review. First, "[w]hether a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action is an issue of law." W.R. Townsend Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civil Constr., Inc., 728 So.2d 297, 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Consequently, the ruling below is subject to de novo review. See id. Additionally, when presented with a motion to dismiss, a trial court is required to "treat the factual allegations of the complaint as true and to consider those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Hollywood Lakes Section Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 676 So.2d 500, 501 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing Caretta Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd., 647 So.2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).
In furtherance of her claim, Siegle contends that the instant policy language is ambiguous, resulting in a triggering of the rule that "[a]mbiguities are interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer who prepared the policy." Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swindal, 622 So.2d 467, 470 (Fla.1993). The ambiguity, Petitioner asserts, is a result of Progressive's failure to define the terms "repair," "replace," or "like kind and quality." It is well settled, however, that an insurance contract is to be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy. See Swindal, 622 So.2d at 470
; Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Butler, 314 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1975); Poole v. Travelers Ins. Co., 130 Fla. 806, 179 So. 138, 141-42 (1937). Thus, it is only where courts first determine that policy language is ambiguous that contractual language is to be construed in favor of the insured. When an insurance contract is not ambiguous, it must be given effect as written. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Oliveras, 441 So.2d 175, 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
A number of opinions from other jurisdictions have spoken directly to the issue as to whether the contract terms complained of by the petitioner here create ambiguity within the policy. Of those, only the Superior Court of Delaware deemed the language ambiguous. See Delledonne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 621 A.2d 350 (Del.Super.Ct.1992)
. In 2001, however, the Delaware Supreme Court held that "[t]he Delledonne Court... incorrectly stated Delaware law by finding that the existence of two separate and distinct lines of authority in the interpretation of similar policy language is evidence of ambiguity." O'Brien v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 289 (Del.2001). Thus, no court has explicitly found the contract language at issue in the instant case to be ambiguous.
Other jurisdictions have specifically deemed the language in question here unambiguous. Most recently, in analyzing the language before us in the instant case, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, stated: Camden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 66 S.W.3d 78, 81 (Mo.Ct.App. 2001). Courts in Arizona, California, Louisiana, and Massachusetts have also deemed the disputed contract language unambiguous.2 Finally, the district court below definitively stated: "We find no ambiguity in the policy, and we have no exclusion to narrowly tailor." Siegle, 788 So.2d at 361.
In the instant case, the petitioner asserts that Progressive's use of the terms "repair," "replace," and "like kind and quality" creates an ambiguity in the policy. Since these terms create ambiguity, Siegle argues, this Court should interpret the term "loss" to include diminished value. It is clear, however, that these terms are utterly unambiguous. The policy language reads:
Id. at 253. Therefore, we conclude that "repair," as used in the instant contract of insurance, is not ambiguous.
Likewise, Progressive's use of "replace" in the contract was only intended to mean that the insurer would "restore [the insured's automobile] to a former place or position," or "take the place of ... as a substitute or successor." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 992 (10th ed.1999). Finally, "of like kind and quality" is properly interpreted to require that the insurer place the insured in possession of a car "the same or nearly the same" as the damaged auto, in terms of the "fundamental nature" and "degree of excellence" of the automobile. Id. at 674, 642-43, 955. As used by Progressive, the meanings of both "replace" and "of like kind and quality" are unambiguous and clear. See Nateman v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 544 So.2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
(). Based upon an analysis of the policy language here, it is clear that the contract terms are not ambiguous, and the petitioner's argument is without merit.
Based upon our conclusion that the terms of the instant contract of insurance are unambiguous, we turn now to the petitioner's assertion that the policy language should be interpreted to cover diminished value. All three District Courts of Appeal that have been...
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