Mujahid v. Crabtree, CV-97-1661-AS.

Decision Date08 April 1998
Docket NumberNo. CV-97-1661-AS.,CV-97-1661-AS.
Citation999 F.Supp. 1398
PartiesSabil M. MUJAHID, Petitioner, v. Joseph H. CRABTREE, Warden, FCI, Sheridan, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon

Christopher J. Schatz, Federal Public Defender's Office, Portland, OR, for Petitioner.

Kenneth C. Bauman, Asst. U.S. Atty's Office, Portland, OR, for Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

ASHMANSKAS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner Sabil M. Mujahid, an inmate at FCI Sheridan, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent has moved to dismiss. All parties have consented to allow a Magistrate Judge to enter final orders and judgment in this case in accordance with FRCP 73 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

BACKGROUND

On September 29, 1995, in the District of Alaska, petitioner was sentenced to a term of 120 months imprisonment, to be followed by a term of three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a $1500.00 fine and a special assessment of $50.00. In its written Judgment In A Criminal Case ("Judgment"), the district court directed that $50 of this obligation was due immediately, with the balance to be paid "in installments to commence 30 day(s) after the date of this judgment." Judgment (Respondent's Answer, Ex. A, p. 14.) The form of judgment listed two alternatives that were not selected by the court. The first would have required the entire sum to be paid by a date certain. The second alternative would have established a schedule of fixed payments at specified intervals. Id.

The Judgment also provided that:

In the event the entire amount of criminal monetary penalties imposed is not paid prior to the commencement of supervision, the U.S. probation officer shall pursue collection of the amount due, and shall request the court to establish a payment schedule if appropriate ...

* * * * * *

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise in the special instructions above, if this judgment imposes a period of imprisonment payment of criminal monetary penalties shall be due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalty payments are to be made to the United States Courts National Fine Center ... except those payments made through the Bureau of Prison's Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. If the National Fine Center is not operating in this district, all criminal monetary penalty payments are to be made as directed by the court, the probation officer, or the United States attorney.

Id.

Following imposition of sentence, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") sent petitioner to reside at the federal correctional institution at Sheridan, Oregon. Shortly after arriving at FCI Sheridan, petitioner was given the option of "voluntarily" enlisting in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP") or else suffering a long list of sanctions.

If petitioner enlisted in the program, the BOP would take funds from his prison account and apply them toward the outstanding balance on his fine, fee assessment, and any other obligations of petitioner including court costs, court-ordered restitution, "[s]tate or local court obligations" or "[o]ther federal government obligations." 28 C.F.R. § 545.11. These latter categories seemingly include anything from child support obligations to defaulted student loans or income taxes.

The regulations fix the minimum "payment" at $25.00 per quarter, but the BOP may unilaterally increase that amount. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b)(1). If petitioner was assigned grades 1 through 4 in UNICOR (the jobs program at the prison), the BOP would take "not less than 50%" of his monthly pay and could unilaterally increase that amount. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b)(2). The regulations allow the BOP to demand "payment" from both "institution resources" (e.g., funds obtained from prison employment) as well as "non-institution resources" which include any funds that petitioner receives from sources such as his family. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b). The regulation is worded broadly enough that it may also allow the BOP to demand payment from any assets petitioner has outside of prison.

Technically, participation in the program is "voluntary" and the BOP cannot take any assets or funds unless petitioner assents to that transaction. However, petitioner faces sanctions if he does not "volunteer" to participate in this program, or make "voluntary" payments in an amount to be determined by the BOP, or "consent" to the BOP's unilateral decision to increase the amount of those required payments. The consequences of refusing to "volunteer" are clearly spelled out in 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d):

(d) Effects of non-participation. Refusal by an inmate to participate in the financial responsibility program or to comply with the provisions of his financial plan ordinarily shall result in the following:

(1) Where applicable, the Parole Commission will be notified of the inmate's failure to participate;

(2) The inmate will not receive any furlough (other than possibly an emergency furlough);

(3) The inmate will not receive performance pay above the maintenance pay level, or bonus pay, or vacation pay;

(4) The inmate will not be assigned to any work detail outside the secure perimeter of the facility;

(5) The inmate will not be placed in UNICOR. Any inmate assigned to UNICOR who fails to make adequate progress on his/her financial plan will be removed from UNICOR, and once removed, may not be placed on a UNICOR waiting list for six months. Any exceptions to this require approval of the Warden;

(6) The inmate will not be permitted to purchase any items in excess of the monthly spending limitation, including special purchase items like sports equipment, hobby crafts, etc.;

(7) The inmate will be quartered in the lowest housing status (dormitory, double bunking, etc.);

(8) The inmate will not be placed in a community-based program;

(9) The inmate will not receive a release gratuity unless approved by the Warden.

