Geiger v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

• Decision Date: 11 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. CV 06 2218 CAS (RC).,CV 06 2218 CAS (RC).
• Citation: 487 F.Supp.2d 1155
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Ronald Earl GEIGER, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; J.L. Norwood, Respondents.

487 F.Supp.2d 1155

Ronald Earl GEIGER, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; J.L. Norwood, Respondents.

No. CV 06 2218 CAS (RC).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

May 11, 2007.

Ronald Earl Geiger, Adelanto, CA, pro se.

Brent A. Whittlesey, AUSA — Office of US Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondents.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SNYDER, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28. U.S.C. Section 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition and other papers along with the attached Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman, as well as petitioner's objections, and has made a de novo determination.

IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Report and Recommendation is approved and adopted; (2) the Report and Recommendation is adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law herein; and (3) Judgment shall be entered denying the habeas corpus petition and dismissing the action with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve copies of this Order, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and Judgment by the United States mail on the parties.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CHAPMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Christina A. Snyder, United States District Judge, by Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 01-13 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

BACKGROUND

I

Petitioner Ronald Earl Geiger was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska of malicious destruction of a vehicle used in and affecting interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), using and carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and possession of a destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(c). United States v. Geiger, 263 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001).¹ "He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus a term of 30 years" and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $17,902.97 to USAA Insurance, a private party. Id. The restitution was due "in full immediately," with "any unpaid portion of restitution [to] be paid during incarceration and thereafter during and as a condition of supervised release in a payment or payments to be determined by the probation officer and the U.S. Attorney." Declaration of Marisa J. Davidson ¶ 4, Exh. 1. The petitioner's judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal. Geiger, 263 F.3d at 1041.

While petitioner was imprisoned in the United States Prison in Lompoc, California, he agreed to participate in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP"), 28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10-545.11, and specifically agreed that commencing October 1999, 50% of his monthly UNICOR² pay would be paid toward his restitution. Davidson Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 3. Subsequently, on May 11, 2004, petitioner refused to continue paying the same 50% of his monthly UNICOR pay toward his restitution, and he was placed on "IFRP refuse status." Id. ¶ 7, Exh. 4. Following petitioner's transfer to the United States Prison in Victorville, California, petitioner refused to pay $25.00 a quarter toward his restitution, and petitioner remained on "IFRP refuse status" through at least March 22, 2006. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, Exhs. 5-6.

II

On April 12, 2006, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the application of IFRP to him, anda on June 20, 2006, respondent answered the petition. On July 6, 2006, petitioner filed a reply or traverse.

The pending petition raises the following grounds for relief:

Ground One: "False and fraudulent misrepresentation of statutory authority for the [IFRP]."

Ground Two: "BOP's³ IFRP usurps the judicial power of the United States and administratively enhances Petitioner's court-imposed sentence." (footnote added).

Ground Three: "The BOP, its agencies, agents and employees are breaching their fiduciary duties as trustees of Petitioner's personal trust funds."

Ground Four: "BOP, its agencies, agents and employees are unlawfully acting as debt collectors" in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990.

Ground Five: "The BOP, its agencies, agents and employees are engaging in statutorily prohibited, unfair debt collection practices" in violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Petition at 3-4(b).

On September 15, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and on November 13, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking a decision in his habeas corpus proceeding.⁴ For the reasons set forth herein, petitioner's motions for judgment on the pleadings and his habeas corpus petition are denied without merit; thus, the petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed as moot.

DISCUSSION

III

The Inmate Financial Responsibility Program is "a work-program instituted by [BOP] to encourage `each sentenced inmate to meet his or her legitimate financial obligations.' The program provides for development of a financial plan that allows inmates to pay certain enumerated obligations, including court-ordered assessments, restitutions, and fines." Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 548 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1091, 119 S.Ct. 1505, 143 L.Ed.2d 657 (1999); 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. "Technically, participation in [IFRP] is `voluntary' and the BOP cannot take any assets or funds unless petitioner assents to that transaction. However, petitioner faces sanctions if he does not `volunteer' to participate in this program, or make `voluntary' payments in an amount to be determined by the BOP, or `consent' to the BOP's unilateral decision to increase the amount of those required payments." Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F.Supp. 1398, 1400 (D.Or.1998), affirmed by, 172 F.3d 57 (9th Cir.1999) (Unpublished Disposition); 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d).

The petitioner raises several challenges to IFRP in his habeas corpus petition, and the Court has tried to understand these claims although some of them are not very clear. In particular, the Court finds Ground One, which claims "[f]alse and fraudulent representation of statutory authority for [IFRP,]" with its citation to multiple other authorities, such as Program Statement 5380.07,⁵ 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(d), 558(a), and 558(b), and Freedom. of Information Act ("FOIA"),⁶ to be unclear. However, reading Grounds Three, Four and Five together, petitioner broadly claims BOP has violated its fiduciary duty to him by unlawfully acting as a debt collector and engaging in unfair debt collection practices. There is no merit to these claims.

The IFRP has been held to have been "properly enacted in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act." James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 631 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 870, 110 S.Ct. 197, 107 L.Ed.2d 151 (1989), and "has been upheld generally, and against constitutional due process challenges." Montano-Figueroa, 162 F.3d at 549 (citations omitted); Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 360 (6th Cir.20011, cert. dismissed, 535 U.S. 967, 122 S.Ct. 1433, 152 L.Ed.2d 377 (2002); see also Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (BOP "has not exceeded its statutory authority, nor departed from its own regulations, by administering [IFRP,]" which is "fully consistent with [BOP's] authorization, under the direction of the Attorney General, to provide for rehabilitation and reformation."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819, 111 S.Ct. 63, 112 L.Ed.2d 38 (1990). Moreover, IFRP "serves a valid penological objective of rehabilitation by facilitating repayment of debts." Johnpoll, 898 F.2d at 850; see also James, 866 F.2d at 630 (IFRP "would appear to be reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in encouraging inmates to rehabilitate themselves by developing a sense of financial responsibility."); Phillips v. Booker, 76 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1192 (D.Kan.1999) [T]he Attorney General has been given statutory authority to provide for the proper government, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation of all federal inmates. The specific statutory authority has, in turn, been delegated to the [BOP].... [¶] The [IFRP] ... falls within the [BOP's] authority to provide for rehabilitation and reformation of federal inmates. ... (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The petitioner's general claims to the contrary provide no grounds to deviate from past precedent. For instance, although petitioner claims in Grounds Four and Five that BOP has violated the Fair Debt Collection Procedures Act ("FDCPA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3008, and Section 1692g of the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, neither is applicable to IFRP. Here, petitioner was ordered to pay restitution to USAA Insurance, a private entity, under the Victim and Witness Protection Act ("the Victim Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(1)(1993), and the FDCPA⁷ "does not affect the government's capacity under the [Victim Act] to collect restitution owed to private parties." Goist v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 2002 WL 32079467, *2 (D.S.C.), affirmed by, 54 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1047, 123 S.Ct. 2111, 155 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2003). Similarly, CCPA is inapplicable because BOP is not a "debt collector" within the meaning of CCPA and federal criminal restitution is not a "debt" under CCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), (6)(C); United States v. Morgan, 2006 WL 2168173, *6 n.7 (N.D.Ind.); see also Eidson v. Harper, 2004 WL 2976675, *4 (N.D.Tex.) (CCPA "excludes United States employees from the definition of `debt collectors"; therefore, inmate's CCPA challenge to the IFRP is without merit), adopted by, 2005 WL 106570 (N.D.Tex.); Goist, 2002 WL 32079467 at *2 ("CCPA only applies to debts `of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which...