Geletka v. Radcliff

• Decision Date: 21 July 2022
• Docket Number: 110988
• Citation: 2022 Ohio 2497
• Parties: MICHAEL GELETKA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL RADCLIFF, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2022-Ohio-2497

MICHAEL GELETKA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL RADCLIFF, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 110988

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga

July 21, 2022

Civil Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court Case No. 20CVF01601 ^[1]

James E. Boulas Co., L.P.A., and James E. Boulas, for appellee.

Law Offices at Pinecrest and David A. Corrado, for appellant.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Michael Radcliff ("Radcliff") appeals the trial court's decision to grant plaintiff-appellee Michael Geletka's ("Geletka") motion for summary judgment, the dismissal of Radcliffs counterclaims, and the dismissal of Geletka's breach-of-contract claim. We affirm the trial court's decision.

{¶ 2} Geletka and Radcliff had an agreement for the replacement of Radcliffs roof. On June 2, 2020, Geletka filed a pro se small-claims complaint against Radcliff alleging that Radcliff owed him a cancellation fee. On July 8, 2020, in response, Radcliff filed a counterclaim alleging that Geletka violated the Ohio Home Solicitation Sales Act ("HSSA") and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act ("CSPA"). Radcliff also accused Geletka of fraud and defamation, and sought a declaratory judgment. Both Geletka and Radcliff moved for summary judgment. On October 15, 2021, the trial court granted both motions and dismissed the entire case.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} Radcliff, a former neighbor of Geletka for 15 years purchased a home around the corner from Geletka that sustained some hail damage to the roof. On April 10, 2020 Radcliff and Geletka met at Radcliffs home, where they inspected the damage to the roof. Geletka advised Radcliff that there was sufficient damage to the roof to file an insurance claim with Radcliffs homeowner's insurance company. According to Geletka, Radcliff did not disclose to him nor to the insurance company that the roof sustained prior damage that caused leaks.

{¶ 4} On the same day as the inspection, Radcliff signed an authorization for Geletka to communicate with the insurance company for the purpose of obtaining a payout to repair the damage to the roof. According to Radcliff, Geletka owned and operated a roofing company called Independent Roofing & Gutters ("IRG"). Radcliff claimed that IRG is an unregistered company that was not permitted to perform roof repairs in the city of Parma. Radcliff also claimed that IRG did not provide proof of insurance that would cover any work performed on the property.

{¶ 5} Despite this, Radcliff claimed that Geletka pressured him to sign a contract, agreeing that Geletka would repair his roof. According to Radcliff, the agreement did not contain the cost of services or how payment was to be remitted to Geletka. Radcliff claimed that the agreement stated that Geletka, as the sole employee of the business, would be the only contractor to perform the work. In addition, the agreement also contained a cancellation clause in the event that Radcliff used another contractor stating that a cancellation fee of $1,000 plus 30 percent of replacement cost value approved by Radcliff s insurance company would be assessed by IRG. Radcliff also claimed that the agreement failed to include any statement on his right to cancel as required by the HSSA.

{¶ 6} However, Geletka claimed that Radcliff did not expect Geletka to physically do the roof repairs himself. Geletka maintained that he was going to contract the work out to someone else. Both Geletka and Radcliff agreed that Radcliffs insurance company approved Radcliffs claim, and Radcliff contacted another company to complete the work, because they offered a better warranty. Geletka claimed that Radcliff texted him that Geletka's efforts would not go uncompensated.

{¶ 7} On June 2, 2020, Geletka filed a small claims complaint, arguing that Radcliff owed him a cancellation fee. On June 18, 2020, Radcliff sent Geletka an email stating that he was cancelling any agreement he had with Geletka concerning his property under the HSSA. On July 7, 2020, Radcliff filed his answer to Geletka's complaint and a counterclaim alleging that Geletka violated both the HSSA and the CSPA. In Radcliffs counterclaim, he also accused Geletka of fraud, defamation, and having an affair with Radcliffs wife. Geletka argued that Radcliff is not married.

