Gem State Lumber Co. v. Cameron

• Decision Date: 30 July 1927
• Docket Number: 4665
• Parties: GEM STATE LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent, v. EDWARD CAMERON and MAUDE CAMERON, Husband and Wife, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

258 P. 539

44 Idaho 595

GEM STATE LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent, v. EDWARD CAMERON and MAUDE CAMERON, Husband and Wife, Appellants

No. 4665

Supreme Court of Idaho

July 30, 1927

MECHANICS' LIENS-LACK OF IDENTIFYING PROPERTY IN DESCRIPTION-INSUFFICIENCY OF CLAIM OF LIEN.

Claim of lien on that certain building now on described lot does not contain a description sufficient for identification of the property to be charged, as required by C. S., sec. 7346 there being more than one building on the lot.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, for Blaine County. Hon. H. F. Ensign, Judge.

Action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. Judgment for plaintiff. Modified.

Cause remanded, with directions, with costs to appellants.

W. A Brodhead, for Appellants.

The claim of lien as filed and recorded is insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim against the interest of these answering defendants. (2 Jones on Liens, 2d ed., sec 1397; White v. Mullins, 3 Idaho 434, 31 P. 801; Steele v. Argentine Min. Co., 4 Idaho 505, 95 Am St. 144, 42 P. 585; Malter v. Falcon Min. Co., 18 Nev. 209, 2 P. 50; Galveston Exhibition Assn. v. Perkins, 80 Tex. 62, 15 S.W. 633; Blattner v. Wadleigh, 48 Kan. 290, 29 P. 165; Wyman v. Quayles, 9 Wyo. 326, 63 P. 988.)

If a lien may be enforced in this state upon a building separate from the land, then in this case the description on the building contained in the claim of lien is not sufficient for identification. (27 Cyc. 163; 2 Jones on Liens, 2d ed., secs. 1422, 1424; Roose v. Billingsley & N.C. Co., 74 Iowa 51, 36 N.W. 885.)

In Idaho a materialman's lien cannot be enforced on the building separate and apart from the real estate. (2 Jones on Liens, 2d ed., secs. 1373, 1384; Kellogg v. Little & Smythe Mfg. Co., 1 Wash. 407, 25 P. 461; Front St. Cable Co. v. Johnson, 2 Wash. 112, 25 P. 1084, 11 L. R. A. 693; Keel v. Ingersol, 27 Okla. 117, 111 P. 214; Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713; Toner v. Whybrew, 50 Ind.App. 387, 98 N.E. 450; Leaver v. Kilmer, 71 N.J.L. 291, 59 A. 643.)

J. G. Hedrick, for Respondent.

"Every person who furnishes materials to be used in the construction of any building has a lien upon the same for the materials furnished." (C. S., secs. 7339, 7344.)

"Where a building is constructed in a permanent manner upon land it becomes a part thereof, but if it is constructed with a lien thereon, it becomes a part of such land subject to the lien." (Linck v. Meikeljohn, 2 Cal.App. 506, 84 P. 309; Humboldt Lumber Co. v. Crisp, 146 Cal. 686, 106 Am. St. 75, 81 P. 31; Stritzel-Spaberg Lumber Co. v. Edwards, 50 Mont. 49, 144 P. 772; Morrow v. Dahl, 66 Mont. 251, 213 P. 602.)

"It was the intent of the mechanic's lien law to grant an absolute lien upon the property, to persons who perform labor or furnish materials to be used in the building or improving such structure.

"The purpose of such statute is to compensate a man who furnishes materials to be used in the construction, alteration or repair of a building or structure." (McGill v. McAdoo, 35 Idaho 283, 206 P. 1057; Stritzel-Spaberg Lumber Co. v. Edwards, supra.)

BRINCK, Commissioner. Varian and McNaughton, CC., concur.

OPINION

BRINCK, Commissioner.--

Plaintiff furnished material for the building of a granary upon land then in the possession of defendants Simpson, they being the vendees of the land under an executory contract of sale from defendants Cameron who held legal title. Plaintiff's contract was only with the Simpsons. After the building was erected, the Simpsons made default in the payment of deferred instalments of the purchase price for the land and the Camerons terminated the contract. The plaintiff in due time, after the furnishing of the materials, filed for record a claim of lien upon the building and the land upon which it is situated for the amount owing it for the materials furnished and brought this action to foreclose the lien, making both the Simpsons and Camerons defendants. The Simpsons made no appearance and suffered a default to be entered, but the defendants Cameron defended upon the theory that no lien could be claimed against their interest in the property and also that the claim of lien was defective. It was conceded by the plaintiff at the trial that its evidence was not sufficient to authorize the fixing of the lien upon the land but that the lien could properly be allowed only upon the building. The trial court entered a judgment for the plaintiff against the Simpsons for the amount of plaintiff's claim, adjudging that the amount thereof constituted a lien upon the granary and ordered that the building be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment. From the judgment...