(10) [Reserved]

(11) The inmate will not receive an incentive for participation in residential drug treatment programs.1

Petitioner refused to enroll in the IFRP program, or agree to make the payments required of participants in that program, because the obligation imposed "did not conform to my understanding as to what I had been ordered to pay by the Alaska District Court" and because "it was my understanding that, were I to agree to participate in the IFRP, the amount to be paid toward my fine would be set by BOP personnel and that the amount set could be increased above the installment payment amount established by the judgment in my case" which petitioner believes to be "$12.91 per month over the term of my incarceration." Mujahid Decl., ¶ 3.

The petition, which was filed pro se, asks that respondent "be enjoined [from] acting as a collection agency for the court in setting [the] time, conditions and amounts of petitioner's payments of fine and manner thereof, i.e., lump sum or by installments through policy statement § 5380.1 and/or title 28 C.F.R. § 545.10 or § 545.11."

Petitioner's argument is further developed in a subsequent memorandum filed after counsel was appointed to represent him. The essence of petitioner's claim is that decisions such as the amount of the installments that he should pay and their timing is a core judicial function that, under Article III, are committed to the courts and cannot be delegated to nonjudicial officers such as the BOP. Consequently, the BOP is overstepping its constitutional authority by purporting to make such decisions and by sanctioning inmates for resisting its unlawful directives. Finally, petitioner contends that respondent's actions are interfering with the installment payment schedule established by the Alaska District Court.

DISCUSSION
1. § 2255 or § 2241

If petitioner was challenging the terms of his sentence, the proper vehicle would be a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition filed in the District of Alaska where he was sentenced. However, as I read this petition, he is merely contesting the manner in which his sentence is being carried out, or asserting that the BOP has taken action inconsistent with the terms of that sentence and in excess of its authority. Therefore, this petition was properly filed in this District, where petitioner is incarcerated, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

2. Mootness, Ripeness, Standing

Respondent argues that this challenge is moot because petitioner has refused to participate in the program. I disagree. At the outset, I question respondent's characterization of the question as one of mootness. Instead, the thrust of respondent's argument appears to be that petitioner lacks standing or that the issue is not ripe. I reject both arguments.

To satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article III, which is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that:

(1) he or she has suffered (or is about to suffer) an "injury in fact": an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of: the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and

(3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

As a consequence of his refusal to enroll in the IFRP, petitioner has been subject to the list of sanctions2 described 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d). Not every sanction on the list has actually been applied to him (since, for instance, he has not yet been released and thus has not had the opportunity to have his release gratuity withheld). However, it is undisputed that at least some of these sanctions have...

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  • Weinberger v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • 21 Octubre 1999
    ...claim to be the overall amount of restitution rather than the means by which it is to be accomplished. 16. See Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F.Supp. 1398, 1403 (D.Or.1998) (finding collection activities, establishing and modifying payment schedule for criminal monetary payments are not essential......
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    ...1113 (E.D.Ark.1999). Moreover, there is no function to be served by further development of the factual record. See Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F.Supp. 1398, 1399 (D.Or. 1998) aff'd, 172 F.3d 57 (9th Cir.1999, Table). For these reasons, the court declines to dismiss this action for failure to e......
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    • 11 Mayo 2007
    ...by the BOP, or `consent' to the BOP's unilateral decision to increase the amount of those required payments." Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F.Supp. 1398, 1400 (D.Or.1998), affirmed by, 172 F.3d 57 (9th Cir.1999) (Unpublished Disposition); 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d). The petitioner raises several chal......
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    • 2 Diciembre 2011
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