{¶ 8} On July 30, 2020, Geletka offered to dismiss his complaint if Radcliff would dismiss his counterclaim. Geletka argued to Radcliff that Radcliff had not paid him any money. Radcliff did not respond to the offer. On February 4, 2021, Geletka filed a motion for summary judgment on Radcliffs counterclaim. On September 2, 2021, Radcliff filed a motion for summary judgment on Geletka's complaint. On October 15, 2021, the trial court granted both motions and dismissed the entire case.

{¶ 9} In its journal entry, the trial court stated:

For the reasons set forth in "plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to defendant's counterclaim" filed on February 4, 2021, said motion is granted. Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed.

For the reasons set for in "defendant's motion for summary judgment" filed on September 2, 2021, at page 5, this court finds this case involves "a single cause of action based on a written contract that admittedly does not exist." As such, plaintiffs case is dismissed.

Case dismissed. Counterclaim dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective costs.

Final. No just cause for delay.

Journal Book, p. 301-200 (Oct. 13, 2021).

{¶10} Radcliff filed this appeal and assigned three errors for our review:

I. The trial court committed reversible error in awarding Geletka's summary judgment on Radcliffs counterclaims because he failed to carry his burden as the moving party and point to specific evidence establishing there were no genuine issues of material fact;

II. The trial court committed reversible error by summarily awarding Geletka's summary judgment on Radcliffs counterclaims without considering Radcliffs opposing brief and evidentiary quality material, which met his reciprocal burden as the nonmoving party, and which raised genuine issues of material fact and warranted the granting of judgment in favor of Radcliff; and

III. Radcliff submitted evidentiary quality materials that warranted the granting of judgment in favor of Radcliff on his counterclaims.

{¶ 11} For clarity and ease of discussion, we will address the assignment of errors together.

II. Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 12} Appellate review of summary judgments is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his or her favor. Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196 (1995), paragraph three of the syllabus; Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998).

{¶ 13} The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential elements of the case with evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). Once the moving party demonstrates entitlement to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence related to any issue on which the party bears the burden of production at trial. Civ.R. 56(E).

B. Law and Analysis

{¶ 14} In Radcliffs first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred when it granted Geletka's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Radcliff contends that in Geletka's complaint, he did not reference any evidence to demonstrate the absence of a material fact. The trial court dismissed the case and counterclaims, stating that a written contract does not exist.

{¶ 15} "In order for a valid contract to exist, there must be mutual assent, an offer and acceptance of the offer, and consideration." Butcher v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81593, 2003-Ohio-1734, ¶ 28, citing Nilavar v. Osborn, 127 Ohio App.3d 1, 711 N.E.2d 726 (1998). "An enforceable contract requires these elements to be met; therefore, if there is no meeting of the minds, the contract has not been formed." Id., citing McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Haiman Co. L.PA. v. First Union Mgt, 87 Ohio App.3d 613, 622 N.E.2d 1093 (May 6, 1993).

{¶ 16} "The definition of 'consideration' is that a promisor received something of value in exchange for what was given up. If there is no consideration, a promise is illusory and void." Id. at ¶ 30, citing Floss v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000). Geletka did not receive anything of value from Radcliff, because there was no consideration. Thus, a contract between Radcliff and Geletka did not exist. Geletka never performed any work for Radcliff, and Radcliff never paid for Geletka's service. Therefore, the trial court did not err in deciding that a contract did not exist between the parties.

{¶ 17} Radcliff also argues that he provided relevant evidence to demonstrate that the contract failed to properly include any statement on the buyer's right to cancel as required by R.C. 1345.23(B)(1) of the HSSA, which states:

In connection with every home solicitation sale:

(1) The following statement shall appear clearly and conspicuously on the copy of the contract left with the buyer in bold-face type of the minimum size of ten points, in substantially the following form and in immediate

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